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ABSTRACT 
POSITIONING GUGLIELMO MARCONI’S WIRELESS:  A RHETORICAL 
ANALYSIS OF AN EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY TECHNOLOGY 
Aaron Antonio Toscano 
July 7, 2006 
 This dissertation is a rhetorical analysis of Guglielmo Marconi’s wireless.  Texts 
surrounding the invention reveal intersections between technology and society and 
communicate information about the wireless through tropes of progress.  The wireless 
was seen as a monumental early twentieth-century technology that would change the 
world by extending communication potential.  This dissertation demonstrates that the 
wireless was created rhetorically before it existed as a black-box technology.  Marconi’s 
technical texts, popular press articles, and F. T. Marinetti’s reinscriptions are discourses 
where the wireless existed rhetorically.  To borrow Charles Bazerman’s definition, the 
rhetoric of technology deals with the ideology surrounding “objects of the built 
environment”; a culture’s attitudes and values help shape the technologies produced by a 
society.  Technologies do not become realized without adhering to a society’s values, 
attitudes, and practices.  A system of mass communication existed in the early twentieth 
century (telegraph and telephone wires), but, almost more importantly, the public was 
conditioned to embrace new technologies for the sake of human advancement.  Texts 
surrounding the wireless’s creation show that certain conditions of modernity—speed, 
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efficiency, evolution, and ahistoricity—appear as tropes of progress in wireless rhetoric.  
The non-mechanical factors that create or allow a technology to become realized are 
found in (re)presentations that show the wireless as a product in according with 
prevailing cultural values. 
 This dissertation is divided into four chapters.  Chapter I reviews literature on 
Science, Technology, and Society studies that offers a theoretical framework for 
analyzing the wireless as a product of modernity.  Chapter II examines three important 
presentations (reprinted in technical journals) Marconi gave to the technical community 
that demonstrate four topoi in Marconi’s rhetoric of the wireless—cultural pride 
associated with advancement/evolution, expectations and current successes, economic 
viability, and patents showing Marconi’s ownership.  Chapter III analyzes the rhetoric 
used by pro-Marconi journalists in American periodicals that construct the wireless in the 
popular press.  Chapter IV explains how “progress” was embedded into Western 
industrial cultures.  Specifically, the chapter demonstrates how the wireless and other 
technologies fit F.T. Marinetti’s love of “progressive” technologies, which was an 
exaggeration of industrial cultures’ fascination with new advancements.
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CROSSING THE ATLANTIC SENZA FILI 
As Sir Oliver Lodge has stated, [using wireless signals to cross the 
Atlantic] was an epoch in history.  I now felt for the first time absolutely 
certain that the day would come when mankind would be able to send 
messages without wires not across the Atlantic but between the 
farthermost ends of the earth.  Guglielmo Marconi, “Messages Without 
Wires” (32) 
 
Guglielmo Marconi first made international headlines when he successfully sent 
and received wireless signals across the English Channel on March 27, 1899.  This 
significant event marked the first international wireless communication.  Many important 
English and French journalists observed the event and promoted Marconi as an 
international celebrity much like Thomas A. Edison and Alexander Graham Bell.  Less 
than three years after crossing the English Channel, Marconi solidified his celebrity status 
by transmitting wireless signals across the Atlantic Ocean on December 12, 1901.  
Newspapers around the world reported what had happened between Poldhu in Cornwall, 
England and Signal Hill in St. John’s, Newfoundland—the Atlantic Ocean had been 
crossed without using wires.  Marconi was awarded the Nobel Prize for Physics in 1909 
for his work in wireless communication. 
Marconi was a technologist with a shrewd business sense and enough electrical 
engineering skill to represent the wireless as an important advancement in science and 
technology (Bucci, Pelosi, and Selleri; Corazza; Crowther; Garratt; Jensen; Kraeuter; D. 
Marconi and M. Marconi; Sungook; Tarrant).  Marconi used towers, balloons, and other 
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related wireless components he compiled or improved in order to physically construct his 
invention.  However, Marconi represented the wireless through charts and scientific and 
engineering discourse to the electrical engineering community.  Through this discourse, 
Marconi proposed the wireless as a possible new technology.  He had to appeal to the 
audience’s values—rigorous scientific practice, need for detail, potential impact—in 
order to show that the wireless was a viable technology. 
 Marconi’s invention demonstrates that technological advances are not merely 
created out of thin air.  Technologies are inventions and innovations created by physical, 
rhetorical, and mechanical actions.  Also, a technology is both a product and 
distinguishing characteristic of any historical context:  Social conditions help create new 
technologies, and society itself is shaped by these contexts (Feenburg; Giddens; Lomask; 
Nye).  To understand how technologies become realities, we must examine how they are 
promoted, negotiated, and constructed.  While technological blueprints show how a 
technology is schematically represented, they do little to reference the historical and 
cultural context in which the technology was created.  Also, understanding the social 
situations present during a technology’s creation allows us to discover the relations 
between science, technology, and society. 
 For the past four decades, many scholars have critically analyzed the rhetoric, 
philosophy, history, and sociology of technology and science in order to demonstrate the 
social construction of scientific knowledge and technical artifacts.  This work falls under 
the broad category of Science, Technology, and Society (STS) studies.  STS seeks to 
understand technology and science from a cultural perspective by investigating both 
discursive and physical situations that surround engineers or scientists making 
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“discoveries.”  The field also recognizes that technologies and sciences do not come from 
laboratories isolated from society; instead, for technologies or sciences to be realized, 
they must fit or be made to fit within established cultural values and practices.  STS 
attempts to demonstrate how ideological and individual values negotiate which 
discoveries become realities. 
 Although STS can be separated into special emphases such as historical, 
sociological, or philosophical analyses of technology and science, it generally shares the 
belief that technology and science are constructed based on social values and through 
social interaction.  Rhetoric is important for the field because new “discoveries” are 
presented to various audiences not just as physical apparatus but also as discourse.  
Regardless of specific focus, rhetorical analyses of technology or science aim to uncover 
the methods and tactics used to construct the reality or image of a new discovery.  
Because social values appear within technological contexts, we can “read” the semiotics 
of technology as we can read other semiotic systems.  As Charles Bazerman argues, 
“[t]he invention is legally not a physical entity.  It is a symbolic representation—a text 
representing an idea” (The Languages of Edison's Light 91).  Bazerman does not just 
mean patent documents are the texts symbolically representing an invention; any 
discourse—for instance, Marconi’s presentations—is a “symbolic representation” that 
also acts as an “ideologically saturated” medium. 
 Beyond the ideologically saturated words an inventor/author uses to describe any 
technology is the technology itself, which is often simply an idea swirling in a dialectical 
frenzy of social, rhetorical, and physical negotiations.  Texts and speech acts enable 
audiences to interpret, reinterpret, and question the need for the technologies that enter 
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their culture.  People learn about technologies not only by actually working with them but 
by interacting with their representations.  Bazerman points out that “technology has 
always been fundamentally designed to meet human ends,” but adhering to those ends 
requires “technology, as a human-made object,” to be “articulated in language and at the 
very heart of rhetoric” (“The Production of Technology” 383).  The wireless was a 
technology conceived by an audience through discourse before users encountered the 
physical “black box.”  A realized technology is a “black box”—a technology about which 
debate has ceased—which is Latour’s metaphor, developed from the term cyberneticians 
use to signal whenever a piece of machinery or set of commands is too complex, that 
describes scientists and engineers’ approaches to “established” facts (Science in Action 2-
3).  Any science that is a black box is assumed to be unalterable.  Scientists and engineers 
risk devoting too many laboratory resources if they attempt to debunk or simply 
reexamine black boxes.  Once a black box is established, new science can be constructed 
based on the premises held by a black box. 
 This rhetorical analysis examines how Guglielmo Marconi’s wireless became 
realized as a product of modernity.  The wireless eventually became the black-boxed 
radio, a fully realized technology, but, before it did, Marconi presented this monumental 
technology to technical and scientific audiences, journalists re-presented the wireless in 
favorable popular press articles, and F. T. Marinetti reinscribed the wireless into early 
Futurist aesthetics along with other “progressive” technologies.  In this dissertation, I 
limit my examination to favorable representations of the wireless in order to concentrate 
on how authors attempt to excite their readers or convince them that Marconi’s wireless 
was an important reality. 
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 My research into Marconi’s contemporary discourse and rhetoric provides 
examples of how “progress” and related attributes accompanied most descriptions of the 
wireless.  In fact, being labeled “progressive” in industrial cultures meant that a 
technology, individual, or nation was advanced economically, evolutionarily, and even 
militarily.  New products had progress labels affixed by inventors, writers, marketers, and 
users.  The discovery I find most interesting from my research is that the discursive 
images of technologies create the sense that the technologies physically exist.  Often 
times, though, the representations are merely projections of a technology’s possibilities.  
When these images become believed and reported, the technology seems to exist before a 
viable product makes it to the marketplace.  Investors, consumers, or readers must believe 
in a technology’s viability before it can be said to exist.  Marconi’s wireless existed as an 
idea prior to his major commercial success.  It was a compilation of gadgets from other 
inventors working on similar wireless systems.  Much of Marconi’s positioning of the 
wireless is marketing, but the wireless’ rhetoric holds cultural values as well. 
Currently, there are no rhetorical analyses of Marconi’s wireless invention.  Most 
research on Marconi has been in the form of biographical sketches of his life (Corazza; 
Garrat; D. Marconi; M. Marconi; Sungook; Tarrant) or historical accounts of the wireless 
as the precursor to radios and related communication technologies (Bucci, Pelosi, and 
Selleri; Crowther; Jensen; Kraeuter; Tarrant).  The historical and biographical scholarship 
on Marconi’s wireless describes the wireless in a detailed time-line fashion and portrays 
Marconi as a genius inventor.  While such studies are important for narrating the 
wireless’s physical construction and Marconi’s life (I rely on both in my study), they 
perpetuate the “lone inventor” myth.  While I acknowledge the fallacy, I choose to 
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concentrate on the positive representations of his particular commercial invention as a 
way to uncover the time period’s attitudes and values.  He was not the sole inventor, but 
he was, arguably, the most important historically.  The existing research credits Marconi 
with bringing a monumental technology to life, and this work is useful for understanding 
the historical significance of Marconi’s wireless.  Research has been done on the effects 
of radio on particular communities after the wireless became entrenched in national (and 
world) infrastructure (Squier; Patnode; Rutland).  But no rhetorical analysis has been 
done on the wireless and only recently has anyone examined the relationship between the 
wireless and modernist aesthetics (c.f. Campbell).  Finally, no scholarship considers what 
cultural work the wireless did based on contemporary descriptions.  Therefore, my 
project focuses on the wireless’s rhetoric and adherence to cultural values. 
In order to have a sound theoretical framework from which to argue the wireless’s 
social, rhetorical, and aesthetic values, Chapter I reviews important STS theories and case 
studies that show technology and science to be products of social interaction.  I first 
discuss theorists such as Charles Bazerman, Bruno Latour, and Wiebe E. Bijker who 
argue that groups affix values to new technological advancements.  Next, I explain how 
rhetoric contributes to the non-physical ways in which technologies are constructed for 
audiences.  After all, a technology’s rhetoric helps establish a technology as a product 
congruent to social values, attitudes, and practices.  Because Marconi’s wireless fit the 
early twentieth century’s progressive ideology, I discuss how new technological 
advancements in the twentieth century often conformed to modernist ideals of 
industrialized nations.  These arguments help me demonstrate the importance of 
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rhetorical analyses of technology in general and the rhetoric behind Guglielmo Marconi’s 
wireless specifically. 
Chapter II analyzes the topoi Marconi uses when presenting the wireless to a 
technical audience.  Marconi’s rhetoric promotes the wireless’s viability and necessity for 
members of the Royal Institution and the Royal Society of Arts, London.  Before the 
wireless became the radio, Marconi prophesized its usefulness, linking it to cultural 
values.  The wireless embodies certain industrial traits—speed, efficiency, profitability, 
evolution/advancement—and these technical presentations employ such images.  Even in 
the most technical forum, Marconi promotes cultural pride and includes the wireless’s 
social and economic characteristics alongside discussions of its technical viability.  At the 
time of Marconi’s presentations, the wireless was not yet a major commercial product; 
instead, it was an idea for linking ships at sea, ships to land stations, and even nations 
with one another.  In order to have a successful product, the wireless had to be portrayed 
as possible and progressive.  The need for instant communication had been around for 
nearly 40 years as evidenced by telegraph and telephone technology.  The wireless did 
not replace those technologies, but it did expand the reach of communication and, 
therefore, mass communication.  As an important mouthpiece for the wireless, Marconi 
offered his audiences not the physical product but the idea of a potential product to mark 
human advancement and bolster economic progress. 
 Chapter III demonstrates how Marconi’s wireless was re-presented to audiences 
through favorable popular press articles in American periodicals.  Many journalists 
reconstructed the wireless rhetorically by emphasizing the technology’s exciting 
attributes, industrial value, and profitable potential.  The rhetoric the authors employed 
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closely follows the topoi Marconi used in his presentations to technical and scientific 
audiences.  The articles promote the wireless’s efficiency, profitability, usefulness, and 
other progress markers.  The popular press also portrayed the wireless as a technology 
marking human evolution.  Although the texts I use do not represent all early twentieth-
century audiences, the descriptions are at least suggestive of positive discourse 
concerning the wireless.  After all, the wireless became a successful black box—the 
radio—so the re-presentations suggest how positive accounts of the wireless fit the 
cultural values and attitudes concerning technology in the early twentieth century.  
Progressive ideology of the early twentieth century is entwined with these favorable 
descriptions.  Although these positive popular press accounts were not the only types of 
descriptions about the wireless, they illustrate what Marconi’s contemporaries had to say 
about an ultimately successful technology, an invention heralded as a monumental 
invention from the turn of the last century. 
Chapter IV demonstrates F. T. Marinetti’s glorification of early twentieth-century 
technologies such as the wireless.  Marinetti saw the wireless as an important tool and 
marker of human advancement.  More than any other modernist artist, Marinetti shows 
the “virtues” of new technologies.  Machines appear as muses to Marinetti who fantasizes 
about becoming one.  Such a transformation would make Marinetti the most efficient 
being possible:  By casting aside his human qualities and “softness,” he would be free.  
Marinetti’s art makes use of parole in liberta—words in freedom—to accentuate the 
aesthetic goals of minimalism and telegraphic prose.  He advocates an aesthetic based on 
reducing expressions to the fewest number of words.  Within this minimalist aesthetic, 
Marinetti promotes the speed and efficiency of wireless communication by using words 
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not attached to traditional syntax.  Similarly, Marinetti claims the wireless is an 
inspiration for such a telegraphic style.  Marinetti’s art reconstructs the cultural values of 
industrialization by promoting textual efficiency.  Also, Marinetti glorifies technologies 
for their war potential.  Along with the wireless, Marinetti groups together the following 
technologies he felt defined modernity:  tanks, airplanes, machine guns, and automobiles.  
Unlike other high modernist authors, such as D. H. Lawrence and Virginia Woolf, 
Marinetti values the destructive nature of new modern technologies.  His manifestos 
exaggerate tropes of progress by advocating a love of mechanization. 
In the conclusion, I reiterate how the rhetoric of technology helps establish a 
technology as an artifact in accordance with cultural values.  Even though an inventor or 
team of inventors may actually create a technology, societal forces fuel the technology’s 
development.  Technological descriptions must also follow the discourse community’s 
conventions of rhetoric:  Writers’ descriptions of technologies form and are formed by 
the community’s values and practices (Bazerman; Journet; Latour; Longo; Mercer; 
Myers).  For example, the wireless did not stand alone as a tool with a purely functional 
role; instead, the wireless’s texts show that descriptions demonstrate how the technology 
fit into the culture.  The wireless changed mass communication for the early twentieth 
century (Attwood and Ryecart; Jensen; Tarrant), but first the wireless had to “fit” into 
and define the historical context of a technologically saturated world.  We can locate 
society’s values by examining how others reinterpret the technology through the various 
discourses on the wireless.  This emphasis is not only a concern for STS, but also for 
technical writing scholarship. 
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This dissertation does not attempt to show the physical construction of the 
wireless but to demonstrate how rhetoric created an image of the wireless that related to 
social, economic, scientific, and literary influences.  My focus on the wireless’s rhetorical 
construction demonstrates how early twentieth-century ideology can be read into the 
discourse that promoted the invention as a product of modernity based on a century of 
science.  Technologies do not simply spring from the earth and change society; instead, 
human societies create an environment that allows certain technologies to be developed.  
What follows is part of the wireless’s story. 
10 
CHAPTER I 
SOCIAL VALUES, ATTITUDES, PRACTICES, AND TECHNOLOGY 
What is called Western or modern civilization by way of contrast with the 
civilization of the Orient or medieval times is at bottom a civilization that 
rests upon machinery and science as distinguished from one founded on 
agricultural or handicraft commerce.  It is in reality a technological 
civilization . . . If the records of patent offices, the statistics of production, 
and the reports of laboratories furnish evidence worthy of credence, 
technological civilization, instead of showing signs of contraction, 
threatens to overcome and transform the whole globe.  Charles A. Beard, 
“The Inevitability of the Machine” (97) 
 
The great nineteenth-century positivists . . . imagined that the statements 
of science were going to replace opinions and beliefs about all things . . . 
Our century has been the graveyard of positivist ideas of progress.  Alain 
Badiou, Ethics (84) 
 
 This chapter reviews literature drawn primarily from Science, Technology, and 
Society studies (STS) that supports rhetorical analyses of technology.  Based on these 
STS studies, I plan to make three arguments.  First, using the work of theorists such as 
Charles Bazerman, Bruno Latour, and Wiebe E. Bijker, I argue that technologies are 
created through a complex system of social interactions where groups affix values to new 
technological advancements.  Second, I argue that rhetorical analyses identify the non-
physical ways in which technologies are realized or understood.  Third, I demonstrate 
that social values related to progress have often been affixed to new technological 
advancements in the twentieth century.  In the case of my study of Marconi’s wireless, 
the relevant social groups of the early twentieth century saw the invention as progress, 
modernity’s most powerful “god term” according to Richard Weaver (212), and 
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considered the invention an important human advancement.  Progress or any other value 
is not physically built into an invention; instead, value is rhetorically constructed.  These 
STS arguments enable me to demonstrate the importance of rhetorical analyses of 
technology in general and Guglielmo Marconi’s wireless specifically. 
 The field of STS includes the philosophy of technology, the history of technology, 
and the sociology of technology, as well as the rhetoric of technology, which I consider 
in a later section of this chapter.  Obviously, these theoretical frameworks overlap, but I 
hope to make clear that all are based on examining the socio-political shaping of 
technology.  This work supports my own analysis of Marconi’s wireless as a product that 
held meaning for an audience in an historical moment and was shaped by social 
interactions.  The following descriptions on the frameworks are not meant to be hermetic 
categories but general ideas. 
 The philosophy of technology derives from research analyzing the meaning of 
technology for a culture.  Philosophers of technology argue that technology itself appears 
to be a major context for industrial cultures (Feenburg; Fuller and Collier; Heath and 
Luff; Melzer; Nye; Rescher; Winner).  Arthur M. Melzer argues that humans are defined 
by their tool use:  Homo sapiens are the “the tool-making animal[s]” with “stages of 
civilization differentiated in terms of the tools men have actually made” (111).  Whether 
one examines the Bronze Age or our contemporary Information Age, human societies 
appear to be defined by the major technologies they have at their disposal.  Therefore, 
although technology cannot be said to have caused a prevailing cultural attitude, it exists 
as a defining principle for individuals.  No social structure is “free” of technology’s 
influence; thus, society is governed in some ways by a techno-socio politic.  Basically, 
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the philosophy of technology attempts to answer why humans organize themselves, at 
least in industrial cultures, around technology and the meanings associated with 
technology. 
 The history of technology aims to define an historical moment by its technology 
(determinism) or to discover how an historical moment shaped technology 
(constructivism).  Some histories of technology provide lists and brief descriptions of 
technologies from certain historical periods (Bunch; Burns; Cardwell; Glick, Livesey, 
and Wallis; Mitcham; Restivo; Rhodes).  Other studies focus on a technology in an 
historical moment or a type of technology from a time period (Cowan; Cross and 
Szostak; Downey; Lewis; Löfgren and Willim; Misa; Reynolds and Cutcliffe; Willmore; 
Yeang).  As with any analysis of technology, defining a time period by a technology can 
be reductive.  Not only do historians risk arguing for technological determinism when 
claiming technology alone shaped an aspect of society, but they also risk creating a 
“whig” history if their work “presents history as uninterrupted progress, implying that the 
present state of affairs follows necessarily from the previous” (Bijker 45).  Instead of 
aiming for a grand narrative of technology’s influence on history, other scholars look at 
smaller “revolutions” involving technological change (Cowan; Esper; Fallows; 
Hoddeson; Walker; Van Slyck).  My dissertation also studies a single technology.  The 
wireless’s overall success, the fact that it became the “radio,” means it fit well with the 
social framework of the early twentieth century.  Just as the historical context of the early 
twentieth century is shaped by society, the society accepting a new tool shapes the 
technology’s meaning through cultural attitudes, practices, and values. 
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 The sociology of technology demonstrates how societies—relevant social groups 
and wider cultural forces—shape and are shaped by technologies.  As mentioned above, 
placing too much emphasis on the effects of technology on society can risk technological 
determinism.  However, a dialectical relationship between society and technology exists, 
and this relationship is socially constructed.  Many scholars analyze specific groups or 
specific technologies to demonstrate how society shapes what technologies become 
created based on wider cultural beliefs and attitudes (Arthur; Das and Kolack; DeLaet; 
Dobres and Hoffman; Kline and Pinch; Kranakis; Noble; Strum and Latour).  
Additionally, scholars demonstrate how technologies are created socially but on a smaller 
scale; for instance, many scholars examine the work of a single invention or inventor to 
demonstrate the social construction of technology (Bazerman; Bijker; Ceruzzi; Johnsom;1 
Latour; Oudshorn; Weber).  Inventors and relevant social groups must interact within the 
social framework in order for a technology to be realized.  “The social framework,” of 
course, is a product of the culture’s attitudes and values that fits or is made to fit social 
practice. 
 
Technology is/as Social Construction 
 In Bruno Latour’s work on the sociology of technology and science, he describes 
how one can view an engineer or scientist’s work in situ in order to understand the forces 
behind technological and scientific “discovery.”  By visiting laboratories and examining 
engineering and scientific discourse, Latour and other scholars have uncovered the non-
material forces and attitudes that shape what technologies and sciences become realized.2  
Latour’s theory of the sociology of technology stems from Michel Foucault’s critiques of 
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power in society.3  Latour argues that one must consider more than the technological 
object when analyzing why a technology succeeds or fails; instead, a researcher has to 
“grab the actors” (Aramis 89).  He wishes “to show technicians that they cannot even 
conceive of a technological object without taking into account the mass of human beings 
with all their passions and politics and pitiful calculations”; by doing so “they can 
become better engineers and better-informed decisionmakers” (Aramis viii).  By applying 
such a perspective, Latour’s methodology lets the individuals’ interactions with the 
technology supply meaning(s) to why a technology fails or succeeds:  His “sociology 
prefers a local history whose framework is defined by the actors and not the investigator” 
or by grand narratives such as capitalism or transportation theories (Aramis 19). 
 Similarly, Bijker’s analysis uses a “snowballing” technique to follow actors or 
“relevant social groups,” as he defines them, who interact with a technology in its early 
stages before it becomes realized (46).  Because “[t]echnological development should be 
viewed as a social process [and] not an autonomous occurrence,” Bijker believes 
“relevant social groups will be carriers of that process” (48).  Latour and Bijker’s 
arguments that technologies and scientific discoveries4 are products of social interactions 
are shared by many other scholars in STS (Bazerman; Feenburg; Gilbert and Mulkay; 
Hikes and Hikes; Latour and Woolgar; MacKenzie and Wajcman; Rouse; Rosalind 
Williams; Yeang).  This approach assumes technology is not created in a vacuum but 
constructed through contemporary values and practices.  Because the actors themselves 
are products of their culture, Marconi would act in ways congruent to the values of 
industrialized cultures in the early twentieth century.  The assumption that socially 
constructed attitudes may shape technology allows me to view the wireless historically as 
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a product of modernity and larger prevailing attitudes.  As Anne L. Hiskes and Richard P. 
Hiskes also argue, “social forces and practical goals always determine the current state 
and direction of technological research” (16).5  In the case of the wireless, social forces 
desiring progressive technology and practical goals pushing for communication at sea 
and to places not accessible by wires drove the wireless’s construction.  To make the 
wireless fit larger social values, Marconi and other wireless supporters reconstructed the 
images of electromagnetic science and technology in relation to the new invention for 
various audiences. 
 Such reconstructions are “public statements” that have been carefully crafted and 
do not immediately count as “the pure world of truth” without an audience’s validation 
(Bazerman, Shaping Written Knowledge 23).  Furthermore, as Bazerman argues, “[t]o 
recognize the rhetorical character of visually transmitted symbolic activity is only to 
recognize that we live and use our texts in a human world” (Shaping Written Knowledge 
23).  The rhetoric of the wireless and the actual physical invention are nothing without 
social interaction.  The ideas Marconi and others affixed to the wireless exist within the 
context of socially maintained ideology.  As Lynn Åkesson argues, realizing technologies 
is more than just being able to produce a working model because technological 
realization “go[es] beyond the product and depend[s] on relations, feelings, emotions and 
culturally constructed beliefs about whether something is worth investing in or not” (44).  
Åkesson’s overall argument is that all technologies must be marketed well before they 
become recognized.  Because technologies must fit within a culture’s values and 
attitudes, the “marketing” or PR involved will most likely adhere to or be made to seem 
to adhere to prevailing cultural beliefs. 
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 The wireless of the early twentieth century, I will suggest, was more of a 
rhetorical reality than a physical one:  Pro-wireless discourse portrayed the wireless as 
“real,” but a viable commercial product was not immediately available.  Before any 
technology becomes a black box, the relevant social groups must use, communicate, 
evaluate, and, ultimately, produce a viable technology.  I do not claim technologies solely 
shape themselves or the practices of relevant social groups; to say that would risk 
technological determinism.  Instead, my study focuses on the wireless’s rhetoric as 
“created” by favorable discourse, rather than on how users physically interacted with the 
invention.  However, I do include the perceptions and, subsequently, the reinterpretations 
of Marconi and journalists who recount their own experiences witnessing the early 
wireless’s capabilities.  The “social interaction” I refer to throughout the dissertation is 
discourse. 
 Because society ultimately accepts or rejects a technology, how a technology fits 
or is made to fit into social life depends partly on audience perception.  Although I will 
not analyze early twentieth century audiences’ specific responses to technological 
discourse, I focus on favorable discourse about the wireless because I assume that an 
ultimately successful technology’s positive discourse reveals attributes that help an 
audience realize its significance.  I believe my study helps demonstrate the common 
rhetorical aspects that “build” a technology so audiences will accept it.  But before I 
discuss features of rhetorical analyses, I want to briefly describe the dialectical 
relationship between society and technology from the point of view of relevant social 
groups.  Technologies might not alter the ways people perceive the world or usher in new 
social conditions, but technologies have altered human practices on small and large 
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scales.  For example, the introduction of the automobile helped create a market for 
American suburban life because workers no longer had to live on a “mass transit” line or 
within walking distance of work.  However, would Americans have wanted to live in 
single-family homes if they were not an individualistic culture with a tendency to expand 
their living spaces?  Likewise, the introduction of mobile phones changed the practice of 
calling:  Now people can talk almost anywhere.  Therefore, because suburban life and 
mobile phones were perceived as valuable, important relevant social groups within the 
culture approved the new technologies and changed living and telephoning practices to 
some degree. 
 
Relevant Social Groups Affix Meaning to Technologies 
 As socially constructed artifacts, technologies represent the values of the culture 
from which they came.  For instance, a culture that advocates the “free sharing of ideas” 
and technical collaboration among its universities and other publicly funded research 
institutions would most likely pursue technologies to help facilitate such 
communication.6  Likewise, a culture at war or simply a military-industrial complex 
perpetually preparing for war will create technologies to improve its defensive or “pre-
emptive” capabilities.  A culture’s needs are often based on the values its people or, more 
importantly, its institutions hold (Noble; Nye; Rhodes; MacKenzie and Wacjman).  Such 
groups ultimately determine what technologies are created and how they are modified for 
particular tasks.  As Bijker argues, 
Technology is created by engineers working alone or in groups, marketing 
people who make the world aware of new products and processes, and 
consumers who decide to buy or not to buy and who modify what they 




No technologies would ever be realized if they were not perceived as conforming to 
social values and practices. 
After Marconi’s wireless became a black box—a commercially viable product—
the electrical engineering community no longer debated the reality of radio waves, and 
the radio became a solution to communication problems.  Being able to transmit and 
receive signals, a “fact” allowed by radio, became the basis for research into radar and 
navigational technologies (Tarrant 233), not to mention technologies related to 
broadcasting.  But, no matter how well an invention works, a black box technology must 
also adhere to larger cultural values.  Relevant social groups immersed in a particular 
culture affix meaning to inventions building technological frames.  Bijker explains that 
“[a] technological frame is built up when interaction ‘around’ an artifact begins”; if a 
frame is not built up in order to “move members of an emerging relevant social group in 
the same direction,” a technology will fail (123).  Before users will accept a technology, 
they must believe the product adheres to social values.  These values give meaning to a 
technological frame.  Bijker argues that “[a] technological frame comprises all elements 
that influence the interactions within relevant social groups and lead to the attribution of 
meanings to technical artifacts—and thus to constituting technology” (123).  Therefore, 
these frames can be understood as sets of meaning(s) groups affix to technology.  From a 
cultural studies point of view, a frame is a deterministic screen or cultural lens that 
defines a technology for an individual or a group.  In other words, people define a 
technology’s values and uses by the socially constructed heuristic or frame between 
themselves and the technology that, in turn, helps define a technology. 
19 
 
 While that argument may appear circular—a technology is defined by a frame that 
defines the technology—it actually suggests the dialectical relationships between 
technology and society.  Other scholars define these relationships as “technological 
regimes” (Nelson and Winter; Rip and Kemp) or “paradigms” (Dosi).  According to Rip 
and Kemp, “[a] technological regime is the technology-specific context of a technology 
which prestructures the kind of problem-solving activities that engineers are likely to do, 
a structure that both enables and constrains certain changes” (340, italics mine).  
Although Rip and Kemp focus on engineers, the argument easily transfers to other 
relevant social groups who are constrained by their own cultural/personal lenses based on 
how they perceive a technology should be used.  Therefore, participatory actions both 
constrain and construct technological meanings. 
 Engineers and scientists work under larger social frameworks for producing 
knowledge.  Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar’s study of biologists at the Salk Institute 
shows the interconnectedness of ideology, science, technology, and history, allowing us 
the chance to understand broad patterns of cultural beliefs.  Jonas Salk, in his introduction 
to Latour and Woolgar’s Laboratory Life, claimed that “[Latour’s] own style of thought 
was transformed by our [biologists’] concepts and ways of thinking” (13).  Salk further 
comments on the centrifugal and centripetal knowledge diffusion between science and 
sociology, noting that “[sociologists at the Salk Institute] are coming to recognize that 
their work is only a subset of our [biologists’] own kind of scientific activity, which in 
turn is only a subset of life in the process of organization” (13).  Latour and Woolgar’s 
goal at the Salk Institute was to uncover “the social construction of scientific knowledge 
in so far as this draws attention to the process by which scientists make sense of their 
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observations” (32).  Such a process is important to Latour and Woolgar because they 
argue that sociological studies often examine the scientist without examining the 
scientific aspects (23-4).  They go on to argue that researchers ought to pay attention to 
“‘technical’ and ‘intellectual’ terminology,” which “is clearly an important feature of 
[scientists’] activity” (27).  This activity comes with a warning against “the uncritical 
acceptance of the concepts and terminology used by some scientists” because that “has 
had the effect of enhancing rather than reducing the mystery which surrounds the doing 
of science” (Latour and Woolgar 29).  This process often comes in the form of discourse, 
such as technical papers or presentations. 
 No science stands solely on its own merits or the merit of one or a few scientists; 
instead, science is peer reviewed.  Latour and Woolgar use Harris’s terms “emic 
validation” and “etic validation” to describe which types of audiences have the final say 
on scientific representations.  According to Harris, etic validation derives from “a 
community of fellow observers”; this group is “the audience who will ultimately assess 
the validity of a description” (qtd. in Latour and Woolgar 38); emic validation holds that 
“the ultimate decision about the adequacy of description rests with participants 
themselves”—the scientists (qtd. in Latour and Woolgar 38).  The two types of validation 
help define when but not why a science or technology exists.7
 Once validated, a science or technology can be said to exist.  However, the 
existence may only be among a select relevant social group before the “facts” diffuse to 
other groups.  In order to diffuse the facts adequately, a group must persuade others about 
the value of the science or technology.  Such persuasion is rhetorical as Latour and 
Woolgar point out.  When the scientists at the Salk Institute attempted to make order out 
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of (relative) chaos, they aimed for “the successful persuasion of readers” by stabilizing 
facts through discourse; the readers, however, “are only convinced when all sources of 
persuasion seem to have disappeared” (76).  According to Latour and Woolgar, observers 
believe “a systematic, ordered account is attainable” from any observation “no matter 
how confused or absurd the circumstances and activities of his tribe might appear” (43).  
Once a fact is stabilized, it appears to have always been there waiting to be discovered 
(Latour and Woolgar 177).  The science seems inevitable in hindsight: 
Once the controversy has settled, reality is taken to be the cause of this 
settlement; but while controversy is still raging, reality is the consequence 
of debate, following each twist and turn in the controversy as if it were the 
shadow of scientific endeavour.  (Latour and Woolgar 182) 
 
Audiences accept the science as a reality because “[f]acts are constructed in such a way 
that, once the controversy settles, they are taken for granted” (Latour and Woolgar 183). 
 The various mechanisms that bring science and technology to life are not salient 
features of technical or scientific discourse.  One mechanism is granting credit, and 
scientific credit often goes to the individual who is perceived to have “gotten there first.”  
According to Bruno Latour, “[w]hen we are dealing with scientists, we still admire the 
great genius and virtue of one man and too rarely suspect the importance of forces that 
made him great” (Pasteurization of France 14).  These “forces” of which Latour speaks 
are many:  economics, philosophy, epistemology, ideology, society, etc.  They can also 
be the groups or teams supporting the “lone” scientist or inventor.  The ingenuity and 
perseverance of a successful scientist cannot be overlooked, but we cannot lose sight of 
the fact that science and technology are built upon past “discoveries” that engage 
multiple actors.  Also, if one believes a “fact” was just waiting to be found, he or she 
ignores the construction of scientific ideas.  Latour claims “[a]n idea . . . never moves of 
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its own accord.  It requires a force to fetch it, seize upon it for its own motives, move it, 
and often transform it” (Pasteurization of France 16).  Scientists often make discoveries 
based on their fields’ histories:  “The social context of a science is rarely made up of a 
context; it is most of the time made up of a previous science” (Latour, Pasteurization of 
France 19).  Pasteur and others discovered new science by building on past science, 
which appeared as part of the social context of a science.  While in popular imagination, 
lone scientists are seen as revolutionaries, Latour argues that science has to be 
communicated before the “revolution” can take place (Pasteurization of France 72).  
Science and engineering need rhetoric to help communicate new discoveries or 
inventions.  Relevant groups use rhetoric to create an image of a technology that reifies 
the invention through discourse.  Relevant groups not only use rhetoric but are persuaded 
by rhetoric to create meaning for a technology.  These groups work to define meaning 
under the social forces that allow products to take shape within a culture. 
 
The Rhetoric of Technology 
 The study of how technologies are described and realized discursively is known 
as the rhetoric of technology.  Charles Bazerman defines the rhetoric of technology in a 
rather useful way:  “The rhetoric of technology shows how the objects of the built 
environment become part of our systems of goals, values, and meanings, part of our 
articulated interests, struggles, and activities” (“The Production of Technology” 386).  
When new technologies become accepted by a population—an acceptance that does not 
need to be universal—society may change certain behaviors; however, the social forces 
that propel technologies to be created or simply accepted exist a priori to those 
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technologies.  Claiming that a direct causal link exists between technology and social 
change may be reductive, but we cannot dismiss the power new technologies have on 
behavior (Feenburg; L. White; Raymond Williams).  After all, some people might be 
persuaded to weave technology into their social practices because they perceive the 
technology as useful.  How a technology is made to seem useful can be understood 
through a rhetorical analysis of a particular technology’s discourse. 
 Defining the “rhetoric of technology” requires defining technology.  What makes 
something a technology?  Popularly, technology is associated with computers and other 
“hi-tech” consumer items.  While those items are technologies, they are not the only 
types of technologies that exist.  Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman claim 
“‘[t]echnology’ is derived from the Greek techne, meaning art, craft, or skill, and logos, 
meaning word or knowledge.  The modern usage of ‘technology’ to include artifacts as 
well as knowledge of those artifacts is thus etymologically incorrect but so entrenched 
that we have chosen not to resist it” (26).  Technologies are thus closely related to new 
knowledge based on science, techniques, and industry.  This knowledge is socially 
constructed through discourse based on relevant social groups’ values and practices.  The 
groups accept and consequently stabilize technologies based in part on the value they 
perceive in particular tools. 
 Whether a technology be a physical tool (i.e., a wrench, hammer, or keyboard) or 
a mental tool (democracy, management science, or the scientific method), it is often 
defined as the available knowledge of a civilization closely connected in contemporary 
times to industry and commerce.  The industrialized world’s economy depends on 
creating new technologies for growth and “prosperity.”  These technologies can be 
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managerial or engineering ideas to increase or make production more efficient 
(management science from Fordism/Taylorism), or they can be actually mass produced 
products (cars, mobile phones, Big Macs ®) from highly rationalized, efficient systems.8  
Regardless of the type of technology, the idea that technology is some kind of tool related 
to work or profit predominates.  After all, the term “modernization” suggests an entity 
(such as a nation) acquires or develops technologies that will theoretically improve its 
economic position.9  As an important profitable technology for industrial nations of the 
early twentieth century, the wireless fits the above “scientific/industrial” definition.  In 
fact, many contemporaries claimed the wireless was an important scientific discovery, 
and Marconi’s application furthered national and international industrial goals. 
 Because society shapes technology, we can locate some social values implicit in 
representations of the wireless or any technology.  Even though values may be affixed to 
technologies, the rhetoric of a technology often adheres to a prevailing cultural value.  
For instance, many contemporary analyses of technologies often examine how 
“democracy,” a major framework for Western industrial cultures, is affixed to 
technologies or threatened by new technologies (Feenberg; Montagu and Matson; Selfe; 
Sikorski; Winner).  However, rarely can a technology be said to embody democratic 
principles of egalitarianism or equal representation.  Because the “democracy” label is 
important to Western industrial culture, technologies are often discussed as furthering or 
not furthering democratic values.  Those values are affixed through rhetoric. 
The next four subsections discuss how rhetoric helps realize or (re)construct a 
technology.  Specifically, I discuss how Charles Bazerman’s study of Edison’s light 
offers a theoretical framework for rhetorically analyzing technology, how technologies 
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are products of systemic forces (i. e., the desire for technologies to be seen as 
democratic), how technologies become stabilized through rhetoric, and how technologies 
do not become stabilized. 
 
Bazerman’s Example of Edison’s Incandescent Light bulb 
 Charles Bazerman’s analysis of inventor Thomas A. Edison’s incandescent light 
bulb (The Languages of Edison's Light) studies patents, laboratory notebooks, personal 
letters, specifications, scientific reports, and popular press articles in order to explain how 
the light bulb and the Edison System (power stations) were both physically and 
rhetorically created.  Bazerman analyzes discourses surrounding the invention in order to 
demonstrate the rhetorical acts that led to the technology’s creation and acceptance.  
Edison was a technologist in search of profit and fame, and he, as would Marconi, 
succeeded in garnering an international celebrity status.  Because Edison was a successful 
(and prolific) inventor, we can assume he invented products that appealed to audiences—
potential users.  Although all of Edison’s inventions were not successful, many were 
accepted through careful marketing/PR strategies.  In other words, Edison and his 
supporters made his inventions fit the attitudes and values of consumers, causing them to 
desire his inventions.   
Bazerman traces Edison’s growth as a young telegrapher10 turned industrialist 
whose legacy continues to this day in the company General Electric.  Edison physically 
and rhetorically “invented” the light bulb, and he kept the public anticipating his 
invention for economic not technical reasons (Bazerman 181).11  This marketing strategy 
suggests that a technology needs more than a physical nature to be realized; a 
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technology’s viability is tied closely to its profitability.  In fact, Edison had to argue for 
his invention’s future value in order to secure investment (Bazerman 200).  He had to 
show this value through fairs, advertisements, demonstrations, letters to stockholders, and 
interviews with popular press writers, or else the light bulb could have failed 
commercially as his phonograph did in the 1880s (Bazerman 198).  Edison marketed his 
electric system in places like New York City and Louisville before the light bulb was 
ready, and the public accepted the “reality” of the technology when the light bulb was 
mainly a rhetorical construction (Bazerman 234).  That is, the public accepted the light 
bulb before incandescent lighting actually illuminated cityscapes. 
 Potential users may thus accept the existence of new technical and scientific 
“discoveries” based on rhetoric.  An important rhetorical strategy for technological 
acceptance is proving value.  In fact, most of Bazerman’s work covers the economic 
strategies Edison used to have the public and investors realize that the light bulb existed.  
Bazerman quotes Adam Smith to show how the market and, therefore, society perceive 
technological value:  “[A]ll economic transactions are rhetorical . . . they are exchanges 
of value and value is a human discursive construct” (141).  New technology does not 
spring from the earth or from a lab without being conditioned or molded by social forces, 
and economics is one major force.  New technology must work within the current 
technological system and carve out a niche for itself; it must also “create a dissatisfaction 
with a current technology” to induce consumers rhetorically to buy new products 
(Bazerman 142).  After all, marketing is “the rhetorical economic work of locating unmet 
desire and matching potential products to desire” (Bazerman 143).  In our postmodern 
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world, desire can be manufactured in order to make consumers want certain products (c.f. 
Chomsky, especially Manufacturing Consent). 
 Before consumers demand new tools, technology needs to succeed materially and 
“symbolically (that is adopt significant and stable meanings within germane discourse 
systems)” (Bazerman 335).  Bazerman goes on to borrow the concept of “heterogeneous 
engineering” from Bijker to show that technologies are products of “the coordination and 
application of many kinds of knowledge and practice, all of which are united and 
instantiated in the final product” (335).  The concept of “heterogeneous symbolic 
engineering” is imperative for inventors who wish to “[build] enduring meaning and 
values for the technology they wish to implant in our daily lives” (Bazerman 335, italics 
mine).  Bazerman argues that incandescent light had to “take a place within the discourse 
and the representational meaning systems of [Edison’s] time before it could transform 
them”; therefore, “the new technology . . . had first to be built on historical continuities of 
meaning and value” (350).  In the absence of historical continuity and cultural values, 
technologies do not become realized simply for their own sake.  Instead, technologies are 
often products of systemic forces and rhetorically constructed to be in accordance with 
prevailing cultural values. 
 
Technology as a Product of Systemic Forces 
 Although “technology for the sake of technology” may seem to be the goal of 
industrial societies, changes in technology “will always be only one factor among others:  
political, economic, cultural, and so on” (MacKenzie and Wajcman 4).  STS scholars and 
other technology critics attempt broader analyses of technologies by examining how 
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socio-political systems in particular produce new technologies.  Technology is a product 
of systemic forces within and across societies.  In our capitalist economic system, we 
often associate technologies with highly profitable companies (i. e., Microsoft, Oracle, 
Dell), but profit is only one of several factors that cause users to embrace a particular 
technology.  After all, companies and not users profit.  This “market” force helps fuel 
technological development.  Consumers are offered many products, and they often have 
to replace products as new ones come out.  Consumers or “the public” are not the only 
relevant social groups, but technologies do not become realized without them.  Often 
consumers are the recipients to whom more powerful, more invested relevant social 
groups direct their rhetoric.  As with any economic system, the means of production and 
the means of marketing products are controlled by an oligarchy of “invested” agents 
working within the techno-structure. 
 This techno-structure values certain technologies over others.  Although large 
organizations have more influence over technological creation, consumers are not 
helpless in the face of technological creation; see, for example, human input into such 
technical designs as “ergonomic” keyboards or “value sensitive design” (c.f. Radetsky).  
However, perception of a technology’s value also “conditions” the technologies 
produced.  Langdon Winner argues that, specifically in the United States (but across 
much of the industrialized world), “[a] fascination with efficiency is a venerable tradition 
in American life” (46).  Americans, Winner argues, have “[a]n eagerness to define 
important public issues as questions of efficiency” (46).  This, in turn, creates a condition 
where “[d]emonstrating the efficiency of a course of action conveys an aura of scientific 
truth, social consensus, and compelling moral urgency” (Winner 46-7).  That condition 
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informs Winner’s ‘Technical Constitution of Society,’ which has five “distinctive 
institutional patterns” excerpted below: 
1. “[T]echnologies of transportation and communication . . . [that] facilitate 
control over events from a single center . . . .”; 
2. “[A] tendency for new devices and techniques to increase the most efficient or 
effective size of organized human associations . . . .”; 
3. “[R]ational arrangement of sociotechnical systems [that] has tended to 
produce its own distinctive forms of hierarchal authority . . . .”; 
4. “[T]he tendency of large, centralized, hierarchically arranged sociotechnical 
entities to crowd out and eliminate other varieties of human activity . . . .”; 
5. “[T]he various ways that large sociotechnical organizations exercise power to 
control the social and political influences that ostensibly control them” (47-8). 
The above five areas constitute some of the systemic forces that perpetuate technological 
creation.  These forces also control users’ preferences and organizational behavior. 
 Because of technology’s socially constructed nature and larger institutional 
control over “hierarchally arranged sociotechnical entities,” a dialectical relationship 
exists between technology and society.  Anthony Giddens explains this phenomenon as 
the dialectic of control:  “[A]ll forms of dependence offer some resources whereby those 
who are subordinate can influence the activities of their superiors” (16).  Although 
Giddens was not specifically describing technology as a “superior,” his theory applies 
because technology must be validated by users or potential users.  Unfortunately, this 
relationship can be skewed in favor of dominant “invested” parties because an illusion of 
power to influence actions also exists.  According to Giddens, those within the social 
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system are confronted with two “faces” of power:  “the capability of actors to enact 
decisions which they favour” and “the ‘mobilization of bias’ that is built into institutions” 
(15).  An example of this power situation is bias towards the dominant two-party system 
in American politics.  Citizens can effect change within the government by voting,12 but 
the two-party system maintains its dominance, making third parties simply nuisances 
because they often can only take enough votes away from one of the dominant parties—
assuming they are even that powerful.  Third parties cannot really expect to win a 
majority or plurality in presidential elections.  Independents have won seats in state and 
local politics in America as well as seats in Congress.  Third parties have tried to win 
Presidential elections, but no modern ones have come close because the two-party 
dominance of Democrats and Republicans is overwhelming; therefore, voters are 
mobilized in accordance to this political bias. 
 The above analogy of America’s two-party system can also be extended to the 
illusion of “real” democratic choices.  Just as voting for Candidate A or B (or sometimes 
C) constitutes limited choice in American politics,13 relevant social groups may also 
position technologies to feign democratic ideals or potentials if not viewed critically 
enough.  Democracy, a major value for Western industrial cultures, is often affixed to 
new technologies.  However, “democracy” in the next section is often used 
synonymously to mean egalitarian participation, a reality to which the technologies 
discussed often do not adhere.  Capitalist forces or, simply, the marketplace often decide 
what technologies become realized because users have already “bought into” the 




 What I hope to make clear is that scholars often want new technologies to adhere 
to democratic principles.  They validate a technology’s potential by claiming a 
technology, such as the Internet, supports democratic principles.  My purpose is not to 
debunk the scholars I discuss in the next section but to demonstrate how important the 
notion of democracy and participation are to rhetorical constructions of technology 
regardless of whether these terms are accurate.  Although I could discuss the many 
popular commercials that advertise the “freedom” of high-speed Internet, I focus on the 
attitudes of technology critics who promote the Internet as a democratic tool or a 
potential democratic tool because that analysis relates to rhetoric and the values affixed to 
hopes for technologies; commercials relate more to consumerist rhetoric. 
 
Rhetorically Constructing Technology through Democracy 
 Scholars claim that technologies are products of “social interaction” (Bazerman; 
Bijker; Feenburg; Latour; Winner), but that term is misleading if one assumes techno-
creation follows an egalitarian inventor-consumer relationship.  Although scholars argue 
for techno-liberation as a political goal, our current late capitalist, post-industrial 
information age influences the technologies created.  Understanding why “democracy” 
may help stabilize technologies requires understanding how scholars argue that certain 
technologies have the potential for increasing democracy.  For instance, Andrew 
Feenburg assumes that the Internet is representative of democratization across all 
technologies.  He claims “computer users in France and the US who introduced human 
communication on networks originally designed for the distribution of data accomplished 
a liberating technical innovation” (xv).14  He goes on to argue that “[i]n all such 
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democratic interventions, experts end up collaborating with a lay public in transforming 
technology” (xv).  Therefore, the onus placed on the “lay public” requires them to 
converse with the established experts to create a democratic technology.  Feenburg’s use 
of “collaborating” is misleading because Internet users are not conversing with those who 
maintain and promote Internet use. 
 The Internet’s liberation is not congruent to the technological liberation of 
computer users.  Feenburg’s argument that the Internet is a liberating technology does not 
account for the ways consumers are conditioned to access the Internet through a cycle of 
dependence on large computer manufacturers.  Consumers are conditioned to take part in 
built-in-obsolescence, and the increasing “user friendliness” of computers further 
removes users from understanding the structure and programming of complex twenty-
first-century networking technology.15  Users are continually at the mercy of help desks 
and IT departments when things go wrong or when “important” upgrades must be made.  
Also, with the exception of virus updates, upgrades done by manufacturers are hardly in 
the interest of the consumer; for instance, eventually programs bought for one operating 
system will no longer be supported by future upgrades of the operating system.  In the 
early 1990s and before, when most home computer users had non-networked systems, 
having an operating system for five or more years was not a serious problem for 
compatibility.  But our current highly networked infrastructure now burdens the 
consumer to buy new expensive software to harness the capabilities of new hardware.  
The new software requires new hardware to get online, which further complicates the 
idea that the Internet is a “democratizing” technology.  If true collaboration existed, users 
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would be able to have older systems be more compatible with newer technologies in 
order to extend a product’s usage.16 
 Within the field of computers and composition, scholars (most notably, Gail 
Hawisher and Cynthia Selfe) have embraced a call to techno-democratization.  
Technology as a democratizing force is reified in “computer lab apparatus”:  the tools and 
networks that comprise the totality of computer-assisted instruction—the Internet being 
the most important tool within the last decade.  Selfe warns of the “perils of not paying 
attention” to the increasing knowledge gap between skilled and unskilled students 
entering college—a gap affecting individuals’ future prosperity (4).  Selfe’s work largely 
focuses on economic class, but she also covers aspects of the digital divide (the gulf 
between whites and African Americans online) and the educational backsliding caused by 
political rhetoric espousing the need to improve children’s technical-scientific skills 
without the necessary public finding.  Because these new computer technologies enable 
students to gain important literacy skills, Selfe argues that the very futures of our students 
are at stake if they are denied access.  Similarly, Henry Louis Gates, Jr. argues that 
African Americans “are failing to gain access to the new tools of literacy,” meaning the 
Internet, and that the Internet is “the most diverse and decentralized electronic medium 
yet invented” (15).  Both Selfe and Gates underscore the idea that access to contemporary 
literacy tools is a democratic imperative.17
 On a broader democratic level, Langdon Winner argues that technology, if created 
in accordance with democratic goals, will support democracy.  Winner analyzes 
undemocratic and horrendously authoritarian technological systems.  The often cited 
example from Winner is that of the architect Robert Moses and his technological Jim 
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Crowism:  As “the master builder of roads, parks, bridges, and other public works of the 
1920s to the 1970s in New York,” Moses “built his overpasses according to 
specifications that would discourage the presence of buses on his parkways” (Winner 23).  
Such an undemocratic system “limit[ed] access of racial minorities and low-income 
groups to Jones Beach, Moses’ widely acclaimed public park” (Winner 23).  Winner 
argues that Moses’ architecture reifies the systemic effects of a racist, classist society; 
certain groups’ access to public areas is denied by physical barriers, which “embody a 
systematic social inequality, a way of engineering relationships among people that, after 
a time, became just another part of the landscape” (23, italics mine).  A similar situation 
exists in low-income, inner-city dwellings where property values dropped as a result of 
“urban planning” that sent highways, railways, and other eye sores through 
predominantly African-American communities.18  
 Racism, a systemic force, helped bring about the technological segregation of 
Moses’s “architecture.”  Such a situation is representative of how white America treated 
African Americans throughout history.  Moses’s setup was simply a microcosm of larger 
cultural oppression—legally upheld until 1954.19  As American history proves, “all men 
are created equal” is relative to who’s in charge.  Therefore, “democratic” societies 
stabilize technology from non-egalitarian social values, attitudes, and practices.  
Ironically, these undemocratic practices are still in accordance with social values as 
Winner’s example of Robert Moses shows.  Also, some technologies “make it” through 
illegal back channels; for instance, Edison had to deal heavily in the graft of the Gilded 
Age to see his New York system to fruition; after all, Tammany Hall had to be 
“convinced” (Bazerman 227).  The electric works Edison proposed had to fit certain 
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political agendas.  Because electricity is a public works issue, politicians had to support 
the endeavor, which, in turn, boosts their prestige.  Therefore, a working technology is 
simply one aspect of technological realization.  To be successful Edison had “to speak the 
language of politics . . . involving patronage, jobs, political support, factional infighting, 
and perhaps payoffs” (Bazerman 228, italics mine).  Such a practice of paying off civil 
servants is hardly a tenet of democracy. 
 Besides civilian projects being political in nature, military projects require 
governmental support, and, as was the case with the U.S. Navy’s long-range wireless 
experiments around 1910, some projects are only possible with state funding.  Chen-Pang 
Yeang analyzes how the U.S. Navy “decided to build the world’s most powerful radio 
transmitter in Arlington, Virginia, one that would exemplify American’s [sic] military 
and economic potential” (1).  Here is politics of a different sort.  Instead of dealing in 
bribes to carry out radio experiments, the military, which was “in a better position than 
scientists in university laboratories to conduct long-range radio experiments, for only the 
state could afford such large-scale projects,” had a de facto monopoly on large-scale 
technological creations (Yeang 3).  By 1910, the navy had financial resources because of 
an internal push towards modernization.20  They needed a company to outfit ships with 
wireless technology and construct land-based stations, which meant awarding a contract 
to the company with the “proper” equipment and contract bid.  Politics had a hand in the 
award.  Despite the fact that the National Electric Signaling Company’s (NESCO) 
wireless device “was not in fact able to match the contract’s long-distance specification,” 
the navy seems to have wanted “an American over a British or German company”—the 
British company bidding on the contract was Marconi’s (Yeang 9).  Because the foreign 
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companies were upset, the navy provided an opportunity for other companies to carry out 
some experiments (Yeang 9).  After all, upsetting possible future companies from helping 
carry out scientific or technical research would be disadvantageous.  The navy was 
planning more fleet improvements and may have needed commercial support. 
The navy did not just decide to outfit ships with wireless because the technology 
was available; the desire to modernize the navy—a political attitudinal change—occurred 
because “a number of top-rank officers” believed “[the wireless] could be incorporated 
into the ‘New Navy’” (Yeang 5).21  The U.S. Navy dealt in favoritism on a micro level 
but did so because of the appeal to modernization on a macro level.  Radios were the 
high-tech items in the early 1910s, and they fit the government’s idea of what progress 
meant—modernizing by acquiring new technologies.  Having wireless technology 
onboard meant the navy was being progressive about selecting one of the time period’s 
most successful products.  What the Navy’s favoritism and Edison’s graft dealings show 
is that “behind the scenes” forces in which relevant social groups engage also stabilize 
technologies.  Values such as democracy, progress, and modernization are affixed to 
technologies by relevant social groups, but the reality of such labels does not have to 
exist.  The meanings simply help a technology’s favorable perception within a culture. 
But sometimes technologies do not become realized:  Many unsuccessful 
technologies were feasible, but they were not represented to appear practical.  
Technology studies often focus on the successful products that make it to the market, so 
we rarely hear about failed technologies   According to Staudenmaier, who studied the 
STS journal Technology and Culture, STS scholarship mainly studies successful 
technologies (Bijker 7).  Relevant social groups affix meaning to technologies that help 
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stabilize them and not stabilize them.  Labeling technologies with positive meanings such 
as progress, democracy, and freedom help technologies; negative meanings such as 
dangerous, expensive, and inefficient do not help.  Two important cases where relevant 
social groups were not able to affix positive meaning(s) to technologies are Rosalind 
Williams’ study of MIT’s reengineering (1994-1999) and Bruno Latour’s widely popular 
account of ARAMIS, the failed Parisian rail car system. 
 
Not Stabilizing Technologies 
 In one of the few studies on a failed technology, Williams examines how MIT’s 
reengineering was not accepted by enough relevant social groups.  These relevant social 
groups were faculty, staff, administrators, students, and various consultants.  The concept 
of “reengineering was defined as ‘the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of 
support processes to bring about dramatic improvements in performance” (Rosalind 
Williams 643).  In order to implement these changes, “a core team analyzed key 
administrative processes and eventually recommended that eight of them be redesigned” 
(Rosalind Williams 643).  The biggest, most expensive change “went into installing a 
new financial system, SAP R/3, which replaced MIT’s” accounting system (Rosalind 
Williams 634).  Williams argues that it was the business side of MIT that forced these 
changes, and not enough users were happy with the proposed changes.  Williams notes 
that one colleague “describe[d] staff resistance to reengineering” by stating “‘[n]othing is 
more real than feelings’” (667).  Faculty and staff feelings were not “factored in” by the 
administrators or consultants implementing the changes. 
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 Reengineering failed because relevant social groups did not affix positive 
meaning to the new technology.22  MIT’s administration apparently was convinced that 
the new business model of “reengineering,” which was popular in the 1990s for 
increasing productivity (Rosalind Williams 643), would be embraced by all parties.  
Unfortunately, the technology, or rather technologies comprising reengineering, did not 
fit within the values and practices of important relevant social groups.  Williams explains 
reengineering’s failure as follows: 
While the MIT administration was heavily invested in reengineering, the 
rank-and-file staff had mixed reactions . . . Others resented the intrusion of 
consultants and teams that they considered inexperienced or even 
incompetent, while feeling that underneath it all reengineering was just 
about eliminating jobs.  The view of the MIT faculty was even more 
negative . . . they regarded the whole effort with considerable skepticism 
and often with outright disdain. (644) 
 
The faculty did not consider reengineering a valuable technology in theory or practice; 
instead, they “considered reengineering at best a distraction from, and at worst an assault 
upon, ‘real’ engineering” (Rosalind Williams 644).   
 Williams delves deeper into the issue of reengineering’s failure by linking it to a 
greater “problem” of modern technology not being “true” technology.  According to 
Williams, over “the last two centuries . . . ‘technology’ has become strongly identified 
with engineering” (644).  However, past engineering was devoted to constructing 
physical products “cover[ing] a wide range of endeavors” such as “sailing, hunting, 
weaving, plowing, fighting, cooking, traveling, mining” and so on (Rosalind Williams 
644).  Williams argues that “The Massachusetts Institute of Technology trains 
engineers,” and “[f]or conventionally defined engineers at MIT . . . reengineering is not 
‘technology’ at all but a ‘business’ or management’ application of technology” (644).  
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Because reengineering fit neither the idea of “technology” nor “engineering,” it failed to 
be realized as a technology by enough potential users—most importantly, the MIT 
faculty.  Williams makes it quite clear that as a business decision reengineering insulted 
the “feelings” of those who were supposed to embrace it as a solution for greater 
productivity.  Reengineering simply did not fit the values and practices of the 
community. 
 Another technology that did not fit the values and practices of relevant social 
groups was the almost-completed Parisian commuter rail project, Aramis.  The project 
began in the early 1970s and came to an end in late 1987.  Millions of francs were spent 
on the project, but Matra Transport could not get the system successfully in place.  Latour 
creates situations for a young engineer and a veteran sociologist to investigate what 
“killed” Aramis.  Latour analyzes this failed technology by researching history, 
economics, behaviors, attitudes, and politics surrounding Aramis.  Prototypes were 
developed, budgets were calculated, and the public was informed, but Aramis failed to 
become realized.  To determine why Aramis did not “work,” Latour has the two fictional 
characters interview Matra employees and members of the Parisian transportation 
authority and examine press releases, correspondences, specifications, and newspaper 
articles to construct Aramis rhetorically.  These fictional characters “grab actors” in order 
to produce a sociological account superior to an historical narrative (Latour, Aramis 89).  
Latour argues that “[t]he time frame for innovations depends on the geometry of the 
actors, not on the calendar” (Aramis 88).  Engineers worked on Aramis; time did not.  
Also, other actors—managers, politicians, accountants—had a part in creating Aramis or, 
more accurately, not having it realized in Paris.  Latour believes we ought to look to the 
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actors for a more fruitful understanding of the time in which a technology was created:  
“Grab the actors, and you’ll get periodization and temporalization as a bonus” (Aramis 
89).  Looking to the actors (or relevant social groups) allows researchers to understand 
when a technology exists.  An inventor securing a patent has no more created a 
“working” technology than a group of engineers with a finished prototype that is not 
feasible (Latour, Aramis 66-67).  The fictional characters in Aramis travel and interview 
the key actors in constructing the railcar, asking what factors contributed to any successes 
or failures at a given moment in Aramis’s history. 
 What Aramis failed to do was become a black box.  Aramis did not have an 
effective support system, and it could not mold human behavior through successful 
marketing or adapt to behavior through engineers’ efforts.  One crucial engineering fault 
was the design that allowed too many individuals the opportunity to choose the direction 
in which they wanted the cars to go; as M. Gueguen, the Parisian transportation authority 
director of infrastructures, pointed out to Latour’s fictional sociologist:  “People all go in 
one direction, then the other.  If you let people direct their own cars to their destinations, 
at the end of the day all the cars would be at the end of the line; how would they get 
back?” (Aramis 90).  Gueguen also adds that if you tried to fix the above issue “you’d 
have so many cars, the system would have to be so enormous, that it would cost a 
fortune” (Latour, Aramis 90).  Also, Aramis’s small-car design went against the values of 
equal access to public transportation:  One psychological study on Aramis noted that with 
the system as proposed “[t]here’s no access for the handicapped, or for the blind, or for 
very tall people, or for luggage” (Latour, Aramis 187).  Additionally, users “expressed 
fear of being closed in” or “trapped” in a railcar whereas the Metro allowed for greater 
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mobility (185-6).  Again, the potential users’ value of security was not a technical but 
social/personal meaning affixed to what they saw as “confining” transportation 
technology. 
 Aramis had a few engineering problems, but not conforming to social values and 
practices meant it was not realized by the relevant social groups.  The Aramis system was 
a local issue.  Although one can say rush hours are similar in many industrial areas, 
Aramis was specific to Paris.  The safety concerns, political “games,” and culture cannot 
be said to be universal.  However, industrial cultures do share an almost universal value 
associating progress with technological advancement (Feenburg; Stent; Weaver; 
Winner).  The wireless’s stabilization meant progress, and tropes of progress were part of 
a broader modernist consciousness that encapsulated the “cult of efficiency” promoted 
not only in technical and scientific discourse but also in avant-garde art. 
 
Modernism and Technology 
Modernist audiences in the early twentieth century were more likely to be 
persuaded to accept a technology promoted as a marker of progress.  Technologies 
marked human progress(ion) from the past to the assumed more efficient present and 
future.  Speed, efficiency, profitability, and movement were all attributes of progress and 
of modernism.  Audiences held the idea of progress in such a high esteem that Richard 
Weaver argued the term was the industrialized world’s quintessential “god term” (212).  
Weaver defines a god term as “that expression about which all other expressions are 
ranked as subordinate and serving dominations and powers” (212).  Although Weaver 
analyzes attitudes surrounding progress from a predominantly American point of view, 
42 
 
his analysis is not limited to one industrialized nation:  Any nation in the twentieth 
century wanting to increase its industrial power would fetishize progress and the values 
associated with it.  Any rhetorical construction of a technology would be aided by being 
seen as progressive.  The value of progress is not in its etymological meaning but in the 
meaning the modern audience associates with it. 
 Why would a word that basically means “to move forward” be rhetorically 
charged to be the god term of the day?  That question is easily answered when we see that 
the era and the mindset of the era affect which words will be god terms.  Weaver argues 
that a collective stance particular to a time period constructs the god term.  Humans 
define themselves by “[revolving] around some concept of value” or else they “[suffer] 
an almost intolerable sense of being lost” (Weaver 213).  “Progress” was such an 
entrenched and universal Western goal that anything associated with it made people 
“socially impelled to accept and even to sacrifice for” the values given to the object 
(Weaver 214).  One would sacrifice “for the ‘progress’ of the community,” and 
“progress” was “the coordinator of all socially respectable effort” (Weaver 214).  
Therefore, technologies that espoused progress could arouse nationalist sentiments 
because the society could point to an object embodying human advancement.  New 
technologies marked a civilization’s perceived greatness. 
 Attitudes towards progress support the “efficiency” practices of Frederick Taylor 
and Henry Ford, which revolutionized management science and factory production.  
Although Henry Ford claims not to have had “any Taylor influence over the assembly 
line,” it is impossible not to see Taylor’s influence (Beatty 207).  John Dos Passos claims 
Taylor, who was consumed by efficiency, had “[p]roduction [go] to his head and thrilled 
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his sleepless nerves like liquor or women on a Saturday night” (qtd. in Beatty 207).  
Passos, writing in the 1930s, may be foisting an unwarranted fetishization of Taylor’s, 
but such an attitude would be in accordance with the technophile and contemporary F. T. 
Marinetti.  However, Henry Ford recognized Taylor’s ideas or, at least, the importance of 
efficiency for production.23  Ford applied Taylor’s scientific management to his assembly 
line and created a new technology indicative of hyper-industrialization at the beginning 
of the twentieth century. 
Although Richard S. Tedlow claims Ford alone was responsible for the assembly 
line (227), industrial culture already valued efficiency as a goal for technologies.  Tedlow 
ignores the social context by arguing that Ford’s investment and not “the market” or 
“[p]ublic opinion” was solely responsible for the assembly line (227); however, this 
argument relies too heavily on “a vacuum theory” of technological creation.  Social 
forces must have been “ready” to accept such a streamlined, dehumanizing workplace 
environment.  Tedlow believes Ford “along with Einstein, Freud, Lenin, and a very few 
others” were “in that class of people who exercised a decisive impact on the history of the 
twentieth century” (227).  What he does not recognize is that these men were the product 
of industrial cultures.  Their genius or impact was congruent to cultural values. 
 As for Western societies, promoting industrial applications of science was very 
important.  Savvy industrialists and other interested parties founded the Royal Society of 
Arts and the Royal Institution to advance commercial applications of science.  David F. 
Noble briefly traces the Royal Society’s impact on scientific and industrial promotion, 
explaining that “[t]here was also a strong connection between the scientific pioneers and 
early capitalist enterprise” (58).  Although Noble’s main argument is that these societies’ 
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religious convictions extended medieval millenarian beliefs into modernity, he also 
shows the early work of the Royal Society to be “researches focused upon the practical 
problems of ” mechanical and commercial industries (59).  These societies promoted 
technology as man’s conquest over nature—advancement through techno-evolution.  
Therefore, technology became a force to be worshipped.  It had dominion over the natural 
world. 
Henry Adams explores the power of machines to become the new spiritual force 
for humanity in “The Dynamo and the Virgin”: 
[T]o Adams the dynamo became a symbol of infinity.  As he grew 
accustomed to the great gallery of machines, he began to feel the forty-
foot dynamos as a moral force, much as the early Christians felt the Cross.  
The planet itself seemed less impressive, in its old-fashioned, deliberate, 
annual or daily revolution, than this huge wheel, revolving within arm’s-
length at some vertiginous speed, and barely murmuring—scarcely 
humming an audible warning to stand a hair’s breadth further for respect 
of power . . . Before the end, one began to pray to it; inherited instinct 
taught the natural expression of man before silent infinite force.  Among 
the thousand symbols of ultimate energy, the dynamo was not so human as 
some, but it was the most expressive. (380) 
 
Interestingly, Adams goes on to show his reverence not just for technology, but also for 
the inventors of new, impressive machines when he says, “[h]e wrapped himself in 
vibrations and rays which were new, and he would have hugged Marconi and Branly had 
he met them, as he hugged the dynamo” (381).  Adams was in complete awe of these new 
machines, and his account is an apotheosis of their creators.  Other modernists glorified 
technologies as “vehicles” of progress.  F. T. Marinetti, the founder and leader of Italian 
Futurism, established speed, efficiency, and ahistoricity as goals for human advancement.  
Marinetti’s manifestos advocate that humans should emulate mechanical characteristics.  
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Although an exaggeration of a social love of progress, Marinetti’s works embody the 
cultural value of progress supported by industrial society. 
 Because technology was a factor in rapidly changing cultural practices and values, 
artists echoed or reinterpreted the meaning of technology in society.  As a contemporary 
technology, the wireless inspired Marinetti’s artistic work.  Specifically, he claimed that 
the wireless influenced his telegraphic style for poetry.24  However, many artists at the 
time were experimenting with telegraphic styles; John White suggests “that ‘telegraphic’ 
writing was generally ‘in the air’ in European avant-garde circles” (160).  Regardless of 
how Marinetti was inspired, he reconstructed the wireless through language influenced by 
this historical modernist moment.  Marinetti and the popular press, therefore, 
reconstructed the wireless for audiences using tropes of progress.  Of course, Marinetti’s 
work exaggerates the wireless’s possibilities, but those exaggerations show how progress 
shapes his artistic experiments and theories of modernism in general.  Part of the Futurist 
aesthetic was to make bombastic claims about the value of technology and promote its 
presence as a force of human advancement:  According to Marinetti and the popular 
press, humans advanced or “evolved” through new technologies. 
 Technology as a marker of human evolution relates to Social Darwinian 
misreadings of evolution.  Evolution is commonly thought to be a progression toward a 
better species, a higher life form.  But Charles Darwin’s theory on evolution does not 
imply that humans or other creatures become better; instead, they become better adapted 
to their environments.  Natural selection is the theory that adaptations enhancing survival 
cause certain traits to become prominent in a species.25  Evolution became an important 
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narrative for late nineteenth and early twentieth century Western societies that often 
feared the opposite—degeneration.  As Peter Childs points out, 
The theory of degeneration threatened Europe with the possibility of a 
reversion to a less complex and more barbaric form of society.  Notions of 
‘evolution’, ‘progress,’ and ‘reform’ led to an urgent fascination for their 
apparent opposites:  ‘regression’, ‘atavism’, and ‘decline’.  (39, italics 
mine) 
 
Industrial societies had to be seen as advancing through technology, Childs goes on to 
argue:  “If a country had not independently achieved an advanced stage of 
industrialization, it signified a social and cultural backwardness, and inferiority on behalf 
of the country’s people” (40).  Marconi’s texts do not speak as narratives against 
degeneracy, but they do fit the techno-evolutionary narrative that Childs argues came 
from Darwinian science (36).  Marconi and other inventors use evolution to mark 
civilization’s progress when they introduce new inventions.  The idea that technology 
signals or is affixed with values of evolution relates to how “democracy” is often affixed 
to or perceived in the Internet:  Relevant social groups promote evolution and democracy 
in spite of the reality of such labels.  Regardless of the accuracy of certain affixed values, 
technology still appears to fascinate audiences. 
 During the Industrial Revolution, new inventions were showcased for popular 
audiences in World’s Fairs.  As David Nye points out, the World’s Fairs embodied the 
cultural need to move forward because they “served as a site within the transitory present 
from which the visitor could glimpse the future” (205).  World’s Fairs showcased 
progress by showing the public the marvels of civilization; the displays were statements 
about the importance of technology in society:  “They marketed the idea of progress 
itself, providing an overall impression of coherent historical development” (Nye 205).  
47 
 
These popular venues also showcased a nation’s technological power—they were 
expressions of industrial might.  And in the political sphere, new movements of the early 
twentieth century, such as Italian and German fascism, readily embraced hyper-
industrialization and the militarization expressed in new technologies.  Such inventions as 
the machine gun, torpedo, dirigible, and even the wireless (which Marconi and the 
popular press promoted as a necessary wartime tool), as Marinetti shows in his 
manifestos, would lead Italy into becoming an industrial powerhouse and world military 
leader.  Nationalist sentiments ran high in Europe at the time, and technophiles like 
Marinetti argued a nation’s technology established a nation’s status. 
 The desire for modernization led Marinetti to his artistic project:  “The liberation 
of the human body, the liberation of Italian democracy, and the efficient re-working of 
the machine are one project for Marinetti” (Hewitt 144).  Andrew Hewitt argues the 
systemic reason for Marinetti’s technophilia “reflects nothing more than the economic 
underdevelopment of Italy and an understandable fascination with industrialization on the 
part of the Italian modernists” (146).  Marinetti’s early Futurist work embodies this 
fascination and violent patriarchal characteristics of the machine-man.26  Hewitt reads 
Marinetti’s works as proto-fascist or indicative of fascist aesthetics, identifying “the 
figure of the machine” in Futurist art as “the symbol of a specific social and political 
organization” (146).  However, machine- or efficiency-inspired political/social 
organization is not limited to twentieth century fascism.  The needs of industrialized 
nations appear to require societies to embrace technological advancement.  After all, 
democratic and socialist nations promoted technology as advancement throughout the 
twentieth century and through today.  From Henry Adams’ glorification of dynamos to 
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the contemporary drive in the U. S. for more math and science skills to secure a world 
leadership role, technologies are progress reified. 
 And the wireless’s rhetorical reconstructions show that it embodied the value of 
progress in the early twentieth century.  In order to demonstrate tropes of progress 
surrounding the wireless, this dissertation shows how Marconi’s wireless fit societal 
values and attitudes supportive of technology by examining a select body of texts 
espousing progress rhetoric.  These reconstructions of the wireless through discourse are 
the first places the wireless exists.  Before it becomes a black box, Marconi and others 





1.  Jim Johnsom is Bruno Latour’s pseudonym in the article “Mixing Humans and 
Nonhumans Together.” 
 
2.  Similarly, Bijker analyzes the social relations and historical discourse related to three 
technologies—bicycles, bakelites, and light bulbs—to demonstrate how those inventions 
were shaped by social attitudes as much as they were shaped by the inventors. 
 
3.  For an analysis on Foucault’s contribution to philosophy of science, see Joseph 
Rouse’s Knowledge and Power.  Rouse argues from the Foucauldian perspective that 
group interaction influences the products created:  “The various ways people are 
enclosed, grouped, distributed, separated, and partitioned mark a related spatial 
organization of power/knowledge.  These distinctions constrain our patterns of activity 
and interaction, and in doing so they shape both our activities and us as agents” (217). 
 
4.  Because science also needs actors working together or, at least, interacting with 
experiments and research, both technology and science should be seen as comparable.  
After all, technology is often an application of science:  In the case of the wireless, actors 
such as Marconi and others worked to harness the power of hertzian waves for 
commercial enterprise. 
 
5.  Hiskes and Hiskes divide historical approaches of technology into “four historical 
periods:  (1)  ancient Greece through the fifteenth century, (2) the Scientific Revolution 
from 1540 through 1750, and (3)  1750 to 1940”; the “somewhat speculative” fourth 
period starts in 1940 and goes to the present, which was 1986 (21).  In each “period” 
science and technology vary in their relationship to each other.  For instance, in ancient 
times science and technology were distinct but “very intimate” disciplines during the 
Scientific Revolution (21-2).  Hikes and Hikes do mention, however, that “[a]lthough the 
scientific and technological communities were isolated from each other during the 1750-
1940 periods . . . occasional transfers of knowledge between them did occur” (24). 
 
6.  This situation allowed the Internet to flourish.  Also, a culture that values 
consumerism would use this technology to facilitate consumer purchasing. 
 
7.  However, a science such as evolution has much more to do with the public.  Currently, 
major challenges to studying evolution in public schools show the politics of a socially 
constructed science.  Many school districts have to contend with the possibility of 
indoctrinating students in “intelligent design” alongside the science of evolution.  The 
major participants are not only scientists but parents, politicians, and judges.  
Consequently, publishers will have to adjust their textbooks to include “scientific” 
discussions of creationism, currently under the guise of “intelligent design,” if school 
districts demand such content; therefore, we see the market as a force in establishing 





8.  George Ritzer argues contemporary cultural systems such as McDonald’s ultra-
efficient business model promote the “rationality of irrationality”:  “[R]ational systems 
are unreasonable systems that deny the humanity, the human reason, of the people who 
work within them or are served by them.  In other words, rational systems are 
dehumanizing” (123-4). 
 
9.  For example, Chinese and Indian modernization relates to the two countries’ 
acquisition of industrial tools that have allowed their economies to grow. 
 
10.  Bazerman claims that Edison is rumored to have been fired from his Louisville 
telegraphy post for unauthorized experimentation. 
 
11.  Unless specified otherwise, all Bazerman citations come from The Languages of 
Edison’s Light. 
 
12.  This assumes, of course, that votes cast are actually counted. 
 
13.  This analogy works best for presidential elections and not state and local elections.  
In order to run successfully for president in modern times, candidates must be able to 
secure millions of dollars in campaign funds.  That process is much easier with support 
from either the Democratic or Republican parties.  Occasionally, third party candidates 
can receive enough votes to hurt other candidates if their political beliefs are closely 
aligned (i.e., Ross Perot taking votes from George H. W. Bush in 1992), but the outcome 
is the still the same—either A or B wins. 
 
14.  Feenburg also ignores the fact that the Internet was one of many post-Sputnik 
influenced technologies created to establish America’s scientific, militaristic, and 
economic dominance through sharing scientific information with allies, bases, and 
universities. 
 
15.  The phrase “user friendly” is extremely important to understanding how computers 
shape social practice.  Before graphical user interfaces (GUIs), such as Microsoft 
Windows, computer users had to understand the language of computers through text-
based commands.  To learn these commands, one had to learn a new language.  
Currently, this language has been converted to graphical object-oriented commands that 
can be done by dragging and dropping.  For instance, copying the file “dissertation.doc” 
from the Desktop to the My Documents file folder can be done by simply dragging 
“dissertation.doc” from the Desktop to the My Documents folder.  The text-based 
command would look like this: 
COPY C:\Documents and Settings\Username\Desktop\dissertation.doc 
C:\Documents and Settings\Username\My Documents\ 
Although the above command is a relatively easy one, a user in a text-based computer 
environment had to enter commands similar to the one above in order to set preferences, 
run programs, scan for viruses, and do other “everyday” tasks.  Those text-based 
commands are now done automatically or with the (double) click of the mouse.  Each 
new computer “advancement,” whether it be hardware or software, is marketed as more 
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user friendly; therefore, to “fix” one’s computer, users need only buy the next release and 
not understand the complex programming behind it. 
 
16.  An exception to this is the growing open source software available to users.  Open 
source means that software is usually free or inexpensive.  Operating systems such as 
LINUX are examples.  However, users normally use open source in conjunction with 
proprietary software, such as Windows or Macintosh.  For example, I have SUSE 
LINUX, but I use Microsoft products because my university uses these products and 
regularly upgrades the proprietary software.  I would be worried if something as 
important as this very dissertation could not be opened on the campus computers if my 
laptop or desktop crashed.  If I were to send a non-Windows file to my advisor that she 
could not open . . . I would have a problem.  Therefore, open source is not a viable 
alternative for users who must have compatible files and software in a closely networked 
environment (such as an office, a university, or a group of gamers). 
 
17.  Deborah Brandt, although not specifically addressing computer literacy but 
literacies, argues that literacy is a basic civil right (206). 
 
18.  The fact that we could identify predominantly African-American communities (as 
opposed to “human” communities) attests to systemic and historic racism. 
 
19.  Although Brown v. the Board of Education of Topeka Kansas overruled Plessey v. 
Ferguson, institutionalized racism still exists.  Democracy is often associated with 
freedom and egalitarianism, but larger cultural values influence how citizens vote; 
historically, voting in America has been to the detriment of African Americans from 
slavery to Jim Crow. 
 
20.  Theodore Roosevelt had been trying to build up the navy since he was the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy under William McKinley; he “observ[ed] the success of Great 
Britain, the growth of Germany, and the increasing dominance of Japan as a Pacific 
power, “and he believed the U. S. “must also have a great navy” (Nelson 3).  In the 
historical moment of the Spanish-American War and the decade beyond, modernizing the 
navy fit with expansionist goals.  From the point of view of a certain relevant social 
group for wireless technology being important for the navy, Roosevelt and senior 
officials helped shape the new navy through new technology. 
 
21.  Even though Marconi’s company did not win the bid, Marconi was the first to outfit 
U.S. Navy ships.  Marconi was “invited to install wireless telegraphy sets on two 
warships for onboard testing [in 1899]” (Yeang 2).  By Marconi’s own admission, he 
chose not to use his most up-to-date device during the U.S. Navy tests because he had not 
yet secured an American patent (“Wireless Telegraphy” 294), an obvious political and 
economic concern. 
 
22.  Rosalind Williams does not consider financial systems or other abstract computer 
systems as technologies (661).  Her article expresses nostalgia for past “true” 
engineering, which according to her was “as much about creating a moral world as it was 
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about creating a world of knowledge or of things” (658).  She also “muses” about 
whether or not “technological development can continue to flourish indefinitely in a 
market environment” (664).  She briefly discusses open source as a potential departure 
from capitalism and (possibly) to more democratic control because “[o]pen-source 
advocates believe that truly robust software can be built only when it is treated as a form 
of scientific knowledge, so that incremental contributions accumulate indefinitely 
through a system of peer review” (664).  However, she feels that “technology that profits 
from change for the sake of change” is hardly a “proper” situation (664). 
 
23.  In Aldus Huxley’s Brave New World, the characters use “My Ford” instead of “My 
God” to show disbelief.  This apotheosis of Ford is Huxley’s interpretation that society 
has embraced industrialization as a religious or spiritual value. 
 
24.  John White suggests that Marinetti’s claim that his prose style was influenced by 
reporting his stories using Morse code while he was a war correspondent during Italy’s 
bombing of Tripoli was a fabrication (162). 
 
25.  Although humans (or, hominids, more specifically) have a common ancestor with 
modern apes, humans did not evolve from apes.  Such a view assumes that modern apes 
never evolved but, instead, stayed in the same form as they are today—not undergoing 
natural selection or adaptation.  In other words, evolution is not a progressive change as 
popular definitions would have us believe. 
 
26.  And “machine-man” is more appropriate for Marinetti than “machine-human” 
because of his disdain for women.  Although Hewitt argues that phallocentrism is 
indicative of fascist ideology (153), I argue industrial ideology is more relevant to 
Marinetti’s early Futurist work. 
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CHAPTER II 
MARCONI’S REPRESENTATIONS OF THE WIRELESS TO THE SCIENTIFIC 
COMMUNITY 
Think of . . . all the calling which goes on every day from room to room of 
a house, and then think of that calling extending from pole to pole, not a 
noisy babble, but a call audible to him who wants to hear, and absolutely 
silent to all others.  It would be like dreamland and ghostland, not the 
ghostland cultivated by heated imagination, but a real communication 
from a distance based on true physical laws.  P. T. McGrath, “A Very 
Loud Electromagnetic Voice” (32) 
 
Ultimately, Marconi’s wireless became a successful technology.  The relevant 
social groups in the early twentieth century recognized it as viable and valuable through 
their negotiations and interactions.  Prior to any technology’s black-box status, though, is 
a period in which inventors, business people, potential users, governments, and similar 
groups “receive” information about a technology.  Although one could argue that users 
learn about technology by interacting with a technology, discourse is also interaction.  
Normally, we associate technology with hi-tech items, specifically, computers.  Before 
computers became “everywhere,” they had to fit into social practices.  The computer’s 
success rests partially upon our Information Age’s gravitation towards the potentials of 
databases, search engines, and related hardware and software.  For society, computers are 
not only tools but symbols:  Educators and parents believe they allow students greater 
opportunities to learn; businesses believe they represent efficiency and professionalism, 
therefore, profit; and everyday users, regardless of whether they are frustrated, believe 
computers are necessities in a world inundated with hi-tech networking.  Technologies 
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such as computers do not exist just because they are feasible or operational; they exist 
because they “caught on.”  Somehow the culture in which they exist accepted them or 
was made to accept them.  Discourse adhering to social values, practices, and attitudes 
may cause acceptance. 
This chapter demonstrates how Marconi rhetorically constructed his early 
wireless invention using strategies that show the wireless to be a product of the “built 
environment” of the early twentieth century.  The environment is immediately the British 
scientific and technical community, but his extended audience stretches to other 
industrialized countries and across the Atlantic Ocean.  Representations of the wireless 
go beyond merely mechanical or physical descriptions.  The wireless was a new 
technology being presented in a scientific forum before it became the radio.  Marconi’s 
representations constructed an image of what the wireless might have become.  These 
presentations were reprinted in technical periodicals and the annals of scientific societies 
such as the Royal Society of Arts, London, the Royal Institution of Great Britain, and the 
Smithsonian Institution.  These texts that contain Marconi’s presentations show the 
wireless as a new product signaling human evolution, creating an economic enterprise, 
supporting the military, and increasing the efficiency and scope of (mass) 
communication.  The wireless “fit” the social framework of the early twentieth century 
because it was an advancement presented as a new communication device that would 
allow humans another form of control over nature.  Marconi promoted the wireless as a 
tool to make the seas safer for travel, insure cargo better, and connect ocean goers with 
“land news.”   
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Marconi’s representations of the wireless demonstrate how rhetoric can position a 
technology to be viable both commercially and culturally.  Selecting technical 
presentations, which later became technical documents and archived texts, is an 
appropriate way to discover a rhetoric of technology.  Marconi presents his wireless in 
these texts as an ideal product for society and an invention indicative of modern progress.  
The texts, however, are but one of several types of rhetorics for the wireless.  In the next 
chapter, I will examine how the popular press uses another rhetoric to (re)present the 
wireless for a popular audience.  Additionally, patent documents and lab notes are 
rhetorics because they represent the wireless symbolically—through text and images.  My 
study notes those symbolic rhetorics but focuses on discourse for a wider audience.  
Although much can be said about the forums in which Marconi presented his findings, 
this chapter concentrates on the texts reprinted from his presentations.  However, I do 
briefly show how the history of such scientific societies as the Royal Society of Arts, 
London and the Royal Institution of Great Britain support my claim that the wireless fits 
the prevailing attitudes and values of progress during the early twentieth century. 
In order to demonstrate how the wireless fit within an industrial culture that 
favored “progress,” I have selected three of Marconi’s early presentations to examine 
how he discusses or represents the wireless as a viable early twentieth-century technology 
through discourse in the following texts: 
1. to the Royal Institute of Great Britain on February 2, 1900 (“Wireless 
Telegraphy”) 
2. to the Royal Society of Arts, London on May 15, 1901 (“Syntonic Wireless 
Telegraphy”)1 and 
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3. to the Royal Institute of Great Britain on March 3, 1905 (“Recent Advances in 
Wireless Telegraphy”) 
The three presentations are instances where Marconi rhetorically represents the 
significance of the wireless.  He delivered them to an important community and spoke to 
concerns outside of science and engineering prior to the wireless becoming a literal and 
figurative black box—the radio.  Marconi delivered the presentations before highly 
technical/scientific audiences, and his discourse conveyed more than technical 
information during the wireless’s early stages.  Marconi presented much of the potential 
of his new system along with current successes:  He discussed how ships communicated 
with other ships and land-based stations; he mentioned how people and cargo were saved 
by distress calls; and he prophesized that the wireless would change how information was 
disseminated.  The forums where he delivered his presentations were important—the 
Royal Institution and the Royal Society of Arts, London were products of the Industrial 
Revolution, clearinghouses and think tanks for “mechanical arts.”  Their goal was to 
promote the practical application of science to human endeavors.  These groups and 
groups similar to them—Birmingham’s Lunar Society, the French Societe d’ 
Encouragement pour l’Industrie Nationale, and the American Society for the Promotion 
of the Useful Arts—were technical venues where scientists and engineers displayed their 
work and promoted ingenuity, and they were also founded by inventors, industrialists, 
and businessmen with entrepreneurial-industrial pursuits (Noble 77-9). 
 These three presentations are not meant to be definitive examples of Marconi’s 
rhetoric; instead, they represent Marconi’s engagement in the rhetorical construction of a 
technology prior to its becoming a black box.  Although Marconi was a widely known 
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and respected inventor in Europe and America, between 1900 and 1905, he did not have a 
widely successful commercial product.  He did have ships outfitted with the wireless, but 
he was still in the pitching stage—attempting to prove the wireless was beneficial (and 
real).  Also, his presentations supported his ownership of the wireless, which I will 
demonstrate later in this chapter as important to establishing himself as the future “father 
of the radio.”  Marconi did not just speak about the technical make up of his invention; 
instead, his presentations show the wireless as a technology embedded in the values of a 
culture.  Specifically, the texts reveal four topoi related to Marconi’s rhetoric, which are 
representative of other rhetorical constructions of technologies:  the cultural pride 
associated with technological advancement/evolution, expectations and current successes 
of the wireless, the economic viability of the wireless, and patents to show Marconi’s 
ownership of the wireless. 
The rest of this chapter demonstrates how Marconi fit his wireless into the 
technical discussion and how the four topoi above, combined with other rhetorical 
strategies beyond physical representations, define the wireless’s rhetoric.  First, I show 
how the wireless fit into the early twentieth century’s scientific-technical framework and 
the importance of Marconi’s texts and presentations for the wireless’s rhetorical 
construction.  Second, I examine how Marconi builds a scientific ethos in order to bolster 






The Wireless’s Place in Early Twentieth-Century Science and Technology 
 Marconi’s presentations to the technical and scientific community represent the 
wireless as human advancement.  The West seemed ready to welcome technology for the 
sake of newness, and Marconi’s audiences gathered in these technical/scientific forums to 
learn about what was new in electromagnetic arts.  His using wireless signals to cross the 
Atlantic Ocean made him a celebrity, but he had rivals and critics who did not feel he had 
a good working technology (c.f. Weightman).  The forums, therefore, were necessary for 
gathering support for the wireless’s existence.  Readers may be quick to assume that 
Marconi wanted increased investment in his company to help the wireless’s R&D; after 
all, seeking capital investment seems necessary for anyone (or any company) trying to 
produce a new product.  However, Marconi’s investors were “locked” according to the 
company prospectus of June 18, 1900, which states “[s]hares are only offered at present 
to the shareholders of Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph Company, Limited” (qtd. in 
Hancock 25).  New investors or directors may have become board members between 
Marconi’s February 1900 presentation and the April 1900 founding of Marconi’s 
Wireless Telegraph Company, Ltd., but the share rules show that only current investors 
would be allowed to invest in the company.  The presentations were most likely 
conversations solidifying the wireless’s scientific merit.  However, the scientific merit of 
the wireless and its economic practicality were not mutually exclusive. 
 Although the technical community2 could not have jumped onto the company’s 
board of directors, Marconi’s mentioning of the economic possibilities of the wireless in 
his presentations shows that the application of science to practical endeavors reflects how 
his rhetorical choices adhere to certain values of industrialized society.  Marconi might 
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not have been consciously constructing his presentations to “fit” traditional scientific 
discourse, but his presentations do support modernist, industrial, Western values for 
technology.  Furthermore, the texts convey the wireless’s rhetoric because they discuss 
the wireless’s potential nature.  Ultimately, the wireless was successful because it became 
a black box—the radio.  Marconi, the technologist, does quite a bit of marketing in these 
texts, which reinforces the fact that his words were not simply to discuss the physical 
makeup of his wireless, but also its economic potential. 
 Marconi demonstrated the wireless’s value as a viable product to enhance 
contemporary communication, positioning the wireless as a better communication tool 
than cables.  Such positioning is really a PR campaign, and Marconi staged some 
important wireless transmissions to intrigue the public:  He had Queen Victoria send a 
message to her son, and, a few years later, he had Theodore Roosevelt and the King of 
England send messages to each other; both events were covered in the popular press.  He 
commented on his successes at sea reporting on yacht races during the presentations; of 
course, this has no scientific merit but is certainly exciting.  As Edison did before him 
with electrical works (Bazerman), Marconi was looking to create a market for his system 
before his system became a reality.  Marconi’s early system (circa 1900) needs to be 
distinguished from the future radio:  The radio is an artifact and, as I mentioned earlier, a 
black box technology; the wireless, is an idea comprised of a transmitter, receiver, and 
various other parts that connects people and stations without wires.  The early wireless is 
a scientific-technical-business product:  “Marconi’s work-network nods respectfully to 
the scholarly achievements of scientific discovery, conceived as properly application-
less, but simultaneously pirates its apparatus, adapting it to a precedent technology 
60 
pregnant with extant applications, telegraphy with wires” (Jaffe forthcoming).  Therefore, 
Marconi’s application becomes positioned to be the next advancement over cables and 
wires.  The texts where the wireless “exists” in the early twentieth century are artifacts on 
wireless negotiations between Marconi and the technical community.  They reveal more 
than the invention’s mechanics; they reveal potential economic viability. 
Part of the wireless’s negotiation was to discuss its economic viability; after all, as 
Charles Bazerman notes, “technology must always overtly adhere to the marketplace, 
political ambitions, and personal desire” (“The Production of Technology” 383).  Those 
who credit Marconi with inventing the wireless attach significance to his economic vision 
for the wireless.  Thus, Judge William K. Townsend—supporting Marconi from a 
necessary legal position—agreed that Marconi was a proprietor of wireless knowledge 
because he “appreciate[ed] that this new current was destined to carry onward the freight 
and traffic of world commerce” (qtd. in Hancock 6).  The court granted Marconi the 
patent because he took the science of hertzian waves (also called “wireless signals” and, 
later, “radio waves”) and created a commercially viable system for harnessing their 
power.  Even though Marconi had great success in courts and in the wireless market, his 
discussions show ownership.  Also, his discussions show that he is worthy of making 
scientific claims and constructing a reliable product. 
 
Building a Scientific/Technical Ethos 
 
 Marconi presented the wireless as a new incarnation of electromagnetic science, a 
field dating back nearly a century from his early work.  He shows that his work is built 
upon an old field in his introduction to his 1900 presentation “Wireless Telegraphy,” 
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where he brings up six major scientists:  Andre-Marie Ampere, Joseph Henry, Michael 
Faraday, James Clerk Maxwell, Heinrich Hertz, and Sir John Ambrose Fleming (287).  
Two of the six are familiar to most audiences, but all are familiar to technical audiences.  
Ampere was a French physicist of the early nineteenth century for whom the ampere 
(amp) was named.  Heinrich Hertz was a German physicist who first discovered radio 
waves.  His name today is mainly associated with measuring cycles per second (Hz).  
Marconi’s references to past inventors show him “standing on the shoulders of 
greatness.”  In part, he is borrowing a scientific ethos by showing he understands the 
field’s rich history, but he is also situating himself in this history.  This strategy helps 
solidify his credibility while promoting the wireless as an important new technology. 
 Of course, Marconi’s accolades to past scientists could just be out of respect, but 
they also introduce the audience to a technology with an important history.  The 
introduction to Marconi’s 1900 presentation offers the following descriptions about three 
important scientists in the field:  James Clerk Maxwell’s “splendid dynamical theory of 
the electro-magnetic field”; Heinrich Hertz to whom “[w]e can not pay too high a tribute 
to [his] genius”; and Professor Hughes “the eminent electrician” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 
287).  Marconi also uses Professor Fleming’s words to praise Hertz when he claims 
Hertz’s discovery is the “greatest insight into the hidden mechanisms of nature which has 
yet been made by the intellect of man” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 287).  Not only does he 
simultaneously praise Hertz and invoke Fleming, but Marconi adds a mystical element to 
his own work:  The “hidden mechanisms of nature”—sending wireless signals—were 
now achieved.  Marconi’s language seems to suggest a way of comprehending these 
invisible waves, which are part of the built environment, part of technological 
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advancement.  Later in the popular press Marconi will be shown as a wizard (like Edison 
and Baekeland) whose efforts are seen as magical because he can conjure up the forces of 
nature.  In his presentation here, it is nature that he is controlling:  “A century of progress 
such as this has made wireless telegraphy possible.  Its basic principles are established in 
the very nature of electricity itself.  Its evolution has placed another great force of nature 
at our disposal” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 287).  Marconi’s words “a century of progress” 
obviously refer to the science of electromagnetism, but, rhetorically, those words connect 
the wireless to human evolution.  After all, nature is at the disposal of humanity. 
The scientists Marconi invokes are the “geniuses” who harness nature’s power, 
and Marconi implicates himself in this important work.  In another presentation, Marconi 
shows that he is continuing in the rich tradition of eminent scientists when he mentions 
“the memorable researches and discoveries of Faraday carried out in the Royal 
Institution” (“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 131).  Since Michael Faraday 
was the founder of these weekly meetings at the Royal Institution, Marconi’s invocation 
works in two ways: 
1) He implicitly links himself with Faraday—the man who first worked in 
electromagnetism, and 
2) He positions his and Faraday’s work in electric communication as an important 
field—a foundational field—for the Royal Institution. 
He finishes his brief historical prelude by mentioning Maxwell’s “wonderful 
mathematical theory of electricity and magnetism,” which was “inspired by Faraday’s 
work,” and explains in the text how, in turn, Maxwell’s work influenced Hertz, who “in 
1887 furnished his great practical proof of the existence of these true electro-magnetic 
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waves” (“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 131-2, italics mine).  Marconi 
describes each of the above scientists’ works as “memorable,” “wonderful,” and “great,” 
respectively.  In the context of scientific progress these memorable, wonderful, and great 
accomplishments are gifts to humanity. 
Marconi’s brief histories set him up as the next important figure in wireless 
research:  “Building on the foundations prepared by these great men, [I] carried out in 
1895 and 1896 [my] first tests, with apparatus which embodied the principle on which 
long-distance wireless telegraphy is successfully worked at the present day” (“Recent 
Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 132).  By adding his name to this rich history, 
Marconi positions himself as an important figure for technological progress.  Marconi 
builds himself into the history of the wireless again by claiming that “a new method 
adopted by the author in 1898 . . . was a step in the right direction” for improving 
syntonic wireless telegraphy.  Had Marconi not been able to have stations in close 
proximity without interference, meaning without syntonic wireless telegraphy, “a very 
important and effectual limit to the practical utilization of wireless telegraphy would be 
imposed” (“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 133).  He then explains in 
technical terms how he was able to correct his system so that transmitters and receivers 
could be tuned correctly, thus allowing messages to be sent to the correct place without 
being lost, jumbled, or re-routed (“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 133). 
 Marconi builds his scientific ethos in order to have credibility with the scientific 
and technical communities.  His audience is more inclined to accept his invention’s value 
and practicality (and even existence) if he adheres to the discourse community’s “rules” 
for presenting new knowledge.  And presenting a new invention as a viable technology, 
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one not (seemingly) as ubiquitous as the radio is today, requires Marconi to present 
himself as scientifically credible.  Wireless signals or, as they were called, “hertzian 
waves,” were not fully understood in the early twentieth century.  Part of Marconi’s 
discourse is to dispel myths about the limits of hertzian waves by countering with 
scientific “facts.”  Building upon the work of those before him helps establish his 
scientific persona and allows him to be seen as an authority who will accurately portray 
the wireless; he must become the wireless’s mouthpiece, and a believable mouthpiece 
would have to be scientifically knowledgeable.  This necessary part of his rhetoric further 
constructs the wireless for his audience:  It is not a trivial, dubious gadget; instead, the 
result is a practical apparatus fulfilling a perceived social need ending a century of 
scientific progress. 
His audience is also hearing (or reading) his scientific ethos when he adheres to a 
few “standard” scientific-paper practices.  While Marconi attempts to create a consensus 
about the science of wireless signals, he does not downplay his involvement in his 
research except through his use of passive voice and third person speech (which may only 
be an editorial stance for the journal in which it is reproduced).  Still, his narrative 
borrows the scientific ethos Gilbert and Mulkay describe in scientific papers where 
conclusions (or accomplishments for Marconi) seem to follow “unproblematically from 
empirical evidence” (46).  Nowhere in the texts does Marconi present the problems or 
failures he encountered when constructing the wireless.  Instead, he offers readers the 
successes as if they were simply waiting to be discovered.  This rhetorical strategy is a 
necessary component of persuading an audience: 
[There is persuasion] through character whenever the speech is spoken in 
such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-
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minded people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others] on 
all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not exact 
knowledge but room for doubt. (Aristotle 1.2.4) 
 
Marconi’s strategy is to portray both him and the wireless as credible.  The technology 
had not yet been universally recognized by the technical community, so Marconi built a 
scientific ethos while rhetorically constructing the wireless, an emerging technology 
without “exact knowledge” but much doubt. 
The scientific aspects of his presentations are necessary because he is convincing 
an audience—an interested but skeptical one—that wireless signals do, in fact, exist.  
Once the technology becomes a regular feature of an established system or tool, the 
technology does not need to justify its existence scientifically.  For instance, the internal 
combustion engine “runs” on the idea that gasoline can explode in a controlled way in 
order to drive pistons and other mechanisms to make an automobile move.  The science 
of such a tool had to be hypothesized before the practical application—such as a diesel 
engine—could be created.  The wireless followed a similar timeline.  Marconi 
hypothesized that he could send wireless signals, and his experiments enabled him to see 
the wireless through to fruition.  But before the final application existed, Marconi 
promoted his “flawless” hertzian wave experiments through scientific rhetoric. 
All of Marconi’s tests were not successful, but that fact is nearly impossible to 
extrapolate from his presentations.  Even the historical accounts seem to gloss over his 
failures and present events as if they happened more or less flawlessly (Tarrant; 
Corrazza; Hancock).  Marconi, as would any inventor, had to “try out” different ways to 
transmit and receive wireless signals.  Although some accounts mention Marconi having 
trouble with a test or tests, the accounts normally claim factors other than the technology 
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are to blame (c.f. Hancock; Tarrant).  In the 1900 presentation, for instance, Marconi 
blames human error when explaining why his system was defective during the Boer War 
in South Africa.  Some assistants went to help, “[b]ut when they arrived at De Aar, they 
found that no arrangements had been made to supply poles, kites, or balloons” (“Wireless 
Telegraphy” 295).  The crew had to use inferior makeshift kites; therefore, “[t]he results 
which [Marconi’s assistant] obtained were not at first altogether satisfactory, but this is 
accounted for by the fact that the working was attempted without poles or proper kites” 
(“Wireless Telegraphy” 295).  Additionally, Marconi makes it clear that the wireless is 
still a good system:  “It is therefore manifest that [the wireless operators’] partial failure 
was due to the lack of proper preparation on the part of the local military authorities, and 
has no bearing on the practicability and utility of the system when carried out under 
normal conditions” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 295). 
 The problems above could have been harmful to Marconi’s reputation (ethos) and, 
therefore, harmful to the wireless system.  Imagine the public hearing that Marconi’s 
assistants using any apparatus failed to establish communication.  Regardless of inferior 
equipment, observers will perceive the results as a system failure, and that perception 
would be hard to overcome.  Marconi himself states “that if I had been on the spot myself 
I should have refused to open any station until the officers had provided the means for 
elevating the wire, which, as you know, is essential to success” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 
296).  Marconi creates the idea of a flawless invention to convince his audience of its 
potential existence.  Of course, having a viable military application would bolster 
Marconi’s economic potential, so he offers with confidence “that before the campaign is 
ended wireless telegraphy will have proved its utility in actual warfare” (“Wireless 
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Telegraphy” 296).  Marconi even foreshadows the wireless’s military usefulness when he 
invites the audience to “agree with me that it is much to be regretted that the system 
could not be got into these towns prior to the commencement of hostilities” (“Wireless 
Telegraphy” 296). 
 Marconi is positioning the wireless and himself favorably.  The scientific ethos he 
builds is an enhancement to his rhetorical construction of the wireless.  But being 
credible is not enough to have the wireless realized.  Marconi must also show how the 
wireless fit with the social attitudes of his audience.  Marconi spoke to the audience’s 
desire for advancement, another cultural trait of Western society. 
 
Cultural Pride through Technological Advancement 
Technological progress is a major trope for modernity.  Inventions were seen as 
progress, and progress was an important cultural variable throughout modernity.  
Marconi himself presented his invention as a monumental technology, one that would 
define the future of communication.  By claiming that his work with the wireless has 
enormous, even unthinkable, potential, Marconi adheres to the belief that technological 
capabilities are beyond comprehension.  He also reaffirms the popular belief that 
technological advancement marks human progress.  Contemporarily, one could find a 
“science fiction” quality in technology being beyond comprehension in the works of H. 
G. Wells.  But what had not yet become part of the mass consciousness was Wells’ 
techno-dystopia or high modernist authors’ concern with mechanization and 
technological atrocity in war (such as the views of D. H. Lawrence and Virginia Woolf). 
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Human evolution appears to be implicit in positive representations of 
technologies.  The wireless’s feats became human feats.  Marconi portrays the wireless as 
a “record breaker” to show where his work fit in the history of electromagnetic science 
and where the wireless would take humanity in the future.  Technological progress had 
virtually no limits, and that realization meant celebration for a culture.  David E. Nye 
mentions how Americans celebrated technological feats, viewing them as sublime.  The 
opening of the Erie Canal and the start of construction on the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad were both firsts that Americans celebrated, and they did so on the Fourth of July 
(Nye 47).  Nye goes on to say “the canal was understood as a product of democracy,” 
meaning the culture shared in the glory of having contributed to its creation (36).  
Technologies were a part of the national consciousness and new displays were a chance 
to celebrate human endeavors.  Being the first to accomplish or create something is 
significant; for instance, a person could cross the English Channel by swimming, a pilot 
could cross the Atlantic Ocean by flying an airplane, or a newspaper could be published 
in a place where it never before existed.  Marconi accomplished all three of the above 
events using wireless signals, and all were major technological feats. 
Marconi’s texts also speak to the wireless’s place in human advancement when he 
discusses the firsts in wireless communication.  Technological firsts are important to a 
culture because they are instances of cultural pride.  The “first” Marconi mentions in his 
1900 presentation is a relatively small one compared to walking on the moon or even 
sending the first wireless transmission across the Atlantic, but being able to print “a small 
paper called the Transatlantic Times” was a major commercial step forward for his 
system (“Wireless Telegraphy” 294, italics mine).  This event revolutionized 
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communication during travel, and Marconi took pride in announcing that “the first 
instance of the passengers of a steamer receiving news while several miles from land . . . 
seems to point to a not far distant prospect of passengers maintaining direct and regular 
communication with the land” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 294, italics mine).  Again, 
Marconi is looking ahead or, more accurately, positioning the audience to look ahead, 
which is an important rhetorical move for a culture inundated with new technological 
advancements. 
 Although firsts can bolster cultural pride, they may also ignite intercultural 
dispute:  When invited to celebrate the wireless’s fiftieth anniversary, the Russian 
ambassador to Rome declined because the Soviet Union had already celebrated the 
wireless’s creation two years earlier by honoring the man they believed to be the true 
inventor of the wireless—the Russian Alexander Stepanovitch Popoff (Hancock 2).  H. E. 
Hancock refutes that Popoff was the “father of the wireless,” claiming “Russian 
psychology” is to blame for the ambassador rejecting Marconi’s historical significance as 
the wireless’s inventor; but the culture capital of being the first is quite apparent (2).  
Popoff had technically been the first to send wireless signals, but Marconi is credited 
with being the first to put the wireless into commercial use, which seems to give him his 
stature among many biographers (Bucci, Pelosi, and Selleri; Corazza; Crowther; Garratt; 
Hancock; Jensen; Kraeuter; D. Marconi; M. Marconi; Sungook; Tarrant).  The 
commercial first of Marconi’s wireless allows him “a communicative application for 
credit-taking” (Jaffe forthcoming).  Here is where the technologist “wins” over the 
scientist according to Aaron Jaffe:  “To say that Marconi—or, for that matter, Hertz, 
Tesla, Popov, Branly, Bose, Lodge, Fleming, Fessenden, DeForest, or Armstrong—
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invented radio is not to say he did so ex nihilo but instead that his name became ‘black-
boxed’ with a certain modification of the application’s component configuration” 
(forthcoming).  Additionally, Marconi’s black-box status or “brand” has support from 
audiences that associate the wireless with him. 
Being the first to envision the economic potential of the wireless, or, at least, 
being the first recognized by history, bolstered Marconi’s credibility.  When he discusses 
his “firsts,” he furthers his scientific ethos, allowing his rhetorical construction of the 
wireless—as a monumental technology—to have more credibility.  Here the distinction 
between the wireless and the radio is most crucial:  The radio is a technology that has not 
been in question in nearly a century; the wireless in its pre-black-box stage needed to be 
accepted by the technical and scientific communities.  Showing his expertise to the 
electromagnetic community is part of his rhetoric, and Marconi struggles not only with 
showing his new invention in a positive light, but also with debunking established 
scientific “truth.”  In fact, even Edison, an established techno-celebrity, did not believe 
Marconi crossed the Atlantic because such a crossing was contrary to the accepted 
scientific belief that radio waves could not pass through the curvature of the earth 
(Tarrant 63).  Eventually, Edison and the rest of the scientific community revised their 
earlier doubts and accepted Marconi’s triumph.  Therefore, building his scientific ethos 
was a necessary aspect of his rhetorical maneuvering—speaking as an expert who had to 
convince audiences that he had a new product that (first) worked and could be used for 
profitable, practical applications.  Later in this chapter I will show how Marconi directly 
dispels this myth, but it is important to emphasize that his accomplishments, which I have 
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no doubt he made, did not stand by themselves.  Marconi had to convince the audience he 
accomplished this transatlantic feat. 
Another way Marconi builds a scientific ethos is by detailing his new 
improvements to emphasize his expertise and success.  Marconi describes a “magnetic 
receiver” that increases the distance of wireless transmissions, thus reducing doubt about 
his wireless claims.  In his 1905 presentation he told the audience about this improvement 
now being “used on the ships of the Royal Navy and on all trans-Atlantic liners which are 
carrying on a long-distance news service,” and “[i]t has also been used to a large extent in 
the tests across the Atlantic Ocean” (“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 137-38).  
In other words, Marconi’s improvement is already in practical use.  He also reaffirms his 
status within the scientific community by again mentioning that “[I] had the honor to 
deliver [my] last lecture at the Royal Institution,” when he spoke about the possibility of 
a magnetic receiver being able to “work a recording instrument” (“Recent Advances in 
Wireless Telegraphy” 138).  Doing so greatly increases the value of his system.  
Fortunately, “[Marconi] is glad to be able to announce that he has recently been able to 
construct a magnetic receiver that will work a relay and a recorder” (“Recent Advances in 
Wireless Telegraphy” 138).  Besides having a more commercially viable system, 
Marconi can also reinforce that his past hypothesis from a previous presentation was 
correct, thus bolstering any new claims or hypotheses he makes for the future of his 
wireless telegraphy system.  Marconi’s ethos, therefore, is a necessary bridge for showing 




Expectations and Current Successes of the Wireless 
The fact that the wireless was an advancement was not enough—Marconi had to 
show its practical necessity.  Was the wireless simply a gadget that amateurs and 
engineers would tinker with in basements and sheds?  Or would the wireless have a 
commercial value that could be realized by a large portion of the culture?  One mission of 
the Royal Institution and Royal Society of Arts was to promote applications of science.  
Marconi thus shows the wireless’s economic value by illustrating instances where the 
wireless seems crucial to social practices, often portraying the wireless as a useful 
humanitarian device.  Marconi’s wireless did not transform society; instead, it fit into 
social practice.  Because telegraph and telephone wires were already in place, the 
wireless did not change communication needs—one need being the ability to 
communicate across vast distances.  But Marconi argues for the value of the wireless in 
three ways: 
1. He creates dissatisfaction with current technology, which speaks to the 
technology’s perceived need. 
2. He discusses the current successes and places where the wireless exists even if 
they are on a small scale. 
3. He dispels myths about the technology. 
Marconi had to show dissatisfaction with current technology in order to make his 
new system seem necessary.  New technology must work within the current system and 
fulfill a niche or demand, which is done rhetorically by a “relevant social group.”  Wiebe 
E. Bijker’s argument that “relevant social groups” help rhetorically (and physically) 
construct technologies is important to creating dissatisfaction.  Although Marconi, the 
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wireless’s mouthpiece, spoke to a small audience, his words helped condition relevant 
social groups such as other scientists, engineers, business people, and the public.  These 
groups had to believe that the wireless was important and then demand it or its services 
(telegrams, communication, rescue dispatching, and entertainment).  Similarly, as 
Bazerman argues, Edison’s marketing had to “create a dissatisfaction with a current 
technology” in order to induce consumers to purchase it (142).  Edison had to create 
dissatisfaction when he was developing his incandescent light bulb:  He showed that gas 
lighting was inferior to his new electric lighting.  In remote parts of the country the new 
technology meant the difference between light and darkness, but, because Edison was 
mainly marketing to urban areas using gas or candle lighting, he had to make other 
rhetorical claims.  Many advertisements in newspapers showed that “gas technology had 
a number of drawbacks”:  Besides the fear of fires and poisoning, the ads pointed out that 
electric lighting was more flattering to female beauty (Bazerman 150). 
As Edison competed with gas, Marconi had to compete with the technology of 
cable by showing the wireless as better and more versatile.  Cables can only be used to 
communicate with the two countries between which they are laid, 
but if a wireless connection is established between two such countries the 
stations may be instantly used in time of war, or in any other emergency, 
to communicate with other stations, situated say, at Gibraltar, the West 
Indies, or some inland point in North America, and also, if necessary, with 
war ships carrying apparatus tuned to the waves such stations radiate. 
(“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 143-4, italics mine) 
 
Marconi tries to convince the relevant social group of scientists and engineers that cable 
has a limited use; also, he subtly warns that the wireless would be necessary if war were 
to break out.  Juxtaposing international wireless communication and war can create an 
aura of insecurity, and his boast that the wireless is currently used “from Cornwall to the 
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Scilly Islands, on the not infrequent occasions of the breaking down of the cables” further 
constructs cable technology as an unpredictable, unacceptable technology (“Recent 
Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 144, italics mine). 
 In addition to showing cable technology as less secure and less reliable than the 
wireless, Marconi seems confident “in [the wireless’s] ability to furnish a more 
economical means for the transmission of telegrams from England to America and from 
England to the colonies than the present service carried on by cables” (“Recent Advances 
in Wireless Telegraphy” 144).  Therefore, Marconi quantifies a “real” value in adopting 
the future wireless system:  It is cheaper than the alternative.  Finally, Marconi does not 
just argue that the wireless is inexpensive; he also proclaims “that some day it would be 
possible to send messages to the other side of the globe,” and that feat would allow “the 
possibility of carrying out tests of very great scientific interest” (“Recent Advances in 
Wireless Telegraphy” 145, italics mine).  The wireless is not just a commercial 
instrument better than cable; it is a scientific development; it is progress understood as 
evolving the human capacity to communicate. 
 Unless a new technology, such as the wireless, can be shown as superior to 
current technology, it may fail.  Marconi specifically creates dissatisfaction with another 
contemporary shipping technology/practice when, in his 1900 presentation, he discusses a 
test between the two vessels the Alexandra and the Juno.  In order to create this 
dissatisfaction, he points out that wireless technology is superior to sight for signaling 
other ships.  Apparently, the Juno transmitted signals from the flagship Alexandra to 
other ships with Marconi’s wireless, which he calls “the system” in this description, and 
“[t]his enabled evolutions to be carried out even when the flagship was out of sight” 
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(“Wireless Telegraphy” 291).  Marconi goes on to argue wireless progress and 
superiority over the current system by claiming “[communication among the ships] 
would have been impossible by means of flags or semaphores” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 
291).  Semaphores are visual signals using flags, lights, or a person’s arms to display an 
alphabetical code.  His wireless system was superior to existing technologies, implying 
they are outdated and inefficient. 
 Besides creating dissatisfaction with current technologies, Marconi also shows 
that the wireless continues to be improved.  Because technological narratives are ones of 
progress, pointing to “the old way of doing things” creates dissatisfaction.  But instead of 
creating dissatisfaction about another technology, Marconi implicitly creates 
dissatisfaction with older versions of the wireless.  He does this effectively when he 
describes tests done on commercial vessels.  Because these tests show improvement, they 
are inherently “progressive.”  Marconi provides the audience with examples of progress 
in order to construct a working image of the wireless.  Throughout the wireless’s 
invention and even after the radio became a black box, inventors and observers (for 
instance, assistants and reporters) stressed the range of communication applications.  
Marconi often refers to increased distances (for transmissions) in his presentation when 
discussing his wireless’s range.  Obviously, each development that increases range and 
quality can be accurately measured and easily reported.  Induction coils, for example, 
used in Marconi’s tests allowed signals to travel farther than previous wireless apparatus.  
In March 1899, Marconi sent signals from “the South Foreland light-house and 
Wimereux, near Boulogne, over a distance of 30 miles” and “[t]he maximum distance 
obtained at that time . . . was 42 miles” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 291).  The July 1899 
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“evolutions” between the Alexandra and Juno had “messages [that] were obtained at no 
less than 74 nautical miles (85 land miles)” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 292).  This new 
induction coil or “tuned circuits” was the famous wireless patent number 7777 (Hancock 
19).  Marconi brings up some specific tests of the new system and improved distances in 
his 1905 presentation to reinforce his technology’s progress:  While discussing yet 
another improvement he refers to a time in early 1900 when his system would only 
transmit 200 miles or less (“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 139); by 1902, 
Marconi shows that the system has greatly improved and messages can be “up to a 
distance of 2,300 miles” (“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 140).  Even if the 
audience knew about other wireless inventors (for instance, Bose, Deforest, or Tesla), 
Marconi’s new patents were improving wireless technology.  In other words, he creates 
dissatisfaction with other wireless systems—even his own older devices. 
Marconi expresses the benefits of the new improvements to his wireless in terms 
of modernist tropes like speed, efficiency, and even automation.  This new receiver “is 
far more simple” and “requires far less attention . . . [b]ut the chief advantage lies in the 
fact that with this receiver it is possible to attain a very high speed of working” (“Recent 
Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 138).  Marconi’s improvement automates the 
reception of transmissions, “[s]o for as speed is concerned . . . this new detector is not 
dependent upon the ability of the operator” (“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 
139).  Thus, the audience has some dissatisfaction with the former wireless devices.  By 
automating the system (to some extent) and increasing the speed at which the system 
transmits signals, Marconi illustrates a more efficient system over the previous coherer 
device:3  “In conjunction with Professor Fleming, [I have] recently introduced 
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improvements which greatly increase the efficiency of the apparatus” (“Recent Advances 
in Wireless Telegraphy” 139).  Because humans are shown as more inefficient than 
machines, automation creates dissatisfaction with human involvement.4  Efficiency meant 
the system was streamlined, reliable, and not wasteful; all of those qualities construct the 
wireless as a viable technology that fits with the time period’s Fordist/Taylorist values, 
especially the perceived economic needs like shipping and, consequently, colonialism.  
The wireless brought the British Empire closer. 
The overall result of creating dissatisfaction with current technologies such as 
cables and visual signaling and older wireless technology is to foster an ideal 
representation of the wireless, one that speaks to technology’s values.  Obviously, 
efficiency and reliability are important for the technology to “catch on” or become part of 
the time’s reality.  But Marconi’s rhetoric manufactures the belief in a potential 
technology as a real artifact.  The wireless, as a potential device, had to be made to fit the 
culture’s value system.  Simply being a “better alternative” to current technology was not 
enough to show that the wireless was valuable.  Additionally, Marconi had to argue for 
its future potential.  The next section demonstrates that the wireless’s potential helped 
create its current value. 
 
The Wireless’s Technical Progress and Future Potential 
  Marconi often represents the wireless as a technology that has moved forward 
and continues to advance.  Although Marconi briefly mentions in one presentation that 
“the early development of [wireless telegraphy’s] practical application was slow,” the 
contemporary “practical application . . . is many times as great as the predictions of five 
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years ago” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 288).  The new improvements he discusses in this 
early presentation allow him to repeat that wireless telegraphy is beyond expectation:  He 
could now “convey the intelligible alphabetical signals over distances far greater than had 
been believed to be possible a few years ago” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 288).  Marconi 
also enhances his scientific ethos during a description of his wireless’s progress:  He 
breaks a law (a black box) that relates energy and wire height to the distance a signal may 
travel.  Apparently, Marconi transmitted signals 85 miles, but “[a]ccording to a rigorous 
application of the law, 72 miles ought to have been obtained . . . thus we obtain a greater 
distance than the application of the law would lead us to believe” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 
289).5  As he would eventually dispel the myth of wireless signals not being able to travel 
over the earth’s horizon, refuting the mathematical law of wire height to wireless signal 
distance positions the wireless as a technology not confined to conventional (or even 
scientific) wisdom. 
Showing the wireless as “beyond expectations” gives it the special quality of 
always being seen as a scientific/technological breakthrough.  Such a quality helps 
Marconi’s “damage control” when he recounts a problem with the Cape Breton station 
which had many accidents in 1903.  Because of the accidents, “the [Marconi Wireless 
Signal Company, Inc.] decided not to attempt the transmission of any more public 
messages until such time as a reliable and continuous service could be maintained and 
guaranteed under all ordinary conditions” (“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 
141).  Although this seems like a failure on face, success is now just around the corner 
because “[a] new station, supplied with more powerful and perfect apparatus” is being 
built, and Marconi assures the audience “that in a very short time the practicality and 
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reliability of transatlantic wireless telegraphy will be fully demonstrated” (“Recent 
Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 142).  He argues further that “[p]ending the 
reconstruction of these long-distance stations, valuable tests have been carried out, and 
daily commercial work is carried on over distances of about 2,000 miles” (“Recent 
Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 142).  Because the wireless has such a long reach, 
“five trans-Atlantic steamships are thus publishing a daily newspaper containing 
telegraphic messages of the latest news” (“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 
142).  The wireless allowed passengers onboard ships to receive news while traveling just 
as railroad passengers received news via telegraph wires at different railroad stations 
(Bazerman 24).  This idea of instant news fits the cultural desire to be in constant contact. 
Because the wireless is shown to be beyond expectations, Marconi can claim that 
his system will overcome current problems and improve.  One issue he had to counter 
was the problem with “the daylight effect,” a phenomenon that “may cut off [wireless] 
signals at great distances” just after day break (“Recent Advances in Wireless 
Telegraphy” 143).  This effect is simply the fact that wireless signals do not need as 
much power to transmit in the night as they do in the day.  Marconi allays concerns by 
claiming he “does not for a moment think that this daylight effect will prove to be a 
serious drawback to the practical application of long distance wireless telegraphy” 
(“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 142).  Marconi does not give the audience a 
technical or scientific reason as to why he is not worried about the daylight effect on 
commercial operations, but his assurance might be good enough because he is the expert 
with personal technical capital.  After all, he has proven the wireless to be a scientific 
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breakthrough; believing the wireless will overcome “the daylight effect,” which may not 
even be understood by the audience, is completely within reason.6
Besides reiterating that the wireless does more than it was expected to do, 
Marconi has to convince the audience that he actually sent wireless signals using 
transmitters and receivers outside of view from each other—beyond the earth’s horizon.  
Marconi accomplished this, but, since it was contrary to scientific belief, he had to 
change the community’s belief; he had to establish a new fact and dispel two myths:  the 
myth of the supposed interference of the curvature of the earth and the myth of iron 
deposits affecting wireless transmissions.  Many scientists did not believe signals could 
be sent beyond the horizon until after his messages crossed the Atlantic.  He dispels the 
idea that “iron in the hills” interferes with wireless communication by claiming such a 
belief is a “very unscientific opinion”:  He denies iron was a hindrance when conducting 
tests with “[a] fleet of 30 ironclads” or “transmit[ting] my messages with absolute 
success across the very high buildings of New York, the upper stories of which are iron” 
(“Wireless Telegraphy” 295).  This refutation adds to Marconi’s proclamation that the 
wireless puts the “great force of nature at our disposal” because nature—the curvature of 
the earth and iron—do not interfere with wireless signals.  Marconi also dispels myths by 
suggesting constant improvements mean that “the technology will work itself out.”7  
Similarly, in this context, the “daylight effect” appears to be a short-term hindrance that 
will work itself out because he “does not for a moment think that this daylight effect will 
prove to be a serious drawback to the practical application of long distance wireless 
telegraphy” (“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 142).  And the future proved his 
hypothesis to be correct. 
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The importance of dispelling myths about the wireless cannot be overlooked.  As 
the wireless’s mouthpiece, Marconi must defend it from others professing doubt:  “One 
of the chief objections which is raised against wireless telegraphy is that it is possible 
only to work two or a very limited number of stations in the immediate vicinity” (“Recent 
Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 132).   Marconi counters this objection by explaining 
his improvement in technical terms and argues that “[t]his objection appears to be much 
more serious to that section of the public which knows little or nothing of telegraphy in 
general than to telegraph engineers” (“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 132); in 
other words, Marconi sets boundaries for who may claim to have advanced wireless 
knowledge by saying “we in the scientific community know better,” causing those who 
believe the myth to think twice.  After all, who wants to be seen as unknowledgeable? 
Marconi singles out another inventor to dispel myths as well.  When describing 
his new syntonic system in 1901, he refers to experiments carried out by a certain 
Professor Slaby—a lesser known wireless inventor.  Marconi dissects Slaby’s supposed 
experiments by mentioning how he improved upon Slaby’s work.  Marconi even points to 
problems with Slaby’s system by saying “[t]he reasons which demonstrate that a closed 
circuit, such as is employed by Slaby, must be a poor radiator, are obvious to those who 
have studied and read the classical works published since the time of Hertz’s 
experiments” (“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 786).  Basically, Marconi portrays Slaby 
as ignorant with respect to wireless telegraphy fundamentals.  Marconi, who was then the 
most prominent name in the field of wireless telegraphy, attempts to convince the 
audience that only non-engineers would believe the wireless could not be used with 
multiple stations in close proximity to each other. 
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But what is seemingly more important than the technical explanation of “syntonic 
apparatus” is Marconi’s affirmation that “[i]t was possible nearly five years ago to send 
different messages simultaneously without interference” (“Recent Advances in Wireless 
Telegraphy” 136).  Claims about that interference are thus historically inaccurate and at 
least five years out of date.  Marconi shows a technical diagram of the “recent 
improvement introduced in method of tuning the receiver” (“Recent Advances in 
Wireless Telegraphy” 136), but, again, he refers to an unknowledgeable audience holding 
a mistaken belief.  He says “[t]here exists at present among the large section of the public 
considerable misconception as to the feasibility of tuning or syntonizing wireless 
telegraphic installations” (“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 136, italics mine).  
The issue he is about to address is that of intercepting messages.  Although the reasons 
for Marconi addressing intercepted messages are not completely clear, we can infer that 
he may have been responding to a criticism of the wireless.  “Syntonizing” refers to 
simultaneously sending and receiving wireless signals.  Apparently, there was concern 
that wireless signals might not reach their intended destination if they happened to be 
picked up by unintended stations.  Marconi corrects the audience—although his words 
are directed at “correcting” the public—about the “accepted understanding” of what 
constitutes a truly ‘intercepted’ message:  An intercepted message is not one that is 
picked up by the wrong receiver; it is a message blocked from the “intended recipient” 
(“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 136).  Marconi assures the audience that any 
wireless signals “tapped or overheard at stations for which they are not intended . . . does 
not by any means prevent the messages from reaching their proper destination” (“Recent 
Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 136). 
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This argument may seem strange to those of us in the twenty-first century.  His 
assurance to the audience is not about security or privacy violations (or, for that matter, 
about identity theft).  He claims messages will be received regardless of whether another 
station “catches” them.  His audience, presumably, was not worried about eavesdropping 
but about missing the message.  Bringing up the issue of intercepted messages allows 
Marconi the chance to counter the concern that signals can be maliciously blocked from 
the intended station.  Although Marconi mentions the possibility that “a powerful 
transmitter giving off strong waves . . . may prevent the reception of messages[,] . . . the 
so-called interfering station is at the same time unable to read the message” (“Recent 
Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 136), his main concern is to show “that any telegraph 
or telephone wire can be tapped, or the conversation going through it overheard, or its 
operation interfered with” (“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 137).  He adds 
that “Sir William Preece has published results which go to show that it is possible to pick 
up . . . the conversation . . . passing through a telephone or telegraph wire” (“Recent 
Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 137).  There is no scientific reason for mentioning 
cables or telephone wires in this description, but, commercially, if the cable is susceptible 
to the same “tapping,” Marconi’s system is not inherently worse. 
Additionally, Marconi also addresses the concern that multiple stations interfere 
with wireless communications.  He foreshadows the future of the wireless by stating that 
[t]he ether about the English Channel has become, in consequence of great 
wireless activity, exceedingly lively, and a non-tuned receiver keeps 
picking up messages or parts of messages from various sources which 
very often render unreadable the message one is trying to receive. 
(“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 786) 
 
84 
By discussing the crowded “ether about the English Channel,” Marconi plants the notion 
that the wireless is being used extensively.  By itself such a statement could mean little, 
but, for a progressive technology such as the wireless, improvements are bound to 
develop.  Marconi is creating dissatisfaction with his older system, which he has 
improved.  He lets the audience know that he is “now prepared with syntonic apparatus 
suitable for commercial purposes” (“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 786).  Besides just 
being a useful device, the wireless must be shown to be a profitable one. 
 
Applications and Economics 
Marconi also constructed the wireless as an economically viable technology in his 
rhetoric.  Any technology is necessarily influenced by economic factors:  Technologies 
cost money to develop, make money through sales, and lose money by not fulfilling a 
niche.  Marconi promoted the wireless as a technology useful for social practices and 
profitable for (current) investors.  A profitable technology is an important technology.  
Marconi spoke to the audiences’ desires concerning profitability in forums with a history 
of using science applications to improve industry (c.f. Noble).  Marconi’s presentations 
speak to these industrial concerns and, thus, create an image of a current and future 
technology with practical applications.  In purely economic terms, Marconi manufactures 
both supply and demand for the wireless:  He creates it, and he fits it into current 
industries. 
The wireless’s early potential was evident in the description of its maritime 
applications and insurance savings.  An important component to Marconi’s early success 
was the interdependency of the Atlantic shipping fleet.  Marconi’s repeated sending of 
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“S” across the Atlantic Ocean in 1901 worked, but only as a scientific event and not a 
commercial enterprise.  It would be some time still before a reliable commercial 
transatlantic wireless service could be consistently maintained.  No ship apparatus could 
transmit signals across the entire Atlantic Ocean in 1901 without a relay system.  A 
wireless operator could transmit signals to any ship within range in order to have a 
message relayed.  For instance, if a ship leaving Europe wanted to get a message to an 
American destination port (or any land station) shortly after leaving its port, the ship 
would have to contact another ship closer to the destination port; likewise, if a station in 
the United States wanted to contact a ship just leaving Europe, it would have to send 
signals to a closer ship that could then relay the message (Hancock 46).  Hancock notes 
that “[p]rogress brought improved apparatus and the need for such charts lessened” as 
new technology allowed ships farther wireless range (47).  The relay system shows how 
Marconi’s wireless fit into the current cargo shipping industry.  Relaying was not new for 
communication and had been in use since the first telegraph wires.  Early telegraph wires 
needed to have repeaters—stations set at certain distances that would repeat the message 
in order to send it farther along the wires—because the mechanisms to transmit signals 
were not powerful enough.  Marconi’s system was thus based on current communication 
practices for weak output. 
Although this relay system eventually became obsolete, it established the Marconi 
system as a “standard” brand of wireless technology.  By September 1901 “[t]he Marconi 
system was now in regular and continuous use on” forty-four ships from major shipping 
companies such as Cunard, Lloyd, and the Red Star Line (Hancock 44).  These ships 
combined with the 54 land-based stations on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean (Hancock 
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44) made the Marconi system a well-known tool in shipping.  By 1906 about 11 “ships 
were equipped with Marconi long-distance receiving apparatus capable of receiving 
messages throughout the whole course of their voyage across the Atlantic” (Hancock 46).  
By 1907, when “139 ships, British and foreign, [were] fitted with Marconi’s wireless 
telegraphy apparatus” (Hancock 47), Marconi’s system was already black boxed.  But 
before those commercial milestones, Marconi further constructed the wireless’s 
importance for maritime usage by calling attention to its military (Navy) application.   
 Marconi concludes his 1901 presentation by highlighting his system’s benefits and 
future, specifically for the Royal Navy:  “As I have already stated, communication over a 
distance of 300 kilometers is now being maintained with my system . . . It may be said 
that long distances of transmission are not necessarily an advantage, but I notice that the 
navy wants long-distance apparatus supplied to it” (“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 786, 
italics mine).  Whoever may have said that transmitting over 100 km is not an advantage 
is unimportant; in fact, no one may have said it.  By stating his system produces and 
receives long-distance communications and mentioning that the military wants this 
capability, Marconi excites more than just the technical community:  He also increases 
interest in his company for military applications.  Marconi goes on to argue that his 
improved “25-centermetre-spark induction coil . . . might have been of use to the 
besieged garrisons in South Africa and China” (“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 784).  
As a side note, the radio became an important WWI technology and a precursor to 
RADAR and SONAR shortly before WWII.  However, Marconi’s early presentations 
spent little time on military applications (outside naval vessels) and focused more on 
commercial enterprise.  Combat operations were not promoted as a good fit for the 
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wireless although Marconi at times implied that the wireless had potential.  In fact, early 
wireless tests by the US Navy (around 1910) were mainly communication tests that 
enhanced the scientific understanding of radio waves (c.f. Yeang).  Although war 
applications surrounded the wireless’s rhetoric, Marconi also represented the wireless as 
an important safety feature for ships. 
 Marconi promotes the wireless by arguing that the world needs the safety it 
affords:  “[I]n the future . . . humanity is likely to have before very long to recognize in 
telegraphy through space without wires the most potent safeguard that has yet been 
devised to reduce the peril of the world’s sea-going population” (“Syntonic Wireless 
Telegraphy” 786).  Goods were shipped between industrial nations, but raw materials 
were also shipped from colonies.  High seas communication among different vessels for 
news and other correspondence made the wireless appear as a new modern convenience.  
Marconi concludes his 1900 presentation with the following prediction:  “[T]he progress 
made this year will greatly surpass what has been accomplished during the last twelve 
months; and, speaking what I believe to be sober sense, I say that by means of the 
wireless telegraph, telegrams will be as common and as much in daily use on the sea as at 
present on land” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 296).  That last speech not only states the future 
potential of the wireless in commercial terms, but it also reinforces the notion that the 
technology seems destined to “surpass” even the safety progress of the previous year.  
Therefore, because of the progressive nature of the wireless, the coming years will 
produce a technology for safety beyond expectations.  This safety device seems to be 
“right around the corner.”  Much will be reported in the 1910s about the safety of having 
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the wireless at sea (for instance, rescuing those from the Titanic) but Marconi at this point 
has to rhetorically construct the wireless as useful and life saving. 
 Marconi discusses commercial safety applications further by claiming the 
audience already understands the wireless’s value and current use; for instance, Marconi 
highlights that “the system has been in practical daily operation between the East 
Goodwin light-ship and the South Foreland light-house since December 24, 1898” by 
stating first “[a]s is probably known to most of you” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 290).  He 
goes on to say that “[i]t is difficult to believe that any person who knows that wireless 
telegraphy has been in use between” the above locations “without breaking down on any 
single occasion, can believe or be justified in saying that wireless telegraphy is 
untrustworthy or uncertain in operation” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 290-1, italics mine).  
After all, as Marconi points out, the system was installed “in a small damp ship” and 
“under conditions which try the system to the utmost” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 291, 
italics mine), which seems to suggest the question “Could you imagine how good the 
system would be under ideal conditions?”  In case the question does not pop into the 
minds of the audience, Marconi hopes that the government will invest more money into 
his system so “millions of pounds’ worth of property and thousands of lives may be 
saved” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 291).  This call is related to the discussion about how 
important the wireless is for “avoid[ing] loss of life and property” (“Wireless 
Telegraphy” 290).  In one particular instance, Marconi shows how cost effective his 
system is with “one short wireless message property to the amount of £52,588 was 
saved” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 290). 
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 For the rest of its history, safety and savings would always be wireless attributes.  
Writing 50 years after Marconi crossed the English Channel, Hancock claimed insurance 
underwriters as well as cargo transporters saved money because the wireless increased 
the safety and reliability of shipping (16).  Hancock offers an anonymous quote from an 
“authority” who claimed insurance companies may decrease “‘premiums for insurance on 
Marconi-fitted ships’” (31), which was what Marconi’s allusion to “millions of pounds’ 
worth of property” suggested.  All the talk about safety and saving money was embedded 
in the wireless’s rhetoric as an efficient and important system.  Marconi spoke to the 
importance of the system because he was the wireless’s mouthpiece, but he was also a 
proprietor who wanted a profitable system. 
  Marketing the wireless as a safe, efficient tool has nothing to do with the science 
of radio waves, nor does it have anything to do with the engineering behind its physical 
construction.  Also, without marketing the benefits and superiority of the wireless over 
cable, the wireless would not have existed.  Safety, dissatisfaction, and profitability of the 
wireless are independent of the science and engineering upon which the wireless is based.  
Profitability, though, is vital for the wireless’s development.  The Marconi Wireless 
Signal Company was incorporated to profit from the wireless technology it created.  In a 
technology’s life cycle there comes a point when “no one is necessary any more to shape 
the black box” (Latour Science in Action 137).  However, prior to becoming a black box 
the wireless needed Maroni and engineers (or some relevant social group) to “shape” it 
into a reality.  Latour believes that inventors usually hand over the maintenance of a 
technology to others to allow the technology “to more easily spread” (Science in Action 
137).  Although Marconi “handed over” some control when he sold his patent rights to 
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other companies, establishing himself as the rightful owner of the patents was key to 
continuing the wireless’s profitability.  In order to profit from the wireless, Marconi had 
to secure patent rights, and his discussion on those patents helped him instill himself as 
the future “father of the radio.” 
 
Patents Showing Marconi’s Ownership 
 Marconi’s presentations mention his patents by name in order to claim ownership 
for the wireless’s improvements.  He uses many diagrams that experts would understand.  
These schematic representations—written in the language of electrical engineers—
represent the various parts of the wireless system.  When Marconi refers to the diagrams, 
the audience is supposed to understand the various functions they represent.  During his 
presentations he mainly explains what has changed with the new apparatus and does not 
go into great detail about the function, which is something a lay audience might need.  
Even though the diagrams are the ultimate jargon of technical discourse—using symbols 
for coils, coherers, and other apparatus—Marconi’s presentations are accessible, so 
researchers outside of the electrical engineering profession can uncover social influences 
in his work. 
The 1901 presentation for the Society of Arts, London allows Marconi to assert 
his ownership.  For instance, Marconi describes how he “connect[s] the receiving aerial 
directly to the earth instead of to the coherer” by referring to a schematic description of 
“the new methods of connection which I adopted in 1898” (“Syntonic Wireless 
Telegraphy” 754) in order to do more than introduce the fact that he is about to describe 
the connection; he is also emphasizing his use and ownership of the improvement.  
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Because he “adopted” this method three years earlier, he explicitly states that he is not 
discussing a theory but a fact.  Immediately after he refers to the schematic, he 
establishes his history in the electrical engineering community by referring to “this 
improvement in the discourse delivered before the Royal Institution on February 2, 1900” 
(“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 755), showing that he has addressed the community 
about his improvement prior to the current presentation.  He attempts to secure the idea of 
his legal rights to the new connection method by specifically mentioning “my first British 
patent specification referring [to the connection method] was applied for on June 1, 1898, 
No. 12,326, and published in due course” (“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 755).  
Marconi refers to this patent three more times in the presentation by always showing 
possession (i.e., “my patent,” “my British patent,” and “the description given by 
myself”).  He also establishes that he has been working in the field considerably longer 
than most think:  “It may probably surprise some of you when I mention how 
comparatively long ago some of the patents which I shall discuss to-night were applied 
for and perfected” (“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 754).  This rhetorical signal tells the 
audience to be surprised that Marconi might not have been given enough credit for being 
in the field longer.  Also, his technical ethos can only be bolstered by showing that he 
started in the field “comparatively long ago.”  These declarations may have little to do 
with the science behind transmitting wireless signals, but they definitely show ownership 
and status.  Rhetorically, Marconi secures his property through patents and his status 
through invoking those patents. 
In order to further his patent claims as real devices currently in use, Marconi 
offers the audience a practical success story of his system: 
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If the system [of earthed wires] had not been used by me, I very much 
doubt whether we should have succeeded in maintaining communication 
with the East Goodwin lightship during 1899, in maintaining 
communication across the English Channel that same year . . . and in 
supplying the Admiralty in the course of the year 1900 with 32 
installations. (“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 755) 
 
Reminding the audience of his commercial successes shows ownership because he is not 
just showing the patent diagram; he is showing its practical use(s).  Also, by implying (or 
being explicit) that he owns the means to transmit wireless signals, he boosts confidence 
in his potential commercial success.  He legally, commercially, and rhetorically becomes 
the inventor of the wireless to the audience:  Legally, he owns the patents; commercially, 
shipping fleets use his system; and rhetorically, the company, products, and stations have 
Marconi in their names. 
 Marconi cites his patent No. 12,326 as containing “improvements on my original 
system, which have been in use by myself and my assistants for several years” (“Syntonic 
Wireless Telegraphy” 755).  Again, Marconi implies he is not new to wireless 
technology, but he also defends himself specifically against two others in the 
presentation—Professor Slaby, an inventor of a rival system, claims in an article that in 
Maconi’s system “[t]he receiving wire was suspended insulated and attached at the lower 
end to the coherer, the other pole of which was connected to earth,” and G. Kapp, who 
claims only in the “Slaby-d’Arco system . . . the receiving wire is earthed” (qtd. in 
“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 755).  Marconi defends his claim that he used “earthed” 
receiving wires, a fact “openly discussed by the scientific press of this and other countries 
a long time previous to the date of Slaby’s paper” (“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 755).  
He continues to prove he used earthed wires by citing other publications and a few 
diagrams, but his representation is not solely to show the makeup of the wireless; instead, 
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he appears to position himself commercially as the true owner of the wireless system.  
Even though he legally owns the patent No. 12,326, he goes into considerable detail to 
prove the patent is part of his working system, a technology he has been using for a 
while. 
 Understandably, having a working technology as opposed to a non-working (or 
unverified) theory would lead to more credibility.  Inventors had to worry about losing 
credibility for making outlandish claims.  Edison himself overstated claims concerning 
his “discovery” of wireless transmissions in 1875, and “[h]e labeled the phenomenon the 
‘etheric force’” (Bazerman 27).  Bazerman notes that Edison went to the press too 
quickly, causing the scientific community to claim his findings were “misguided and 
overblown,” damaging his credibility (27-8). 
 In order to secure the scientific community’s approval or acknowledgement of his 
ownership, Marconi impresses upon the audience the fact that others incorrectly 
understand his system.  Of course, this idea relates to the previous example I mentioned 
where Marconi claimed that only the unknowledgeable do not understand the “proper” 
workings of the wireless.  Marconi’s presentations were a mixture of scientific and 
technical knowledge:  scientific in that he commented on the science of radio waves 
(passing around the horizon, unhindered by iron, signaling distance related to height of 
tower); and technical in that he described the apparatus (coherers, wires, balloons, 
transistors, etc.) that created those waves.  The wireless was not yet a large-scale 
commodity in the early twentieth century.  Marconi’s audience may have been potential 
users, but most would not have been current users. 
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 Also, many readers/listeners would have been familiar with the work of other 
inventors.  Marconi refers to Dr. Ambrose Fleming’s lecture in his 1901 presentation 
“delivered before this society in November and December last year” (“Syntonic Wireless 
Telegraphy” 755).  His immediate goal is to explain that “electrical oscillations set up by 
the ordinary spark discharge method cease” because of “electrical radiation removing the 
energy in the form of electric waves” (“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 755).  
Apparently, Fleming, a prominent scientist at the time, observed “that in the case of 
conductors of a certain form the electric oscillations die away with great rapidity” (qtd. in 
“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 755).  Marconi further builds a scientific ethos by 
equating himself with Fleming.  He, again, shows that he is “standing on the shoulders of 
greatness” when he claims that he tried to “carr[y] out a great number of experiments by 
adding to the radiating and receiving wires inductance coils” similar to a patent held by 
Oliver Lodge (“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 781).  Although Marconi was 
unsuccessful, he continued to forge ahead and was eventually able to improve his system 
and patent this improvement “by myself on March 21, 1900, No. 5,387” (“Syntonic 
Wireless Telegraphy” 781-2).  Therefore, his improvement nullifies the benefit of 
Lodge’s patent. 
 Just as Lodge’s patent was incomplete and untested, so was W. G. Brown’s patent 
on the “use of two conductors of equal length joined to each side of the spark-gap” 
(“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 782).  Marconi mentions Brown’s work only to 
undermine its importance:  “[Brown] did not describe the inductance in series between 
them and the spark-gap, which, according to my experience, is absolutely essential for 
long distance work” (“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 782).  Marconi implies that long-
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distance communication is favorable, the way of the future.  Of course, he also points out 
how he used certain techniques before others did.  For instance, Marconi mentions that 
“[t]he idea of using a Tesla coil to produce the oscillations is not new” in order to set up 
the fact that he had been using the Tesla coil in his commercial system since 1898 
(“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 783).  Although he mentions that others such as Lodge 
and Braun used such a technique, he points out that “[his] idea was to associate with this 
compound radiator a receiver tuned to the frequency of the oscillations set up in the 
vertical wire by the condenser circuit” (“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 783).  Thus, he 
separates his work from the others and further explains the technical details for using 
transformers and conductors to create these coveted oscillations.   
Marconi shrewdly notes “that Professor Braun has recognized the necessity of 
tuning the circuits of the transmitter and receiver when using a Tesla coil in order to 
obtain syntonic effects, but I am not aware that such a proposal was published prior to the 
description given in [Marconi’s famous patent No. 7,777]” (“Syntonic Wireless 
Telegraphy” 783).  The only reason to mention the fact that his system is the first to tune 
circuits when transmitting and receiving is to show his property, his patent.  Although we 
can figure out the public experiment from his patent numbers, he describes his patents as 
lab events, showing ownership and demonstrating his technical knowledge.  The 
explanations are mostly devoid of real-world examples; for instance, instead of saying 
where he accomplished or discovered that “it will not be difficult to transmit to any one 
of [the several stations], without danger of the message being picked up by the other 
stations for which it is not intended,” he introduces this idea as a hypothetical possibility:  
“It is easy to understand that if we have several different receiving stations” (“Syntonic 
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Wireless Telegraphy” 784 emphasis mine).  Although he tested the induction in a lab 
setting, Marconi’s system in 1901 was not strained by simultaneous transmissions.  In the 
future, simultaneous transmissions would be an issue, but they were not at the time of this 
presentation.  Presenting the wireless in this way rhetorically constructs it as a technology 
that performs a certain way, but it is not quite a viable commercial system. 
 Marconi brings up another patent in his “concluding” section of the 1901 
presentation to return to more criticism of Slaby’s work.  He cites Slaby’s use of a 
“multiplicator” by claiming Slaby refers to “an especially wound induction coil 
(‘induction-spule’), the function of which is to increase the electro-motive force of the 
oscillations at the end of the coherer” (qtd. in “Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 785).  
Marconi tells his audience that “[he] assume[d] that the multiplicator was an oscillation 
transformer performing the function of those described in my patent, dated June 1, 1898” 
(“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 785).  Mentioning his patent here does reinforce his 
property and accomplishment, but it also sets up a dismissal of Slaby’s experiment; 
apparently, Slaby claims to have not used “a transformer, as [this multiplicator] has no 
secondary winding” (qtd. in “Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 785).  Marconi continues to 
dissect Slaby’s supposed experiments by mentioning how he improved upon Slaby’s 
work; at one point he even discredits Slaby’s system by saying “[t]he reasons which 
demonstrate that a closed circuit, such as is employed by Slaby, must be a poor radiator, 
are obvious to those who have studied and read the classical works published since the 
time of Hertz’s experiments” (“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 786).  Basically, Marconi 
is saying that Slaby is out of touch with the fundamentals of the wireless, a claim he later 
repeats in his 1905 presentation that a certain wireless operation perceived to be a 
97 
problem “appears to be much more serious to that section of the public which knows little 
or nothing of telegraphy in general than to telegraph engineers” (“Recent Advances in 
Wireless Telegraphy” 132).  As I stated before, Marconi is convincing the audience that 
“most people know these facts; the unknowledgeable do not.”  Marconi finishes 
discrediting Slaby by telling the audience that he has a better working system that has 
overcome the “big” difficulties (at least as far as May 1901 is concerned; he is still seven 
months away from crossing the Atlantic): 
 Slaby has not yet described how to obtain different messages from 
transmitters situated at equal distances from receivers, which is much 
more difficult in my experience, nor does it appear possible with the 
method he describes to transmit various messages at the same time from 
one sending wire, as can be done with the system I have just explained. 
(“Syntonic Wireless Telegraphy” 786, italics mine) 
 
Marconi’s patents secured the legal ownership of his wireless system, but his 
presentations convey his ownership and knowledge about wireless technology.  Although 
a patent is a form of discourse that represents the wireless’s physical nature, Marconi’s 
presentations reify the idea of the wireless, bringing the physical (via patents and other 
diagrammatic representations), scientific, and economic aspects of the technology 
together.   
 Marconi’s presentations show even in the most technical forum, he still speaks to 
the attitudes and values of the audience and emphasizes the practical potential of his 
system and not simply the physical make up of the wireless.  The presentations are 
examples of how technology is infused in the workings of a society.  The government, 
with its seemingly endless coffers of tax revenue, needs to support large technological 
systems in order for these technologies to become realized.  Marconi needed the British 
and Canadian governments to support (and allow) the construction of wireless stations 
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and, eventually, hire him to install the wireless onboard naval vessels.  Also, he needed 
important figures (such as the Queen, kings, dukes, the President, and others) to use the 
wireless to garner the public’s attention and the support of policy makers.  Again, 
technology cannot be created in a vacuum.  Marconi needed governments to grant him 
not only the right to perform experiments on their soil, but also to finance part of his 
system and, eventually, a national infrastructure.  In fact, even the Italian government 
“placed a 7,000-ton cruiser, the Carlo Alberto, at the author’s disposal” to help Marconi 
carry out some experiments (“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 139).  This 
assistance shows that governments are also relevant social groups, to borrow Bijker’s 
phrase, in creating technology. 
 Although Marconi occasionally and softly criticizes the British government for 
being behind the times, he immediately says “[I] considered it [my] duty to send the first 
messages [from Canada] to their Majesties the Kings of England and Italy, both of whom 
had previously given [me] much encouragement and assistance in [my] work” (“Recent 
Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 141).  Besides publicly thanking these two important 
figures, Marconi brings up the possibility of connecting different countries immediately 
through wireless communication by showing that “[m]essages were sent to His Majesty 
from Lord Minto, the Governor-General of Canada” and that “a message from President 
[Theodore] Roosevelt was successfully transmitted from this station [on Cape Cod] to 
His Majesty the King” (“Recent Advances in Wireless Telegraphy” 140).  Having 
national leaders use new technology does more than legitimize the product; it causes the 
population, or at least a large portion of it, to recognize the technology as a force in their 
lives.  Many presidents and state leaders have “opened” new technologies through 
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ceremonies.  David Nye claims that celebrating technology through ceremonies where 
politicians and other cultural elites gather creates a feeling within the population that the 
new technology, especially technology that shows off landmarks, “demonstrates how 
technological spectacle can produce bonds of solidarity” (172).  That ceremony helps 
manufacture a positive attitude for the new technology, which has been constructed in 
accordance with the culture’s values. 
 Marconi’s descriptions about implementing his system for satisfied customers are 
major instances where he creates a wireless consciousness.  By discussing patents and 
commercial ventures, Marconi makes the wireless a reality for the audience; knowing 
that the system is in operation somewhere or that “the admiralty are taking steps to 
introduce the system into general use in the navy” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 292) reifies at 
least the belief in the technology because someone is using it.  The wireless exists before 
it becomes commercially viable:  Marconi may have been building stations and equipping 
ships with wireless systems in 1900, but they were mainly for test purposes.  After the 
wireless became a viable technology, it contributed to mass communication.  Marconi’s 
scientific and technical descriptions show the benefits not just of a device, but of an 
international system of communication.  Similarly, Edison was not just interested in 
inventing a light bulb; he wanted an entire electrical system that would guarantee 
households would be able to utilize the technology (Bazerman 159).  Having a system as 
opposed to a simple tool makes the technology inevitable but only after the technology 
fits with current technology or practices.  Unlike Aramis, which did not fit with Parisian 
commuter practices, Marconi’s system was easily installed on ships that were already 
crossing the Atlantic. 
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  Additionally, the new technology begins to take shape within the culture as a 
representation of the culture’s values.  Marconi represented the wireless as an efficient, 
instant communication device.  Efficiency and speed—two modernist tropes—speak to 
the values of Western industrialized nations, and they are values echoed in Marconi’s 
presentation.  Having royalty, governors, and presidents embrace these technologies 
implies that the culture embraces the technologies, which were already positioned 
according to the goals of the society.  Fortunately, for Marconi and other inventors’ 
progress is a value of industrial societies, so positioning a technology as an improvement 
over “the old way” fits the culture’s ideology.  The wireless was not yet a realized 
technology; instead, it was being negotiated by relevant social groups.  Marconi created 
an abstract concept of the wireless through rhetoric, therefore, creating an image of a 
working, viable technology.  Although I don’t argue whether the audiences at the 
presentations accepted the wireless as real, I assume that Marconi’s rhetoric was well 
received because his invention is recorded favorably by history.  To continue examining 
favorably representations of the wireless in the early twentieth century, the next chapter 
examines how journalists enmeshed in modernist values and practices represented 
Marconi’s wireless in the popular press.
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Notes 
1.  This presentation is published in two parts in The Electrical Review.  Part I is 
published in the 15 June 1901 issue, and part II is published in the 22 June 1901 issue.  
Because both are the same presentation, I cite them as one source—“Syntonic Wireless 
Telegraphy”—but they are listed separately in the Works Cited section. 
 
2.  The wireless invention is an engineering product, but sending “hertzian waves” was a 
science issue for nearly 100 years.  However, both scientists and engineers would have 
been interested in Marconi’s presentations. 
 
3.  A coherer is a vacuum tube filled with pieces of iron and used to detect radio waves.  
Marconi used Edouard Branley’s coherer in his early experiments, which was a great 
improvement over the older coherer invented by Heinrich Hertz.  This is one reason I 
often call Marconi the “assembler” of the radio because he did not invent each 
component.  Instead, he put the components together and envisioned that wireless signals 
could travel to and from transmitters and receivers. 
 
4.  Here I must pause to emphasize that this is a step toward decreasing human 
involvement in technical systems.  Automation eventually removes human inefficiency 
(and error) by literally removing humans from tasks, but, before total human removal 
occurs, operational tasks are increasingly reduced to repetitive, simple commands or 
movements that cause the operator to work in a mechanical fashion. 
 
5.  Marconi established this law in a presentation to the Institution of Electrical 
Engineers—which is now know as the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 
(IEEE)—in March 1899 and restates the old law in this presentation.  The law states “that 
the distance over which it is possible to signal with a given amount of energy varies 
approximately with the square of the height of the vertical wire, and with the square root 
of the capacity of a plate, drum, or other form of capacity area” (“Wireless Telegraphy” 
289). 
 
6.  “The daylight effect” is the phenomenon whereby radio signals travel farther at night 
than during the day.  Marconi and others knew about this, but did not understand why.  In 
his Nobel Prize lecture, Marconi believes this effect has something to do with clear skies 
(“Wireless Telegraphic Communication” 211).  However, long-range radio signals travel 
farther and stronger due to the fact that radio waves bounce off the Earth’s ionosphere 
better at night.  This does not work, however, for later FM transmissions.   
 
7.  This is similar to the phrases we often use: “eventually they’ll produce computers that 
can perform miracles.”  I remember in the early 1990s while in high school taking a 
computer programming class that a math teacher of mine said, “all of you won’t have to 
worry about spelling because in the future word processors will automatically correct 
your misspelled words as you type.”  Of course, the autocorrect function is not perfect 
because it often “corrects” what we do not want changed. 
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CHAPTER III 
POPULAR PRESS REPRESENTATIONS OF MARCONI’S WIRELESS 
The development of some varieties of municipal engineering is absolutely 
dependent upon the development of public opinion and must proceed with 
it.  The matter of street cleaning is largely a question of an improved 
public taste in the matter of street paving.  Unless streets are well paved 
they cannot be well cleaned except at a prohibitive cost.  To jump from 
one degree of cleanliness in this respect, to another, without a supporting 
public opinion, may be enough to wreck an administration and to set the 
tide of civic improvement running in the opposite direction.  The 
newspaper is a great educator in these matters today.  Morris Llewellyn 
Cooke, “Paving Propaganda” (61) 
 
 In the early twentieth century, Marconi’s wireless excited journalists on both sides 
of the Atlantic.  Although his invention was not yet commercially viable or universally 
accepted, many relevant social groups affixed positive meanings to it.  After Marconi 
demonstrated the wireless’s potential in his technical presentations and physical 
demonstrations, journalists reconstructed the wireless for larger audiences.  Many set out 
to promote Marconi’s “triumphs” in their periodicals.  Even advertisers used “the 
wireless” to promote products:  In the March 1903 issue of World’s Work, an 
advertisement for Pears’ soap boasts of “A Wireless Message Across the Atlantic . . . 
Sent 20 Years Ago” (Fig. 1).  Positive representations of the wireless allowed readers “a 
glimpse into the future,” just as David Nye argued World’s Fairs did (205).  Marconi’s 
invention and presentations appeared in periodicals as news events with much of the 
technical information removed or described differently for a lay audience; however, the 
popular press articles share several qualities of Marconi’s presentations. 
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Fig. 1.  Pears’ Soap advertisement (World’s Work Mar. 1903:  3047). 
 This chapter demonstrates how pro-Marconi popular press articles used tropes of 
progress to reconstruct the wireless in 13 articles from the following American 
periodicals dated from 1899-1905:  McClure’s, World’s Work, Current Literature, Frank 
Leslie’s Popular Monthly, Living Age, North American Review, and The New York Times.  
Although Marconi was not an American, these American popular press articles show how 
Marconi’s experiments and potential thrilled journalists.  This response is important 
because, though a British company in competition with other American and European 
104 
 
inventors, Marconi and the Marconi Signal and Wireless Company emerge as the 
individual and company most responsible for bringing wireless technology to the world.  
History records Marconi as the “father of the radio,” and American periodicals are one 
place where this status materializes.  Their articles discuss similar international events 
and help trace the process by which the wireless and Marconi’s status become 
instantiated in the culture:  These representations suggest his wireless fit with prevailing 
cultural values, attitudes, and practices of the early twentieth century.  The articles mainly 
focus on Marconi, the man, his wireless feats and records, and his invention’s future 
potential.  While the wireless was not Marconi’s invention alone, the popular press 
represented it as his invention, helping solidify his future title of “father of the radio.”  
These reconstructions also show the wireless as a progressive technology more efficient 
than contemporary alternatives.  The wireless, consequently, reflects the social attitudes 
and values of the Industrial Revolution—specifically, the early twentieth century’s 
technophilia.  According to many journalists, the wireless would usher in a new 
communication standard and free humanity from physical wires or cables. 
 The following sections of this chapter discuss the importance of the popular press 
as a relevant social group, the instances where Marconi’s persona is positively ascribed, 
the ways the popular press described the wireless as monumental, and the 
visions/prophecies of wireless benefits.  First, the popular press is an important relevant 
social group because its texts represent the wireless’s image and, therefore, its reality 
prior to becoming a black box.  Second, the popular press constructed Marconi’s 
trustworthiness just as how he himself built a scientific ethos in his presentations:  Both 
construct Marconi as an important cultural figure.  Finally, just as Marconi envisioned 
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future practical applications for the wireless, journalists also reconstructed the wireless’s 
value by discussing its potential.  Interestingly, the popular press proclaims that the 
wireless’s potential is “beyond expectation” much more boldly than even Marconi. 
 
The Relevance of Journalists and Their Descriptions of the Wireless 
 Before discussing the “relevance” of journalists, I need to explain what I mean by 
“popular press,” which distributed journalists’ contributions.  Journalists fulfilled an 
important role as a relevant social group because they constructed the news.  According 
to Bazerman, “[n]ewspapers are the daily world gathered into words and pictures” (2).  
Bazerman discusses the importance of the “emerging world of news” for Edison’s 
inventions:  As technology allowed greater contact via telegraph communication, 
“journalism turned from small circulation partisan commentary to mass-circulation 
retelling of the happenings of the world” (23).  Journalists captured “[e]vents that 
happened anywhere . . . everywhere . . . or nowhere (like the promise of a new 
invention)” (Bazerman 23).  I refer to the journalists’ texts on Marconi’s wireless as the 
“popular press” because I want to stress the popular nature of this particular venue.  As 
Bazerman points out, the press “became a new kind of stage” for representing 
“technological advance[s],” one that popularized inventions and inventors (23).  
Although I do not argue specifically how audiences received the wireless’s popular 
representations, from journalist’s descriptions of Marconi’s wireless, I have found 
descriptions that adhere to prevailing cultural values.  These accounts do not represent all 
wireless-based journalism; instead, they reflect how pro-Marconi descriptions conveyed 
the wireless’s image as a new, efficient marker of progress. 
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While no discourse holds a technology’s total value, texts from different genres 
reflect some of the cultural work a technology does.  For instance, contemporary media 
report work on the supercollider, virtual reality systems, spacecraft for civilian travel, and 
even “wireless” Internet access.  Also, commonly reported, not-yet-available scientific 
products are abundant in popular press reports on potential medicines/treatments.  One 
need only recall that often repeated phrase about a medical breakthrough reported on the 
nightly news that is “pending FDA approval” to understand the parallel between the 
wireless prior to becoming a black box and a forthcoming medication or vaccine.1  
Although audiences did not need a consistently working wireless model as proof, they 
needed to be told the wireless was coming or in use somewhere in order to accept the 
technology.  Fortunately, the public “loved” the wireless because the press promoted it, at 
least in part, in accordance with their values and expectations.  This dissertation does not 
argue that the public wholeheartedly believed Marconi’s truthfulness or that the wireless 
was a physical reality but that popular press accounts act as a cultural repository where 
the wireless “existed.” 
All texts about technologies are sites for negotiation.  Even though I do not argue 
specifically how or to what extent audiences believed in the popular representations, the 
articles I examine fit the early twentieth century’s progressive industrialized ideology.  
These articles convey that cultural work; therefore, the journalists are an important 
“relevant social group.”  They described an exciting new scientific breakthrough—a 
“human” advancement.  As David Nye argues, technological achievements are important 
cultural markers that transcend nationality and excite or electrify the cultures in which 
they are invented (xiii).  Although Marconi was an Italian subject doing most of his work 
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for his British company, American journalists capture or report the sublime effect the 
wireless had on them to the public.  The wireless bridged the Atlantic and made the world 
“smaller”; it was not contained within a single society but spread from Britain to Italy to 
the United States to Hawaii to Japan and even to Africa.  The international reach seems to 
be a marker of progress for the industrialized Western World, causing American 
periodicals to celebrate a foreign invention.2  Even Henry Adams “would have hugged 
Marconi” out of reverence for his invention as he stood awe-struck in front of the great 
dynamos at the 1899 World’s Fair (380). 
The emerging interest in science and technology in the early twentieth century is 
apparent from popular press descriptions, suggesting that scientific and technical subjects 
were of interest to wider audiences.  In the previous chapter, Marconi’s presentations 
were meant for highly technical audiences—people judging the physical viability of the 
wireless.  Although non-scientists and non-technologists attended the Royal Institution 
and the Society of Arts lectures, they were not peer reviewers.  The popular press 
coverage suggests what a culture (in general) found worthy to follow, and the wireless 
was important news.  The articles were not for science and engineering discourse 
communities, but the journalists validated the wireless by reifying it in a popular forum.  
To popular audiences in the early twentieth century, machines were wonderful (even 
liberating) inventions—although, many high modernist artists would later lament the 
dehumanizing mechanization of consciousness and human labor.  The popular press 
articles I examine contain no hint of mechanical dehumanization, environmental 
degradation, or human alienation.  Quite the contrary.  Journalists provide glowing 
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accounts and possibilities for the wireless; the only negativity is towards “outdated” 
technologies about which they create “dissatisfaction.”3
 Although anti-Marconi articles exist, their attempt to dissuade the public from 
holding Marconi in high regard ultimately failed.  In fact, one quasi-critical article about 
the wireless praises Marconi’s “wonderful achievement of transmitting a message across 
the Atlantic,” but claims that tests “in the Mediterranean proved a ‘total failure’” 
(“Wireless Telegraphy,” Current Literature 3).  Nevertheless, the article does not 
conclude negatively.  Instead, it connects optimistically about the new wireless 
technology because “[m]odern ingenuity is not daunted by the failure of experiments, but 
takes new courage from defeat, and triumphs in the end” (“Wireless Telegraphy,” 
Current Literature 3).  And many popular press articles connect Marconi to this 
“triumph.”4
 Journalists constructed Marconi as the main inventor in a group of important 
world-renowned figures:  “Lodge, Fleming, Muirhead, Fessenden, de Forest, Tesla, 
Ducretet, Rochefort, Guarini, Popoff,[5] Arco, Brann, Slaby” (Waterbury 656).  This 
portrayal creates an image of the soon-to-be “father of the radio.”  One journalist 
commented that “in many cases [wireless] patents show that there have been independent 
discoveries of exactly the same thing in different countries at practically the same time” 
(Waterbury 656).  However, Marconi’s importance as the main inventor is apparent when 
one article notes that “a dozen or more people have sprung up to share or to attempt to 
obtain the glory of originality,” but “Marconi stands unquestionably at the head of the 
list” (“Recent Wireless Telegraphy Development” 419).  I avoid patent-battle articles and 
focus on descriptions of Marconi’s wireless’s events and uses because the legal 
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construction is not valuable for my study of rhetoric aimed at a popular audience.  While 
rivals had their own national and international attention, these other systems did not 
receive the same “buzz” contemporarily or historically.  The journalists helped construct 
Marconi’s system as a benchmark even though he “compiled” his apparatus from his own 
work and the inventions of others.  Other systems and apparatus existed, but they existed 
as just that—other—or other-than-the-benchmark standard according to the popular 
press.6  The articles describe Marconi’s invention’s profitability, usefulness, scientific 
importance, and improvement over cable—the existing “inefficient” technology of the 
time period.  They also construct Marconi’s image. 
 
The Popular Press’s Apotheosis of Marconi 
 The popular press constructed Marconi as an almost royalty-like celebrity.  The 
King of Italy bestowed in 1897 the title chevalier, which “correspond[s] to an English 
knighthood” (A Friend 529).  Much later in his career he was reported as having received 
the Italian nobleman title of Marchese in 1929, and “King George V conferred upon him 
the Honorary Knighthood of the Grand Cross of the Victorian Order” (Hancock 163), 
which establishes his historical significance.  His royal status began almost immediately 
after his first public experiments.  Marconi’s apparatus, even though not commercially 
viable in the early twentieth century, had famous users, adding to its status as an exciting, 
important invention.  The popular press made many reports about wireless transmissions 
between the Queen of England and her son (the future King Edward VII), and later the 
press reported messages between Theodore Roosevelt and King Edward VII.  One article 
reports that transmissions between the Queen and Prince “were the memorable tests . . . 
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between Osborne House, on the Isle of Wight, and the royal yacht, with the Prince of 
Wales aboard” (Moffett 4).  Such descriptions invoke the wireless as an invention for 
royalty. 
 After crossing the Atlantic Ocean, as one article claims, “[t]he people of the 
‘ancient colony’ of Newfoundland . . . crowned [Marconi] with every honor in their 
power,” and that “it seemed as if every fisher and farmer in that wild country had heard 
of him . . . at twenty-three he was famous the world over” (Baker 4, italics mine), despite 
the fact that his fame was probably concentrated in Europe, America, and the colonies.  
Henry Herbert McClure portrays Marconi’s elevated status by noticing that “Marconi’s 
party occupied four staterooms on the upper deck” during wireless experiments aboard 
the Philadelphia (526).  Marconi and his “party” carried out the experiments in one of the 
rooms, but occupied the other “upper-deck staterooms” as would any high-class celebrity. 
 This attempt to promote Marconi as “royalty” helps lend importance to his 
system.  The wireless was a newsworthy event, which meant Marconi, the man who 
brought the wireless to the world, had celebrity-like attributes.  Furthermore, these 
reports on Marconi’s status reinforce his magical character.  After all, sending invisible 
waves would have been magical for this early twentieth-century audience.7  Other 
inventors also had magician-like qualities in the popular press.  Leo Henricus Arthur 
Baekland, who invented “the first truly synthetic plastic” (Bijker 101), was described by 
the popular press as a “‘grand duke, wizard, and bohemian’” (Bijker 197).  Although 
Bijker argues that the “wizard” attribute distorts the social construction of a technology 
by possibly portraying the invention as “the development of . . . the genius of”an 
inventor (197), the magical aura described recurs in popular press accounts, especially 
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those accounts that identify a single inventor of a new technology.  Edison was popularly 
known as the “wizard of Menlo Park,” and Marconi similarly was often attributed with 
magician-like qualities.8  For instance, one article specifically describes Marconi’s 
wireless’s ability to transmit invisible waves through the “ether”:  “Electric waves cannot 
be seen, but electricians have learned how to incite them, to a certain extent how to 
control them, and have devised cunning instruments which register their presence” 
(Baker 6).  Therefore, Marconi, the electrician whose system was being described, can 
manipulate nature. 
 Marconi makes the invisible a reality through his “cunning” apparatus and 
magical quality.  Another popular press article describes Marconi as a “wonder-worker” 
and “an audacious experimenter,” which, combined with the idea that he is “a man who 
has largely complemented whatever promises he has made” (A Friend 530), suggests his 
limitless potential as an inventor.  Andrew Carnegie establishes that Marconi’s persona 
and power are beyond the audience’s imagination:  “‘No one can tell or even dream of 
what tremendous things he will be able to do in a few years’” (qtd. in Wallace 1).  While 
commenting on Marconi’s transatlantic feat, one article establishes that even though the 
world “accepted that [Marconi] was now preparing for bolder ventures . . . none imagined 
a project so amazing as he entertained” (A Friend 530). 
 These popular press accounts, therefore, help establish the wireless—or, more 
appropriately for 1899-1905, the science of radio waves—as a reality; Marconi created or 
discovered knowledge, and “to the world, what was hardly a probability three months ago 
is now an undisputed fact” (McClure 526, italics mine).  McClure’s comment comes 
from an article reporting on a new advancement circa April 1902 and is explicitly stating 
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a “truth” for the audience:  Marconi has discovered, created, and established a “fact.”  
Another article underscores the perceived need to show an inventor’s trustworthiness 
because “at present one certainly takes the public into one’s confidence when one sends a 
wireless telegraphic message” (Waterbury 658).  Wireless signals are invisible—they 
cannot be seen or heard.  In contrast, the public can see or hear “the construction of ships, 
the transmission of sound, the detonation of explosives, etc.” (Waterbury 658).  Because 
wireless signals are intangible, discourse must construct their existence, so Marconi’s 
celebrity and pseudo-royalty status help create his image, which, in turn, helps establish 
the wireless’s potential for the audience. 
 The popular press reporting a transmission as “fact” further adds to the excitement 
surrounding the wireless.  Because industrial nations had a growing scientifically and 
technically aware population, journalists create almost fantastic stories about new 
technologies to excite readers.  The fact that so many popular press accounts about 
Marconi’s experiments exist is one testament to the excitement he created.  One journalist 
remarks that “the world throbbed with the surprise of his [crossing the Atlantic], and the 
cables were loaded with congratulatory messages to him” (A Friend 532).  Additionally, 
periodicals would preview up-coming experiments or interviews with inventors alongside 
advertisements for adventure novels and other sensational bestsellers to be printed:  
McClure’s Magazine advertised between a review of Robert Louis Stevenson’s St. Ives 
and Anthony Hope’s sequel to “The Prisoner of Zenda” that a future issue would have an 
interview with Marconi and J. Chandra Bose.9  The fascination and awareness of 
important new technologies was not new in the early twentieth century.  World’s Fairs 
had been exciting people for decades.  But machines had a superhuman quality to them, 
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and many popular press accounts insisted the audience ought to trust a technology over a 
human.  In fact, journalists portrayed Marconi himself as a machine, a characteristic that 
allows him to succeed:  “[T]he keynote to [Marconi’s] success is his unfailing industry 
and energy.  He is a human dynamo” (A Friend 532).  Dynamos were the computers of 
the time period. 
 But accolades would not have had the same force in print had Marconi not been 
seen as trustworthy.  Years of reports and even contact with wireless apparatus might 
have reified Marconi’s “miracle,” but journalists help construct the wireless by filtering 
Marconi’s credibility.  The popular press builds Marconi’s scientific ethos by praising his 
great scientific/technical mind and builds trust by pointing to his careful nature when 
revealing success to the public.  Edison also developed public credibility, allowing him to 
claim he had a working light bulb nearly a year prior to a completed prototype “and an 
additional year before a full system was ready” (Bazerman 13).  Bazerman argues that 
“the meanings people attributed to [Edison] were embedded in specific and well-
developed systems of communication that made his work seem credible” (13).  
Therefore, Edison had to have an aura of credibility to help establish his invention as 
extant or possible.  As was often the case for Marconi, his credibility establishes that the 
invention is “just around the corner.”  Belief is enough for a technology to exist 
rhetorically.  Marconi’s wireless’s rhetoric necessarily establishes his invention, for the 
popular press argues his truthfulness and dependability, suggesting that he will continue 
to improve his invention. 
 Many popular press articles tout Marconi’s record for not making bombastic 
claims about experiments and his potential for future development.  One article claims 
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Marconi and the wireless share the following “confidence” for future progress:  “[W]ith 
an assured achievement and practical daily working of 200 miles, and an experimental 
success of 2,000, it is beyond dispute that Marconi’s work warrants the confidence which 
enthusiasts have in its future” (A Friend 533, italics mine).  Another article claims that 
Marconi’s truthfulness “unquestionably carried great weight in convincing Mr. Edison, 
Mr. Graham Bell, and others of equal note of the literal truth of his” experiments (Baker 
4).  Major S. Flood Page (Marconi’s assistant) reaffirms Marconi’s credibility in the 
popular press by stating that Marconi “has never made any statement in public until he 
has been absolutely certain of the fact:  he has never had to withdraw any statement that 
he has made as to his progress in the past” (qtd. in Baker 4).  While reporting Marconi’s 
claim that it would be possible to “establish wireless communication between San 
Francisco and Manila without an intermediary station at Honolulu or Wake Island,” the 
journalist points out that “Mr. Marconi has never been known to say that he could do a 
thing which he either had not already done or very shortly did do” (Wallace 4). 
 Marconi’s trustworthiness is constructed as “business success.”  The popular 
press made the wireless seem to be destined to work out its flaws, with a final product 
beyond the readers’ imaginations.  Similarly, one article assures readers that Marconi will 
fulfill his promise of creating a wireless station in Nantucket that will allow for 
consistent, reliable transatlantic transmissions:  “It is the first prophecy that Marconi has 
made since he began his work in wireless telegraphy seven years ago.  He has not failed 
before.  Few believe that he will fail now” (McClure 527).  In effect, the article attempts 
to recruit the audience to believe in Marconi’s invention.  In April 1902, when that article 
was published, Marconi’s work was mainly experimental, but it existed as a viable idea 
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with the article’s reassurance that Marconi spoke the truth and could not fail.  This and 
other reports help establish Marconi’s trustworthiness and help establish the wireless as a 
“real” technology, partially by using Marconi’s personality and celebrity status to build 
the wireless’s image as an actual technology progressing to better levels. 
 
Popular Press Representations of the Wireless as an Important Historical 
Development and Progression of Past Science 
Much like Marconi builds a scientific ethos by showing himself as continuing the 
important work of past scientists, the popular press often shows Marconi’s work as a 
continuation—a progression—of past science.  In one article, the author10 recognizes a 
simple version of “wireless telegraphy” existed before Marconi, “for a score of inventors 
had preceded him . . . and Heinrich Hertz, the famous German savant, had proven that” 
wireless signals could be sent (A Friend 531-32).  But the article goes on to claim 
Marconi kept persevering “and spent five years before he solved the [early wireless] 
difficulties” (A Friend 532).  In other words, Marconi continued from the point where 
others, according to the article, had stopped.  Such an account contributes to the “lone 
inventor myth” because it never names other inventors from whom Marconi compiled 
various components to use in his wireless apparatus.11  This omission adds to the 
ahistoricity of technology (an important component of F.T. Marinetti’s “The Founding 
and Manifesto of Futurism”):  Although journalists may discuss past science, they do not 
usually write about the many other specific contributors to an invention.  Marconi is often 
given credit for the entire wireless in popular articles; he is perceived as being the most 
important inventor because he created a commercial enterprise for the wireless.  
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Therefore, the popular press accounts are as much about Marconi, the man, as they are 
about the wireless. 
Several authors of this time period—literary, popular, and artistic—portray 
machines as all powerful.  While describing the power required to send wireless signals, 
one journalist shows his awe of the telegraphic spark by claiming it to be “as thick as a 
man’s wrist . . . the most powerful electric flash yet devised” (McClure 526).  The 
journalist goes on to claim “the very ground near by [the spark] quivered and cracked 
with the energy,” and “[n]o human being could stand near the huge coil which produced 
this tremendous flash of lightning” (McClure 526).  These texts show the “power” and 
“energy” needed to transmit signals across vast distances.  Therefore, the image the 
popular press creates is one that positions the wireless as real and monumental.  These 
larger-than-life accounts of the wireless praise Marconi and his invention, a machine. 
Machines also add validity to Marconi’s experiments.  After observing Marconi’s 
transmissions from land stations to the Philadelphia, which were captured by a recording 
tape, H. H. McClure argues for the transmission’s authenticity because “[w]hen a 
machine does a thing, we humans believe; so long as a man stands between, we doubt” 
(525).  That is, humans distrust what they perceive as human inefficiency; a machine, in 
contrast, is trustworthy and accurate because “there [is] no human agency to ‘think’ or 
‘imagine,’ and perhaps err” (McClure 525).  Another writer also argues that machines are 
better “from the fact that a record on a tape is quite independent of what any man with a 
telephone thinks he hears” (Waterbury 660).  Even Marconi’s system, which “was 
successfully established among the Sandwich Islands . . . failed through unreliability 
caused [solely] by lack of skill among the native operators” (Waterbury 661).  The 
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machine, the wireless, was not to blame—the human operators were.  While Henry 
Adams’ account of the awesome power he felt from the dynamos shows how many in the 
late-nineteenth century worshipped machines, these popular press accounts tell us that 
some saw technology as superior to human interpretation.  Machines are seen as more 
accurate and, therefore, more useful.  Such a view reaffirms dominant progress tropes of 
modernism such as speed and efficiency.  The wireless was a new marker of human 
progress.  The popular press uses exciting language to describe the wireless and attempts 
to “prove” the wireless’s importance by discussing its current usage and “obvious” future 
potential. 
 The biographical literature describes Marconi as a genius for being the “first” to 
create a viable technology.  After envisioning the wireless’s potential, which came to him 
after he read an article by his former professor Augosto Righi, Marconi set out to make a 
practical, commercially viable invention (Hancock; Tarrant).  However, though many 
popular press accounts describe past scientists who developed theories about radio waves, 
they begin with Marconi as the inventor of the first practical apparatus; and it is this 
practicality that privileges Marconi’s status as the inventor of the wireless.  In fact, even 
more technical journalists overlooked Marconi’s contemporaries:  In a 14 October 1898 
article from The Electrician, the author solidifies Marconi’s preeminent status as the 
wireless inventor: 
For some considerable time the scientific aspect of this development 
(Hertz and Clerk Maxwell) completely obscured its more practical 
applications.  Scientists were so charmed with the experimental evidence 
it afforded as to the validity of Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory, that for 
many years the fact that these experiments possessed any practical value 
as a means of signalling between two pieces of physically, mechanically 
disconnected apparatus almost escaped their notice . . . All honour is due 
to Marconi for having been the first to bring prominently forward before 
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official bodies and the public the possibility, and, indeed, the eminent 
practicability of using Hertzian waves for telegraphing between two 
places not connected by an electrical conductor. (Reprinted in Hancock 6-
7, italics mine)12 
 
The science may be the work of others, but the practical invention is Marconi’s. 
 Although Marconi appears as the sole inventor, articles also suggest Marconi’s 
modesty.  Many articles establish that Marconi “makes no claim to being the first to 
experiment along the lines which led to wireless telegraphy . . . it remained for Marconi 
to perfect a [wireless] system and put it into practical working order” (Baker 5, italics 
mine).  One journalist notes that many other inventors helped contribute to the wireless’s 
invention but argues that “Marconi’s discovery gave the clue to practical and useful 
ranges; he was the first to see the commercial value of Wireless Telegraphy, and the 
Marconi Company was the first company in the field to exploit the new discovery” 
(Waterbury 656).  Several pro-Marconi popular press articles agree with the above ones 
but make it clear to the readers that “[Marconi] deserves all the credit the world can give 
him for making the idea of such great practical value” (Wallace 2). 
 Occasionally, eminent scientists who would write about Marconi’s status in 
popular periodicals would not ignore other contributors as journalists often did.  
Professor John Ambrose Fleming, Marconi’s friend and mentor, minimizes the 
contributions of Marconi’s contemporaries and portrays Marconi as the inventor who had 
the vision for commerce.  Professor Fleming (later Sir John Ambrose Fleming) traces the 
“world’s” knowledge of ether as a conductor13 from “Prof. J. C. Maxwell,” who “left as 
his most splendid intellectual legacy to the world his remarkable Electro-magnetic 
Theory of Light” (632).  He notes that this electromagnetic science is “research of the 
present century” (631), a point Marconi borrows in his 1900 presentation discussed in the 
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previous chapter.  Fleming covers Clerk-Maxwell, Faraday, and Hertz—the past 
electromagnetic scientists—in detail, but he simply lists Marconi’s contemporaries:  
“Lodge, Fitzgerald, Trouton, Savasin, de la Reve, Bose and many other physicists 
extend[ing]” Hertz’s research (636).  Fleming portrays Marconi as the major wireless 
technologist “[s]tarting from [the scientists’] known facts” (636).  Marconi’s experiments 
mark the beginning of what Fleming calls “the Ether Age” (640):  This new age marks 
human progress, and Fleming, writing in May 1899, foresees the twentieth century as a 
period of time history will judge according to the wireless’s ability to produce practical 
applications associated with “the ether waves we are learning to employ” (640). 
 Interestingly, Marconi’s crossing of the Atlantic appears to be the end of 
historical discussions of past scientists in the popular press.  This situation may be due to 
the fact that the wireless’s Atlantic crossing solved an important question:  Could 
wireless signals make it around the Earth’s horizon?  The only exception to this omission 
is in a June 1902 article in McClure’s Magazine that briefly discusses Clerk-Maxwell and 
the fact that Hertz stumbled upon his own theory while “trying to disprove Clerk-
Maxwell’s theory” (Wallace 1).  The article even lists contemporary inventors who 
tinkered with Hertz’s experiments, but argues “it remained for the young Italian 
(Marconi) to jump across the gap of years of scientific study and make practical the most 
important discovery since Faraday invented the induction coil” (Wallace 2, italics mine).  
Other inventors such as Varley, Calzecchi-Onesti, and Branly created imperfect coherers 
based on Faraday’s coil, but Marconi perfected those gadgets and “began then a series of 
experiments which would have discouraged any less determined man” (Wallace 2).  
Although Hertz, Faraday, and other non-contemporary “electromagnetic” scientists are 
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mentioned in glowing accounts of Marconi, their inclusion still does not diminish 
Marconi’s status.  Other articles attempt to “shed light” on contemporary inventors, but 
rarely do they try to supplant Marconi as the main wireless inventor.14
 Being seen as the sole inventor is part of Marconi’s charisma, and charisma is 
important for inventors being perceived as trustworthy and capable.  Charles Bazerman 
argues that “Edison was the charismatic center of the organizations that formed around 
him” (259).  Bazerman goes on to argue that Edison’s “first institutions to develop, 
manufacture, and disseminate his system of delivering light and power were built on the 
force of his authority and the trust he granted his close associates”; his charisma, 
therefore, built the foundation of his corporate legacy (259).  Bazerman uses Max 
Weber’s theory of charisma as an aspect of authority:  Followers place their “‘personal 
trust in the leader’s revelation, his heroism or his exemplary character’” (260).  The 
authority in the relationship of chief inventor to assistant inventors mirrors Marconi’s 
authority in the popular press.  The articles promote Marconi as trustworthy, which acts 
as proof of the wireless’s future applications and current existence.  Marconi most likely 
had charismatic power over his close associates, but the popular press uses his words—
journalists often quote Marconi in their articles—to construct the wireless’s potentiality 
for their audiences.  Marconi, the inventor, is as important in the popular press accounts 
as his invention. 
 The popular press helped rhetorically construct the wireless’s potential black box 
status (the future radio) by presenting its monumental nature.  Long before DC Comics’ 
Superman excited audiences with his super powers, Marconi “leaped the ocean at one 
single bound” (A Friend 529).  His crossing of the Atlantic inspired writers to portray 
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him as a “latter-day Columbus, with the same splendid daring, [who] faced the broad 
expanse of waters to demonstrate another mighty scientific fact” (A Friend 529, italics 
mine).  Fleming comments that “[p]ublic attention, on both sides of the Atlantic, has 
recently been strongly directed to the possibilities of telegraphy through space, by 
remarkable experiments of Sig. G. Marconi” (630, italics mine).  Fleming writes just 
after Marconi crossed the English Channel, but he prophesizes the potential of Marconi’s 
work as “the crowning achievement in a long series of scientific labors” (631).  Another 
journalist believes the wireless has yet to reach its full potential, but even a limited 
invention would still be good:  “Let his system be limited to but one hundred miles, and 
within that radius it will develop inestimable services” (Iles 1785, italics mine).  The 
image constructed is that of an inventor and invention unbounded by any constraints.  
The journalists wrote about Marconi’s wireless as if it were a black box, but it was not 
even viable for transmitting across the Atlantic at the time on a regular basis. 
 Marconi mainly conducted scientific experiments during this early period; he was 
still “tinkering” with his apparatus—boosting its transmission capacity.  Even his 
crossing of the Atlantic was a kind of tinkering but on a scale much larger than when he 
conducted his first experiments “transmitting messages over distances of a few miles” 
back in Villa Grifone, the enormous estate near Bologna, Italy where Marconi grew up 
(Tarrant 22).  With the Atlantic experiment, though, his international tinkering made 
news, and journalists rhetorically constructed the wireless through their accolades.  One 
article praises the wireless (specifically, the crossing of the Atlantic) as unimaginable and 
“of a nature to balk human credulity” (Baker 4).15  The article’s introduction claims 12 
December 1901 is “a day destined to be important in the annals of invention” (Baker 5).  
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The praises continue by noting Marconi’s work is “[o]ne of the great wonders of science 
ever wrought” and that Marconi has delivered “a new scientific wonder” to the world 
(Baker 6).  Another article proclaims “[t]here can scarcely be a reader of McClure’s 
Magazine who has not known of the great work which Marconi has accomplished in 
wireless telegraphy” (Wallace 1).16  The journalist tells readers that skeptics should not 
doubt Marconi’s triumph:  If skeptics were present at the wireless demonstrations, 
“Marconi would be hailed by them, as he has been hailed by many great scientists who 
have seen his system in operation, as one of the greatest inventors of all time” (Wallace 
1).  The New York Times also hailed Marconi and his Atlantic crossing as monumental:  
One article claims Marconi is a giant, and “his name will stand through the ages among 
the very first of the world’s great inventors” (“The Epoch-Making Marconi” 8); and 
months later after a land-to sea experiment, The New York Times claims the occasion 
“marks the beginning of an epoch in international intercommunication” (“Wireless 
Telegraphy” 6).  Another article addresses the lay audience by noting that “[t]o those of 
us unfamiliar with electrical apparatus there is something incomprehensible in the feat of 
Marconi” (Iles 1784, italics mine).  These praises rhetorically construct both Marconi and 
the wireless as groundbreaking. 
 
Popular Press Constructions of Military and Commercial Uses of the Wireless 
 Much like Marconi’s rhetorical representations to the scientific and technical 
community, the popular press focused on more than the technical descriptions of the 
wireless.  On face, the lack of journalists’ expertise in wireless science may appear to be 
the obvious reason for non-technical descriptions.  However, many popular press 
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accounts also include technical descriptions along with current successes, future 
potential, profitability, and other non-technical descriptions common to Marconi’s own 
presentations.  One possible reason for this is that technical descriptions mean nothing to 
a popular audience without the knowledge of the wireless’s commercial use (or 
potential).  The wireless could not simply exist as a physical product; it had to mean 
something to the audience to which it was described; it had to be constructed as useful.  
The popular press descriptions suggest the audience’s imaginations would be excited by 
new breakthroughs and future potentials.  Consumers could not yet buy radios, but they 
learned about wireless transmissions on the high seas and “Marconigrams”—wireless 
telegrams—being sent by important people. 
The articles I consider describe the “countless” uses of the wireless, projecting its 
importance and potential.  For instance, one article lists the possible uses of the wireless 
when commenting on its future profitability:   
[T]here will be considerable profit from leases of the service to great lake 
steamers, to pleasure yachts, and to a number of ships in our merchant 
marine.  In addition, there is to be considered the possibility of 
Government use; the operation of the system overland, along our coast, in 
the lighthouse stations; by the Weather Bureau in foretelling approach of 
storms; in time of war by our armies; and on the ships of our navy.  
(Wallace 4) 
 
The popular press discussed wartime applications as much as other potential commercial 
applications.  The growing militarization of the West, foreshadowing WWI, appears on 
the pages of the popular press accounts, and the wireless becomes an important 
technology for future wars. 
 Marconi spent some time on the wireless’s wartime potential in his presentations, 
but these popular press articles discussed such applications (maneuvers and surveillance) 
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much more.  The growing agitation of European nations and their warlike past may have 
unconsciously influenced journalists covering new technologies.  Eventually, Marinetti 
will figuratively describe the wireless as a weapon assisting Italy’s campaign in Tripoli in 
1911.  The wireless’s war potential described by journalists acts as a rhetorical appeal in 
these accounts.  One such article warns that “[w]ithout secrecy no system of wireless 
telegraphy could ever reach great commercial importance” (Baker 7).  The article 
summarizes Marconi’s response to the wireless’s secretive capabilities by discussing a 
“reflector” that “could be faced in any desired direction” and, therefore, would not allow 
an unintended ship to pick up the signal (Baker 7).  That description is not enough for the 
author who points out that “an enemy [ship] might still creep in between the sending a 
receiving stations” (Baker 7).  Such conjecture at an early stage of the wireless shows at 
the very least a popular suspicion of other nations or acceptance of war and the new 
technologies that may be used in future wars. 
Concern with wartime use appears in other popular press accounts.  Cleveland 
Moffett interviewed Marconi and asked about message secrecy and if during wartime 
“communications between battleships or armies [would] be at the mercy of any one 
including enemies” (12).  Moffett also reports Marconi’s position that the wireless would 
allow the U. S. “to keep close guard over Havana harbor without sending” in the navy; 
instead, the U. S. would need only “a single fast cruiser” if “[the] Americans were at war 
with Spain” (16).  Moffett’s article from June 1899 comes less than six months after the 
Treaty of Paris ended the Spanish-American War.  Many popular press accounts cover 
the potential for war, and, because Moffett uses Marconi’s words, he creates the wireless 
as a potential device for “[t]he warfare of the future,” which “will have startling things in 
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it; perhaps the steering of torpedo craft from a distance will be” possible (17).  Such 
advancements would have been considered fantastic to a world without automobiles; in 
fact, bicycles were the most “hi-tech” mode of personal transportation in 1899 even 
though internal combustion engines were being developed. 
 Other popular press accounts construct the wireless’s versatility for wartime uses:  
The wireless “can be moved as easily as a machine gun . . . and keeps in communication 
bodies of troops within four days’ march of one another” (Lyle 5845).  To emphasize the 
war-like nature or, at least, potential of the time period, one writer even asks how “the 
nations—huge belligerent individuals that they are—” will use the wireless (Lyle 5847), 
suggesting the audience expected or was receptive to descriptions of a technology’s 
wartime application.  The journalists also construct the wireless as an important tool for 
colonization.  The U. S. had just “won” its first Pacific territory during the Spanish-
American War—Guam.  Because cable would have been outrageously expensive, one 
article claims America’s interests in the Pacific would be improved by “the installation of 
[Marconi’s] system between California and Honolulu and Manila, thus joining together 
by invisible links, as it were, the widely scattered possessions of the United States in the 
Orient” (Wallace 1, italics mine).  The journalist suggests that these American 
“possessions” have to be in contact with the U. S. mainland in order for America to 
prosper in its new imperialistic endeavors in the Pacific.  Demonstrating that the wireless 
supports imperialism implies that the wireless will assist in military expansion.  
Furthermore, the journalist tells his audience that America’s “enormous telegraph 
business with Europe; our trade with Cuba, Porto Rico, the Philippines, and Alaska 
makes us more and more of a world power,” and Marconi’s wireless will become “the 
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daily means of communication from our shores to our various possessions and other 
countries over seas” (3, italics mine). 
 The popular press not only describes the wireless’s current applications but also 
predicts the wide range of future possibilities.  Just as Marconi describes his system’s 
current usage during his presentations, the popular press focuses on the wireless’s current 
commercial applications and often uses exact figures for costs.  Articles on the wireless 
dispel the notion that “wireless telegraphy is still largely in the uncertain experimental 
stage” by noting “it has long since passed from the laboratory to a wide commercial use” 
(Baker 8).  The press emphasizes the speed at which Marconi advanced:  Wireless 
“development . . . has been astonishingly rapid,” and “[m]ost of the ships of the great 
navies of Europe and all important ocean liners are now fitted with the ‘wireless’” (Baker 
8, italics mine).  One article tells the audience that they “may communicate with a friend 
on almost any transatlantic liner . . . send . . . money, or give notice of legal action”; also, 
according to the article, one could even play a game of chess with” people on different 
ships or in different countries (Lyle 5843).  The wireless supports industrialization and 
keeps the “businessman” efficient:  “A passenger on an ocean grayhound no longer loses 
a week” because “[the passenger] learns that the Russians are retreating in good order,” 
and “he notes the wheat crop reports from Argentina, and straightaway orders his New 
York broker to sell or buy” (Lyle 5843). 
 Other articles report the wireless’s profitability by noting that “[e]ach installation 
on a transatlantic passenger ship now nets about $5,000 a year,” and “more than 8,000 
words were transmitted in a few hours from an ocean liner, and on another ship the 
receipts for two days’ operation amounted to $300” (Wallace 3).  The article goes further 
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by claiming “this business is increasing in volume” and the future profit estimate “from 
one installation . . . would amount to over a million dollars a year” (Wallace 3).  Another 
article specifies that wireless telegrams (marconigrams) cost “twelve cents a word for 
transmission to [seagoing] vessels” and that the “[Marconi] company was now actually 
doing a profitable business on a commercial basis” (Baker 8).  In other words, profits 
make an invention real because that means “useful” and, therefore, “in demand.”  The 
legitimacy or accuracy of these profit estimates are irrelevant to the image they construct.  
Rhetorically, the wireless is profitable, and people appeared to be using it at an increasing 
rate. 
 Showing Marconi as the origination of commercial applications establishes his 
credibility for the claims he and the popular press articles make about the wireless’s 
future potential.  Marconi made the “impossible . . . later come to pass” (Lyle 5848).  
Because Marconi made this wireless “miracle” possible, his claims about future 
possibilities are more believable than those of a non-celebrity inventor.  One “fantastic” 
potential the popular press reported was the Internet-like qualities possible (ones not 
recognized for over 90 years):  “the news might be ticked off tapes every hour right into 
the houses of all subscribers” with Marconi apparatus (Moffett 16); and “the time will 
even come when the great banking and business houses, or even families and friends, will 
each have its own wireless system” (Baker 8).17  Marconi’s credibility helps construct an 
image of the wireless’s future potential, and his business sense also seems important for 
journalists:  One journalist shows Marconi as a man in league with Edison and Bell, and 
“[b]ecause of these facts of character, and the thoroughly business-like manner in which 
the plans have gone ahead for the various utilities of his system, it is difficult to know just 
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where to limit Marconi’s possibilities” (Wallace 4).  Such articles claim Marconi’s 
system has arrived, furthering the image of the wireless as a permanent technology.  
Also, the fact that Marconi’s English and American companies have capital backing and 
his stock has been rapidly acquired “is sufficient evidence of the confidence in which the 
investing public holds Marconi and his work” (Wallace 4, italics mine).  This “investing 
public” is confident that Marconi will continue to be profitable; otherwise, as the popular 
press implies, he would not have excited the business-oriented groups. 
 These faceless investors and the general audience might have been fascinated by 
the thought of what was to come next in wireless technology when the popular press 
claims improvements seem always to be “on the way.”  Articles often quote Marconi or 
speak through his persona, explaining that he will overcome current obstacles.  Marconi 
made a bold statement shortly after crossing the Atlantic to one journalist:  “Give me a 
week at Nantucket and I will guarantee to receive signals from England . . . and all kinds 
of messages across the Atlantic” once he has built a reliable station (qtd. in McClure 
527).  He also claimed his experiments in syntony—tuning transmissions for specific 
frequencies—are not perfect because “the electric tuning of a particular transmitter to a 
particular receiver” still permits some interference, but this “is a possibility in the future,” 
which “bids fair soon to be realized” (qtd. in Moffett 16).  Another journalist claims 
being able accurately to warn “vessels entering a dangerous harbor in thick weather . . . is 
one of the developments of the near future” (Baker 7).  The popular press, especially 
those favorable to Marconi, help construct the idea of a working technology.  And the 
Marconi system, specifically, will help usher in “the time when messages [will] be 
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regularly flashing between Europe and America,” a time “much nearer than most people 
[think]” (Baker 8). 
 An interesting contrast to the above rhetorical claims that the wireless is sure to 
accomplish its goals appears in John I. Waterbury’s November 1903 article from The 
North American Review.  Waterbury supports many of Marconi’s claims and maintains 
that the wireless is an extremely important invention, but he also claims that the 
“importance lies more in the future than in the present[,] for Wireless Telegraphy is still 
in that nebulous state which prevents one from fairly judging whether or not it is of such 
real value as its present condition would indicate” (655).  His article differs from the 
other positive Marconi articles in its discussion of the merits of many other wireless 
systems; for instance, he briefly talks about the de Forest system—the biggest American 
rival18—as well as the various “national” systems that tried to emerge in France, 
Germany, Austria, Russia, and Spain (661-62).  Waterbury merely reviews which 
systems the different European countries happen to use.  Unlike the other popular press 
articles I have analyzed, which are obviously pro-Marconi, Waterbury’s does not argue 
for future potential of one system over another.  He even promotes the polygenesis theory 
of the wireless’s invention:  “It is the old story over again that is found in the history of 
so many inventions:  the world being ripe for the idea, the minds of many men in many 
countries were turned to it at the same instant” (656).  Waterbury, therefore, minimizes 
Marconi’s role by being somewhat skeptical of the wireless’s future and by not focusing 
as much (or solely as other accounts do) on Marconi’s system.  However, Waterbury 
points to Marconi as the first to see the commercial potential.  He just does not emphasize 
Marconi’s system as the system; instead, he argues that the future of the wireless (not a 
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particular inventor’s version) looks promising.  The more pro-Marconi articles argue 
specifically for Marconi’s future potential and current success; also those articles show 
that Marconi’s system will replace the current inefficient cable technology. 
 The popular press created dissatisfaction with cables by pointing out their 
shortcomings—unreliability and outrageous expense.  Cables were the established 
technology for long-distance communication:  Telegraph wires had been in place for 
nearly 60 years and the transatlantic cable had been operating for nearly 40 years before 
Marconi sent wireless signals across the Atlantic.  Just as Marconi created dissatisfaction 
with cable technology, the popular press constructed “wired” communication as 
unsatisfactory.  One article notes that “Professor [Michael I.] Pupin”—a Serbian emigrant 
and physicist who created an important induction coil for telegraph wires—“has pointed 
out that . . . any one cable cannot work faster than a single Marconi installation,” and “it 
is evident that the Marconi system has all the elements of competing successfully with 
the cables now in greater operation” (Wallace 3).  Other popular press accounts go into 
greater detail on why cables are not as good; for instance, one article suggests “that 
[Marconi] would be able to build and equip stations on both sides of the Atlantic for less 
than $150,000” (Baker 8).  In contrast, “[a] cable across the Atlantic costs between 
$3,000,000 and $4,000,000, and it is a constant source of expenditure for repairs” (Baker 
8).  Furthermore, “messages which now go by cable at twenty-five cents a word might be 
sent profitably at a cent a word or less” (Baker 9).19  Consumers “win” by being able to 
send cheap marconigrams, and investors or other interested business parties (i.e., the 




 Many popular press accounts prophesized the wireless’s replacement of cable.  
One article creates dissatisfaction with cable by claiming offshore lightships provide “the 
Marconi system admirable opportunity of replacing cables, which are very expensive and 
in constant danger of breaking” (13-14).  Speaking in an interview about savings with the 
wireless, Marconi claims that “deep-sea cable costs $750” and landed cables cost about 
$1,000 per mile (qtd. in Moffett 16).  Marconi also mentions “the great expense of 
keeping a cable steamer constantly in commission making repairs and laying new 
lengths” (qtd. in Moffett 16).  On the other hand, Marconi claims “[a]ll we need is a 
couple of masts and a little wire,” and “[t]he wear and tear is practically nothing” (qtd. in 
Moffett 16).  The expensive, unreliable cables cannot withstand the inexpensiveness and 
versatility of the wireless.  The popular press creates dissatisfaction with cable 
technology, which, in turn, constructs more than the wireless’s potential; dissatisfaction 
makes the wireless a real alternative. 
 And alternatives were important for the hyper-industrialized nations of the early 
twentieth century.  The time favored new technologies and judging by how much 
emphasis Marconi and the popular press placed on progress, the wireless had to fit that 
ideal before it would become realized.  Of course, the professional relevant social groups, 
such as engineers, scientists, and businesspeople certainly played a beginning role in 
physically constructing the wireless and other technologies.  However, the public were 
potential users who also had to be convinced of the wireless’s worth.  The image the 
popular press constructs is that of an important new technology.  For instance, the 
wireless can be used during war “over stretches where it might be impossible for the 
telegraph corps to string wires or for couriers to pass on account of the presence of the 
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enemy” (Baker 9).  The popular press even claims “it is beyond dispute that Marconi’s 
work warrants the confidence which enthusiasts have in its future” (A Friend 533).  
Because of Marconi’s “miracle,” in the near future “[t]he Pacific cable will be 
unnecessary[,] [t]he Atlantic cables will be abandoned[, and] [l]and lines eventually may 
be forced out of business” (A Friend 533).  Because the popular press engages in such 
dissatisfaction rhetoric, the wireless’s image—at least in the popular press articles—
becomes a real alternative.  The popular press probably would not have written so many 
articles had they not thought the public would be engulfed or moved by them.  Using 
tropes of progress, the articles boast that Marconi’s invention would bring the “future” to 
the present.  Often the “beyond belief ” or “around the corner” descriptions reified the 
technology.   
 And the wireless, which was ultimately successful, adheres to the same strategies 
as the other two discourses I consider:  Marconi’s work stands for progress.  Rhetoric 
constructs the wireless as a progressive, efficient, and profitable technology and 
constructs Marconi himself as a genius inventor who could be trusted to bring the future 
to the world.  One could certainly examine the accounts of other wireless inventors’ 
systems to understand how they, too, were rhetorically constructed.  What is important in 
this chapter is that Marconi’s work was being closely followed by the popular press and 
(re)presented according to particularly important themes:  The wireless was a 
monumental new invention based on nearly 100 years of research, important for war, 
commercially viable, and more efficient, therefore, better than cable.  Such themes as 
those above suggest the audience would be receptive to the wireless because it fit the 
“modern” lifestyle socially, economically, and even personally.  The popular press 
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creates the simultaneous images of a technology that’s “right around the corner” and also 
“here and now.”  Those seemingly contradictory images have a rhetorical basis:  The 
popular press accounts portray both the current uses for the wireless and prophesize its 
future.  Therefore, the wireless is “the technology of the day”; older technologies, then, 
become outdated.  Creating dissatisfaction with cable and other “outdated” technologies 
seems to be a key component of the values associated with wireless technology; in 
contrast to cables and wires, the wireless is cheaper, more versatile, more efficient, and 
more modern. 
 In the next chapter, I analyze how an artistic movement re-presented the wireless 
along with other early twentieth-century technologies in order to give a more robust 
analysis of the wireless’s rhetorical representations alongside other progressive 
technologies.  I do not argue that the wireless caused artists to glorify technology; 
instead, technologies were already being fetishized or invoking awe (c.f. Adams; Nye).  
As an industrial product of modernity, the wireless speaks to the theories of modernism.  
F. T. Marinetti, the founder of the first avant-garde (Futurism), reinscribed the wireless 
into his aesthetics.  Instead of being a scientist, engineer, journalist, or consumer, 
Marinetti was a lover of the wireless—a modernist technophile—who shared a passion 




1.  Mifeprestone (or RU-486) is a good (albeit controversial) example because its 
introduction in the United States had to overcome social, political, and scientific pressure 
that thwarted its approval for many years. 
 
2.  Although the US Navy appears to have awarded a contract to an American over a 
foreign company for certain experiments circa 1910 (c.f. Yeang), Marconi’s status as an 
inventor was quite high in the American popular press. 
 
3.  Although this dissertation’s methodology has limitations because I have almost 
exclusively chosen positive representations of Marconi’s wireless, the patterns that 
appear in the articles are at least suggestive of audience values and expectations.  If 
anything, we can observe that Marconi’s contemporaries in the mass media articulated 
certain positive images of his wireless. 
 
4.  The Marconi Signal and Wireless Co, founded in the late nineteenth century, 
continued to have “Marconi” in its name—there were minor changes—until the company 
was sold off in January 2006.  Rogue polemicists online do rail against Marconi as the 
“father of the radio”; one particular site claims Nikola Tesla was the true inventor and 
Marconi was a thief (“Why I Hate Marconi.”  http://www.loneinventor.com/). 
 
5.  Alexander Stepanovitch Popoff, a Russian electromagnetic scientist in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, has his name spelled “Popoff” and “Popov.”  
When I quote an author’s mentioning of him, I use the same spelling as the author. 
 
6.  A current example of how a specific name secures itself as a benchmark long after 
other companies’ products have reached the market is the adjective/verb/noun XEROX:  
Many of us have created xerox copies, xeroxed originals, or asked “Where’s the Xerox?” 
in order to photocopy originals using an HP, Panasonic, Samsung, or other photocopier 
brands. 
 
7.  Arthur C. Clarke, the famous science fiction writer, claims that any new technological 
discovery should not be very far removed from magic. 
 
8.  I attended T. A. Edison High School in Franconia, VA.  Students had to do reports on 
Edison and were often told that he was a “wizard.”  In fact, my lacrosse team had shirts 
made with “The Wizards of Menlo Field” printed on the back as a pun on Edison’s lab at 
Menlo Park.  Unfortunately, we lost all but one game the entire season. 
 
9.  J. Chandra Bose has recently been accepted as the inventor of the coherer Marconi 
used in his 1901 transatlantic experiments (Bondyopadhyay 259). 
 
10.  The article’s author is simply credited as “A Friend,” and the article is a glowing 




11.  Bijan Jabbari, a senior IEEE member, notes that “Marconi put to work the concepts 
already developed by Hertz, Branly, Lodge, Popov, and a few others” (1523). 
 
12.  H. E. Hancock’s history of Marconi’s wireless, written in the late 1940s as a 
celebration of Marconi’s work, also overlooks Marconi’s contemporary contributors. 
 
13.  “Ether” was believed to be the unseen matter in the universe, a substance that could 
conduct electricity and, subsequently, radio waves. 
 
14.  While it may seem as if I am glorifying Marconi and contributing to his lone inventor 
legend, my emphasis on him reflects my argument that the popular press rhetorically 
constructed the Marconi wireless apparatus as the most important and dominant system.  
His celebrity status and (eventual) Nobel Prize—which he shared with a lesser-known 
German inventor, Karl Ferdinand Braun—does not prove historically that he was the sole 
inventor of the wireless technology, but his popularity does suggest his wireless was 
known as one of the first and most important inventions. 
 
15.  Baker’s introduction to this article also appears in the March 1902 issue of Current 
Literature, and another large section is quoted in Herbert Wallace’s June 1902 McClure’s 
Magazine article. 
 
16.  McClure’s Magazine was extremely positive about Marconi’s work.  Robert 
McClure was actually present in Dover, England for Marconi’s crossing of the English 
Channel and was “allowed to hold cross-channel conversation” with Cleveland Moffett in 
order to, “in the interests of [McClure’s] readers, satisfy ourselves that this wireless 
telegraphy marvel had really been accomplished” (Moffett 15). 
 
17.  Although the Internet in the form of the World Wide Web was recognized by 
consumers in the early 1990s, its creation dates back to the 1960s.  Beaming nightly news 
into the homes of families seems more an invention for satellite television, but Baker 
believes the news would be written down for the occupants to read at their leisure.  
Interestingly, the idea of people gathering around a radio set or television set to listen or 
watch “news” was not part of the popular consciousness as evidenced in these popular 
press articles. 
 
18.  Nicola Tesla also had a wireless idea and worked extensively in America, but his 
outlandish claims eventually made him seem too far out to be a serious rival. 
 
19.  The popular press varied in its price-per-word estimates.  Authors claimed the system 
would be profitable at less than a cent a word to around five cents a word.  Of course, all 
claimed the wireless rate was significantly cheaper to telegram rates.  Also, there were 
differences in the exact price of building stations and outfitting ships. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TROPES OF PROGRESS IN F. T. MARINETTI’S EARLY FUTURIST TEXTS 
History is more or less bunk.  It’s tradition.  We don’t want tradition.  We 
want to live in the present and the only history that is worth a tinker’s dam 
is the history we make today.  Henry Ford, “Making History” (61) 
 
 Western industrialized societies of the early twentieth century were entrenched in 
ideologies favoring progress:  From human advancements to management science, the 
early twentieth century believed “efficiency” was one of the highest goals of progressive 
life.  Frederick Taylor’s efficiency manifesto The Principles of Scientific Management, 
for example, articulated efficiency principles that were put into practical use by one of 
the leading industrialists of the time, Henry Ford.  Fordism/Taylorism exemplifies the 
early twentieth century’s fascination with efficiency and progress, and modernist artists 
captured similar images, attitudes, and situations related to these values in their works.  
After all, art reflects the artist’s world and world view.  European and American avant-
gardes contributed to new artistic movements that incorporated and promoted new 
technological advances.  A machine gun, an automobile, and a wireless telegraphy station 
replaced (somewhat) “traditional” muses such as an ocean, a mountain range, and a 
flower.  Even artists who did not glorify technological progress were affected by the new 
tools of science that excited the minds of artists and audiences.1  To live in industrialized 
countries meant one could experience the progress around him or her.  New 
advancements were integral elements of avant-gardes such as Futurism. 
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This chapter demonstrates how F. T. Marinetti incorporated values and attitudes 
of progress associated with the wireless and other early twentieth-century technologies 
into his early Futurist manifestos.  His manifestos are products of a period consumed by 
new scientific, technological, and industrial discoveries and, therefore, reflect the 
culture’s overall belief that “progress” is an important social goal.  For Marinetti, the 
wireless and other contemporary technologies signified humanity’s progress(ion) away 
from an irrelevant past.  Other artists were not so sure new technological advancements 
deserved such praise; for instance, D. H. Lawrence, Virginia Woolf, H. G. Wells, and 
Aldus Huxley presented technology in less panacean and more skeptical ways.  In 
contrast, Marinetti fetishizes technology and promotes new advancements as beneficial 
products and markers of civilization.  Marinetti describes these technologies similarly to 
how Marconi and the popular press describe the wireless but in exaggerated ways.  Using 
tropes of progress in his early Futurist texts, Marinetti shows how technologies exemplify 
the values of speed, efficiency, evolution, and ahistoricity. 
 Those values continue to manifest themselves into rhetorical constructions of 
technologies as I show in previous chapters.  In this chapter, I will demonstrate how an 
adamant technophile such as Marinetti rhetorically reconstructs the wireless using tropes 
of progress that he also affixes to other inventions (i.e., the machine gun, airplane, ocean 
vessel).  His texts portray early twentieth-century inventions as saviors of humanity, the 
pride of industrialization, and a model for humans to emulate.  Marinetti wanted his 
audiences to embrace the values of progress as represented through speed, efficiency, 
evolution, and ahistoricity.  According to Marinetti’s Futurist agenda, technology helps 
humans “escape” from passéisme, which is a love for the sentimental past and not for the 
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industrial future.  Also, as an avant-garde artist, Marinetti’s texts display an experimental 
aspect through telegraphic lyricism or mimicking telegraphic discourse. 
  My analysis is meant to be not an exhaustive study on Marinetti or Futurism but a 
suggestion that Marinetti’s fascination with technology indicates that he is a product of 
modernity.  Futurism is often used interchangeably with Italian Futurism, which 
mistakenly implies Marinetti’s aesthetics were universally accepted by the various 
Futurist groups—Russian Futurism, Cubo-Futurism, Ego-Futurism—and that his 
aesthetics were representative of avant-garde aesthetics.  Many scholars even note that as 
the first avant-garde, Marinetti influenced all of the avant-gardes that followed 
(Bondenella; Butler; Kirby; Perloff; Poggioli; Rainey).  One scholar observes that 
“[Marinetti’s] ideas were received enthusiastically by most of the principal writers of the 
times,” but later many withdrew their support or denied Futurism’s influence (Bondanella 
316).  Also, the avant-garde was not the only crowd receptive to Marinetti.2
To demonstrate how Marinetti’s aesthetics relate to industrial or technological 
tropes of progress, I analyzed the following texts from his early phase of Futurism:3
1. “The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism,” 
2. “The Birth of a Futurist Aesthetic,” 
3. “Electrical War (A Futurist Vision-Hypothesis),” 
4. Destruction of Syntax-[Wireless Imagination]-Words in Freedom, 
5. and Zang Tumb Tumb. 
I cover the last text Zang Tumb Tumb briefly in order to give some examples of 
Marinetti’s parole in libertá poetry.4  Much of Marinetti’s aesthetic license is obvious in 
the first four texts, but Zang Tumb Tumb’s onomatopoeic style and avant-garde nature are 
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best seen and not described.  The reader should examine Richard Pioli’s translation of 
Futurist texts Stung by Salt and War and Elizabeth R. Napier and Barbara Studholme’s 
translation of Marinetti’s texts Selected Poems and Related Prose (compiled by Luce 
Marinetti, Marinetti’s daughter) in order to observe the multiple typefaces, font sizes, and 
styles that make Marinetti’s parole in libertá unchained.  These foundational texts of 
Italian Futurism and, therefore, the historical avant-garde were published shortly after 
Marconi’s wireless became a black box.  Marinetti’s reliance on the machine in his art is 
more than an allegory of speed, efficiency, evolution, and the future; he also pushes 
Italian modernization. 
 To demonstrate Marinetti’s avant-garde penchant for glorifying technologies in 
his manifestos, I discuss how Marinetti’s texts position him as a product of modernity:  
His nationalism, accompanied by a desire for militarism and further industrialization fits 
the cultural values and practices of early twentieth-century industrial nations.  
Furthermore, technologies are muses for Marinetti, and his texts show science fiction 
fascination with machines.  Whether he is describing a futuristic monoplane or “twenty-
first-century” wireless warfare, Marinetti constructs another type of favorable rhetoric in 
order to explain the (potential) usefulness of an invention—he echoes the other 
discourses that described the wireless as “beyond expectations.” 
 
Marinetti’s Response to the “Cult of Efficiency” Surrounding New Technologies 
 The wireless was one of these important technologies that performs “beyond 
expectations” in Marinetti’s work.  Marinetti often groups the wireless together with 
telephones, automobiles, machine guns, and even airplanes when he claims “inventions” 
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will bring Italy to greatness.  Such nationalist sentiment emerges when he advocates war 
and attacks what he sees as weakness in a past-loving culture.  His polemics rarely focus 
on concrete possibilities for new machines; instead, he makes bombastic claims about an 
unrealistic future, a utopia brought about through technology.  Marinetti’s art often has a 
science fiction appeal; he represents technologies by describing them as exciting or 
fantastic tools that are also economic and industrial “saviors.” 
 Marinetti believed techno-salvation is possible and issued the first avant-garde 
manifesto in 1909 (“The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism”) to show the explicit 
importance of technology.  For Marinetti, technologies do not just advance progress; they 
are the muses which humans and his new Futurist movement must emulate.  The word 
“Futurism” implies that Marinetti’s goal was for the future:  He wanted Italy to advance 
technologically away from the past, which was dead to him, and move into a new 
industrial age, one that favored the machine.  By advancing mechanistic “virtues,” 
Marinetti proposes that life—not just art—ought to follow technological values:  Humans 
should be fast like cars, explosive like bombs, super productive like factories, and as free 
as wireless signals.  The technologies Marinetti favors also act as aesthetic “models” for 
his art; for example, in “The Electrical War (A Futurist Vision-Hypothesis),” Marinetti 
pays homage directly to the wireless and offers it as a model for his poetry. 
 The speed with which the wireless communicates (instantaneously) and the form 
an author’s words take in telegraphic communication define Marinetti’s “telegraphic 
lyricism” style.  Such a style is “a swift, brutal, and immediate lyricism” (DWW 104).  
Marinetti aimed to reduce words to the simplest, most efficient form possible.  Various 
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Futurist groups experimented with telegraphic styles (J. White 147), so Marinetti was not 
the sole originator.  As John White points out, 
Even granting Futurism an instrumental role in disseminating and 
popularizing telegraphic writing among the Orphists, the Expressionists, 
and the Vorticists, in the case of such a widespread modernist 
phenomenon one has to allow for the eventuality of polygenesis.  Indeed, 
the possibility that the attractions of such a style had occurred almost 
simultaneously to various avant-garde writers in different countries is a 
strong one. (147) 
 
These European Futurist artists lived in industrial(izing) nations, so they and their 
aesthetics are products of their social context.  The spirit of progress and modernization 
influenced this European “cult of the ‘telegraphic,’” and “[i]ts mushrooming popularity 
owed much to two things:  the discoveries of Guglielmo Marconi, and contemporary 
mythification of the Eiffel Tower” (J. White 147). 
Although Marconi’s invention is an important object for Marinetti, the promotion 
of progress underlies the goals set forth in his manifestos and poems.  Besides his 
typographical long poem Zang Tumb Tumb, his early manifestos show this terse, 
telegraphic writing as an artist’s duty and embracing industrialization perpetuates human 
evolution.  Marinetti can be used synonymously with Italian Futurist beginnings because 
Marinetti was the movement’s leader,5 he is considered the most important (Blum; 
Bondanella; Hewitt; Perloff; Poggioli; J. White).  From his first Futurist texts, readers are 
bombarded with industrial images.  For instance, the first Futurist manifesto shows the 
movement’s love of speed and violence in the prologue, where Marinetti and his friends 
become re-energized after their car crashes into a river full of factory effluents (FMF 40-
1).  Such markers of industrialization pinpoint the correlation between art and the 
industrialized world’s pro-technological values.  “Growth,” “progress,” and “evolution” 
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existed prior to Marinetti; after all, World’s Fairs had been exciting the public with their 
technical, scientific, and industrial marvels for over half a century before Futurism.  
Marinetti, Marconi, and others were influenced by an age that celebrated humanity’s 
techno-evolution.  Machines were prostheses to humans, allowing them to accomplish 
“higher” forms of work.  Increased production through mechanization meant humans 
could become superhuman workers.  Marinetti also portrays the machine as a model for 
human biology.  To transform into a machine meant being able to cast off human 
“frailties” and become the most efficient specimen possible. 
According to Marinetti, the Futurists, as super-efficient beings, “have already 
scattered treasures, a thousand treasures of force, love, courage, astuteness, and raw will 
power,” yet, “[o]ur hearts know no weariness because they are fed with fire, hatred, and 
speed!” (FMF 43-4).  The image most appropriate for this transformation is to imagine a 
“radio-bomb.”  The radio signifies his increased communication speed through 
telegraphic lyricism, and bombs reflect his incendiary rhetoric, which permeates 
Marinetti’s poetry and prose.6  An important aspect of his parole in libertá is “[l]ove of 
speed, abbreviation, and the summary.  ‘Quick, give me the whole thing in two words!’” 
(DWW 98).  As a “radio-bomb,” Marinetti, who did not use this particular expression,7 
becomes a weapon launched from a radio tower to incite chaos.  Although we often have 
to consider the figurative nature of poetry and prose, Marinetti’s texts imply that he 
would have literally wanted to become a radio transmission and explode his invectives 
for millions within the reach of this new international communication technology.  The 
wireless was a tool for the future, and “Marinetti singles out the invention of wireless 
telegraphy as one of the great milestones in civilization’s progress towards the Futurist 
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electric millennium of the twenty-first century” (J. White 148).  As John White points 
out, the wireless excited the mass audience: 
News could be transmitted and received virtually instantaneously 
thousands of miles away.  The telegraphic dissemination of the new word 
of science became the technological equivalent of the spreading of the 
Gospel, and writers treated the subject with an appropriate religiosity, 
often using the imagery of the biblical word. (148) 
 
From White’s argument, the wireless’s reception, fetishization, and subsequent 
reinscription can be said to have happened because the invention embodies the power of a 
divine miracle.  Divinity had been replaced by technology (c.f. Adams). 
 Specifically, Futurism captures the culture’s reliance and devotion to progress in 
works that range from manifestos and poems to sculpture and architecture.  Each art 
genre—painting, literature, architecture, sculpture, etc.—had its own manifesto.  
Although Marinetti’s movement was Italian, the value of mechanization, of progress 
through technological advancements, was international.  Such sentiments ran through the 
European avant-garde circles and reflected the growing dependence on new sciences and 
technologies.  In order to compete effectively in this hyper-industrial situation in which 
Marinetti and others found themselves, each nation had to acquire the proper 
technologies. 
Marinetti’s techno-dogma suggests that he attempted to help Italy see the need for 
a social push for modernization.  During a visit to Venice, Marinetti and a few of his 
followers passed around leaflets chastising the “romantic” passéisme of the city.  He 
wanted Italy to become a major industrial power, and he despised those who wished to 
reminisce about the past.  The image is best captured by the comic strip artist André 
Warnod in Comedia from 1910: 
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[T]he cartoonist provided comic ‘before’ and ‘after’ pictures . . . Before:  
grotesque and flabby lovers smooching in the Piazza San Marco; after:  a 
city of bridges dirigibles, smoke stacks, and electric lamps, their rays 
replacing those of the sun.  To the left of center, we see a replica of the 
Eiffel Tower, as if to say Venice has now become Paris. (Perloff 104) 
 
Paris, which had radio broadcasts beaming from the Eiffel Tower, was the pinnacle of 
modernization for Marinetti, a state Italy should mimic.  Modernization aroused strong 
nationalist sentiments in Italy, and Marinetti himself conflates patriotism with a lust for 
mechanization.  Because technology marked progress for Marinetti, anyone not 
consenting to the mechanical present (or future) “affirmed once again the ridiculous 
nullity of nostalgic memory, of myopic history and the dead past” (BFA 83).  New 
technologies offered direction “from a new sun, which is certainly not the sun that 
caressed the placid backs of our grandfathers—those slow steps sagely measured to the 
lazy hours of provincial cities with their grassy cobblestones of silence” (BFA 83).  
Progress and progress reified through technological advancements were objects behind 
which pro-modernization forces rallied.8
 
The Effect of the Wireless and Other Technologies on Futurist Aesthetics 
 The Futurists, the wireless, and Marconi were products of the early twentieth 
century—an era consumed with progress.  Just as Marconi and the popular press 
presented the wireless as another possible incarnation of modern progress, Marinetti 
unleashed his Futurist polemics urging further industrialization and, of course, 
mechanization.  New technologies encouraged progress because they extended the work a 
human could do:  The automobile, assembly line, and wireless were all prostheses 
allowing humans faster movement, more efficient production, and wider communication 
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possibilities.  Prostheses like these helped create the aesthetic of dynamism:  “The world 
the Futurists knew could be traversed . . . using such new means of transportation as the 
automobile, the high-speed train, and, for short runs, even the airplane” (Perloff xxxvii).  
In his texts, Marinetti imagines the human-machine possibilities of these new 
technologies.  Although one cannot deny the comfort of some technologies of leisure 
(cars, TVs, airplanes, etc), the assembly line and factory itself are technologies of 
mechanization.  Fordist/Taylorist management science sought to reduce the human 
(error) element in production by creating a situation (i.e., the assembly line) where 
workers’ tasks could be reduced to simple repetition and little, if any, thought.9  Such 
streamlining reflects dominant tropes of speed, efficiency, evolution, and ahistoricity.   
 Marinetti glorifies technology by linking machine advancement to human 
progress—evolution.  Current scholarship claims that Marinetti’s aesthetics embody 
advancement through machinery.  Although most scholars make the connection between 
technology and Marinetti’s poetic style (Blum; Butler; Campbell; Hewitt; Perloff; C. 
Taylor), John J. White specifically claims that Marconi’s wireless was a key influence on 
artistic telegraphy or, as he puts it, “the cult of the ‘telegraphic’” (147).  White also 
argues that Marinetti was not the only artist experimenting with such a style because 
“‘telegraphic’ writing was generally ‘in the air’ in European avant-garde circles” in the 
early twentieth century (160).  White credits Marconi’s popularity and discoveries for 
inspiring “the public imagination and . . . hav[ing] a tangible influence on the quality of 
everyday modern life” (148).  In fact, Marinetti claims that the wireless influenced his 
style after his time as a war correspondent during Italy’s bombing of Tripoli (J. White 
161); however, White believes that account to be Marinetti’s revisionist history (162). 
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 Christine Poggi argues that Marinetti’s telegraphic parole in libertá writings 
“violate all the rules of proper telegram writing” (qtd. in J. White 165).  White notes that 
Poggi’s argument for “the violation of the conventional rules for telegrams lies in 
Marinetti’s use of diagrammatical pictures instead of any words” (165).  Focusing on 
Marinetti’s violation of “proper” telegraphic form reduces his artistic contribution to 
telegraphic lyricism because “violation” assumes his style is somehow a 
miscommunication.  Such a style was not meant to be of practical use in wireless or 
“wired” telegraphy.  For example, Marinetti’s famous bombardment poem Zang Tumb 
Tumb uses “tataluuuntlin” to describe the sound of a train going over an iron bridge and 
“sssssssiii ssiissii ssiisssssiiii” to describe the sound or whistle of a train’s smoke stack 
(56 and 57).  Furthermore, the bolded text denotes loudness.  Although a radio operator 
or telegrapher could easily record or decipher the letters above, Marinetti’s onomatopoeic 
“words” were not meant to be communicated via Morse code.  This style was meant to be 
read or heard (as it was in Marinetti’s public performances).  Marinetti’s texts included 
such constructions as 
 
  POESIA NASCERE 
in order to signify a crescendo and to reinforce the idea that his poetry is born in this new 
age of bombs.10  The crescendo, the gradual increasing of sound, mimics the gradual 
increasing loudness of a bomb falling to the ground, and the finale is an explosion. 
 The wireless influenced Marinetti’s concept of parole in libertá, which offers 
readers a sense that contemporary communication technologies played a significant role 
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in Futurist aesthetics.  That style reinscribes tropes of progress.  Marinetti’s aesthetics 
derive cultural and artistic value from “progress” based on Industrialization’s larger 
culture influences.  Marinetti valued technology in a way that Latour’s fictional 
sociologist would recognize as “love.”  Although Marinetti’s response was more of an 
obsession than a practical technological design project, he reflects a larger cultural “love” 
of technology that allowed early twentieth-century inventions to become realized.  
Industrial cultures embraced new technologies and even felt in awe of their massive 
power, as Henry Adams did at the 1899 World’s Fair.  Marinetti felt humans should 
embrace technology in order to leap into the future.  His devotion to ahistoricity is 
simultaneously his rejection of the past, a time, according to Marinetti, that is worthless. 
 But not all modernists subscribed to technological utopian dreams.  For instance, 
D. H. Lawrence had an interest in Futurism, but considered the movement immature, and 
his works do not promote technology as any savior.  Whether Lawrence has coal mines 
cut into the English landscape or creates characters dehumanized by “modern” 
technology and industrialization, Women in Love critiques the modernist reconstruction 
of technology as progressive—in the sense that progressive connotes beneficence or 
necessity.  Although different modernist artists did not share the same views on 
technology, technology still had a role in modernist texts.11  While Lawrence and Woolf 
were critical of technology because of its destructive, alienating qualities, Marinetti 
celebrated it. 
 Marinetti’s war imagery is enhanced by using onomatopoeic and experimental 
typography.  Besides a steadily increasing font size, Marinetti often “render[s] dynamism 
typographically by using shaped writing to indicate lines of movement” (J. White 18).  
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The cover of his 1919 novel 8 Souls in a Bomb (Fig. 2) portrays the sound of a bomb 
firing out of a cannon (TUM), going up into an arc (rrrrrr . . . ), coming down onto a 
hillside (ua ua ua . . . ), and exploding (Braaang Bragraa).  This format was not 
supposed to be used as sound telegraphic style; instead, the typographical “image” 
conveys Marinetti’s poetry as explosive.  The eight souls of the title may represent eight 
Futurist artists—F.T. Marinetti, Giacoma Balla, Antonio Sant’Elia, Gino Severini, Carlo 
Carrá, Umberto Boccioni, Luigi Russolo, and Andengo Soffici12—with the image evoked 
by the text’s artistic representation of the Futurist polemical assault from the air and, 
possibly, the air waves.  Although Boccioni, Russolo, and Sant’Elia died during (or from 
injuries sustained in) WWI, they were integral members pushing the boundaries of avant-
garde art prior to WWI. 
 
Fig. 2.  Cover to 8 Souls in a Bomb by F. T. Marinetti.  Rpt. in John J. White, Literary 
Futurism:  Aspects of the First Avant Garde.  Oxford:  Clarendon P, 1990. 
 
 Those artists also celebrated movement, speed, and efficiency in their work, so 
the novel’s cover represents the Futurist Movement’s overall goal of exciting the 
imagination of the Italian masses through incendiary art.  During a 1910 performance in 
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Venice, Marinetti and his cohorts scolded the Venetian crowd because they were not 
embracing modernization enough:  “Shame on you!  Shame on you!” he shouted.  He 
wanted the Venetians to get out of the way “while we prepare a great strong, industrial, 
commercial, and military Venice on the Adriatic Sea, that great Italian Lake!” (qtd. in 
Perloff 106).  In the 1920s and 1930s, Marinetti would douse his audience with his 
polemical Variety Theatre and radio broadcasts, but the pre-WWI violent rhetoric exists 
on the page in Marinetti’s earlier works, much of which glorify bombardment and 
communication as ways to attack.  Other technologies contribute to Marinetti’s violent 
poetry, but his “wireless imagination” concept creates an ideal freedom inextricably 
linked to mechanical values and tropes of progress.  After all, the mechanical wireless 
produces signals that “fly” back and forth between stations. 
 One of Marinetti’s most celebratory works specifically about the wireless is his 
poem-manifesto13 “Electrical War (A Futurist Vision-Hypothesis),” which shows how the 
wireless is reconceived through bombardment imagery to become both a muse of sorts 
and a means to promote Italian nationalism.  This pre-WWI piece heralds a new 
panitalianismo, which will be carried out in large part by new technologies.  “Electrical 
War” opens with the following introduction:  “Oh! how I envy the men who will be born 
into the next century on my beautiful peninsula when it is wholly vivified, shaken and 
bridled by the new electric forces!” (104).14  The wireless acts as an important controlling 
mechanism for Marinetti’s imagined, future Italy “transformed by man’s genius into 
many millions of Kilowatts” (EW 104).  In the vision, Marinetti denounces the 
romanticist poets of the past for their love of the sea and claims humans have found a 
way to make the sea labor for Italy “with all its diligent, raging storms to set in ceaseless 
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motion numberless iron pontoons that energize two million dynamos scattered along the 
beaches and in a thousand working gulfs” (EW 104).  This energy “needing no wires” in 
Marinetti’s vision is “controlled from keyboards with a fertilizing abundance that throbs 
beneath the fingers of the engineers” (EW 104).  Instead of having a world created by 
natural forces, Marinetti’s vision promotes a hyper-industrial science fiction reality where 
radio-type engineers “sit before switchboards, with dials to right and left, keyboards, 
regulators, and commutators, and everywhere the splendid flash of polished levers” (EW 
104-5).  While this “control room” reflects a science fiction spaceship, Marinetti’s 
description comes from a radio room.  The vision’s engineers “have finally won the joy 
of living between iron walls,” and, because “[t]hey are finally free of wood and its lesson 
of weakness,” mechanization forges a new reality based on the strength of new materials 
(EW 105).  Marinetti privileged machines for their power and denigrated the natural, 
which he saw as weakness needing to be conquered.  Not surprisingly, this vision comes 
from his novel War, the World’s only Hygiene where he glorifies the cleansing aspects of 
destruction—destruction of the past carried out by new technologies. 
 Airplanes and the wireless assist the vision’s engineers who “regulate the 
lightning speed of the seed-scattering trains that two or three times a year cross the 
lowlands for basic sowing” (EW 105, italics mine).  Airplanes had yet to have wireless 
capabilities in 1911, but popular press articles had already prophesized remote control 
possibilities—mechanical manipulation via radio signals—so a radio in an airplane would 
not have seemed too far fetched.  One article even speculated that remote control 
torpedoes would eventually be used during naval battles (Moffett 17).  While popular 
press reports speculated on non-organic wireless and general electrical possibilities, 
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Marinetti has a more fanciful, organic vision where electricity not only plants seeds but 
helps them grow.  Marinetti envisions crops and orchards with “numberless lightning 
rods” placed in the ground to “tickle the turgid bellies of storm clouds” in order to excite 
“the roots of the plants” (EW 105).  This electro-fertilization helps grow bigger, stronger 
crops faster, a system far more efficient than simply organic means.  Electricity, which 
appears to follow the idea that ether is a conductor, is no longer wasted:  “All the 
atmospheric electricity hanging over us, all the incalculable electricity of the earth, is 
finally harnessed” (EW 105).  Plants also grow “with lightning speed” when stimulated 
by “artificial electricity at high tension” (EW 105).  The wireless makes this electro-
agricultural vision possible because invisible electric signals—with no physical 
connection—have no limits for Marinetti.15  Wireless signals penetrate walls, hills, and 
other barriers, so electricity “will penetrate every muscle, artery, and nerve of the [Italian] 
peninsula” (EW 104). 
 The Futurist(ic) vision assumes that “the discovery of the wireless telegraph far in 
the past” helped bring about this techno-utopian Italy (EW 106).  Marinetti’s glimpse of 
the future reflects Marconi and the popular press’s topos that the wireless’s potential is 
beyond expectations, and that the future will fully recognize the wireless and other 
technologies’ capabilities.  The wireless and the fact that “the use of dielectrics increases 
every day” (EW 106) builds Marinettis’s vision of a hyper-industrial and hyper-efficient 
new world.  Just as Marconi and supportive popular press writers rhetorically constructed 
the wireless as a commercial success, Marinetti infuses his poem-manifesto with labor 
images, which show both the popular press and Marinetti promote industry.  In 
Marinetti’s utopian world, physical occupations are done by machines:  “Ended now the 
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need for wearisome and debasing labors.  Intelligence finally reigns everywhere.  
Muscular work ceases to be servile” (EW 106).  Marinetti also promotes a Libertarian or 
proto-Objectivist theory16 because laissez faire economic principles appear to give 
humans massive surpluses.  No hunger or poverty exist in this vision because “[t]he 
financial question [has been] reduced to a simple matter of accounting” and society 
allows “[f]reedom for all to make money” (EW 106). 
 Because of these new commercial successes, Marinetti creates a new ideal for 
human intellect and prosperity.  Basically, he wants machines to (do the) labor, so that 
these new humans “can perfect their lives in numberless antagonistic exertions” (EW 
106).  The new humans no longer walk on earth—too inefficient; instead, they fly in 
personal monoplanes.  Physical exertion “now [has] only three goals:  hygiene, pleasure, 
and struggle” (EW 106).  Even today pro-industrialists promote technology as saving 
human time.  Machines are seen as more efficient, which is why athletes and coaches 
often describe a person’s body through machine metaphors.  A machine rarely gets sick 
or performs inconsistently in such comparisons.  If athletes have automatic, mechanical 
physical responses at game time, they will win.  Marinetti envisions such cyborg-like 
creatures who can now be more efficient because “[e]yes and other human organs are no 
longer simple sensory receptors, but true accumulators of electric energy” (EW 106).17  
In other words, Marinetti celebrates as human evolution the mechanical and human 
worlds becoming entwined after technological efficiency has replaced human labor. 
 For Marinetti, advancement breaks from the “old ways,” so techno-celebrations fit 
Futurist art well.  Because technology is valued for commercial reasons, its promoters (as 
I have shown in the previous two chapters) emphasize commercial potentials.  Marinetti 
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is no exception.  The world he envisions includes “[t]wenty five great powers . . . fighting 
over markets of a superabundant industrial production” (EW 107).  Marinetti envisions 
that “the first electric war” will not use “more of those old explosives” but will harness 
the energy of the atmosphere and attack using wireless means—signals as bombs (EW 
107).  In this poem-manifesto, the wireless is a central technology that helps usher in this 
new utopian (albeit violent) hyper-industrial world.  The world powers fight over 
resources in cleansing wars.  Marinetti felt war was the world’s only hygiene, for it 
removes the past and the inefficient elements that stand in the way of progress.  To 
indicate progress and a break from the past, Marinetti’s vision offers a horrific image:  
“The sick and weak, crushed, crumbled, pulverized by the vehement wheels of intense 
civilization.  The green beards of provincial back alleys will be shaved clean by the cruel 
razors of speed” (EW 108). 
 Before this new world can begin, Marinetti claims Italians must “kill” the past.  In 
“The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism,” which establishes Marinetti’s movement, he 
rejects the past and is born anew.  He advances his attack further in “The Electrical War” 
by denouncing passéisme.  Marinetti ridicules lovers of the past and those who love Italy 
specifically for its past.  To “correct” this seemingly misguided love he offers the 
following plan:  “After having insulted every stranger who adores our Italian past and 
despises us as singers or serenades, as ciceroni or beggars, we have asked them to admire 
us as the most gifted race on earth.  Thanks to us, Italy will cease to be the love-room of 
the cosmopolitan world” (EW 108).  Marinetti wants Italy to evolve into this utopian 




A Love of Technology 
 Marinetti’s vision captures a love of technology and dismisses any remotely 
nostalgic aesthetic.  While telegraphic lyricism is a common component of the European 
avant-garde circa 1910 (Perloff; J. White), the techno-fetishization apparent in 
Marinetti’s art is predominantly Futurist.  J. White argues that Marinetti’s parole in 
libertá style can be “interpreted as a part of a process of liberation from the hold of the 
past which is an inevitable feature of the modern world” (164).  White also claims that 
the Futurists’ love of brevity “is more than just a virtuous economy reflecting the pace of 
modern life”; instead, “it is in some way the key to greater truths and thus renders most 
passéist writing not only anachronistic but also superficial” (164).  Marinetti’s style 
reflects the industrial world’s cult of efficiency more than any link to actual telegraphic 
writing practices.  He envisions a smaller world “brought about by the great discoveries 
of science” (qtd. in Perloff 57), and he promotes these new discoveries in his poetry and 
prose.  His manifestos and telegraphic writing point to the technological and scientific 
undercurrent of his time period. 
 Marinetti positions the wireless as the new, efficient communication technology 
helping to make the world smaller.  He also portrays other technologies—often in the 
image of a generic machine—as indicative of modern progress.  “The Founding and 
Manifesto of Futurism,” “The Birth of a Futurist Aesthetic,” and Destruction of Syntax-
[Wireless Imagination]-Words in Freedom demonstrate Marinetti’s connection or simply 
his mirroring of progress tropes.  These texts serve as sites where Marinetti’s early 
Futurist stance can be read as propaganda for a future that will glorify technological 
advancement as reified progress:  “Marinetti’s argument [for speed and efficiency] is 
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reductive enough to make for compelling propaganda” (Perloff 57).  Although such a 
discussion could highlight Marinetti’s proto-fascist leanings, I want to avoid reading 
fascism into Marinetti’s early works because that would risk being reductive as Perloff 
warns (xxix).18  Marinetti’s glorification of violence, war, and industrialization is not 
uniquely fascist.  After all, quite a few parallels exist between the Futurist Manifestos, 
Marconi’s presentations, and the popular press’s re-presentations.  To read his works as 
fascistic ignores the richer discussion that argues fascist principles are inherent in hyper-
industrial, hyper-fetishistic technological societies.  Even “democracies” such as the 
United States or Britain had more of an oligarchy controlling resources and production.  
In order for industries to profit, they needed highly efficient and dependent labor. 
 The new materials (and material conditions) of the early twentieth century require 
new ways of organizing resources.  Frederick Taylor advocates his management science 
theories to help make factories more efficient.  Marinetti, on the other hand, raises 
“efficiency” as a virtue.  Instead of promoting efficiency as a practical element for the 
modern industry as Taylor does, Marinetti promotes efficiency as human virtue—one 
developed by privileging mechanical qualities over human frailty.  To label such an 
aesthetic quality or industrial practicality as fascist, ignores the ideological link to all 
industrial economies—fascist, communist, capitalist, or “mixed” systems.  The wireless 
and Futurism are both products of modernity, and two important events in 1909 help 
point to the significance of science and technology in popular and literary consciousness:  
Marconi won the Nobel Prize for Physics, and Marinetti published his first Futurist 
manifesto.  Marconi’s Nobel Prize did not introduce him to the world but helped certify 
his status among the scientific community.  In contrast, Marinetti, who “was a mediocre 
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late Symbolist” until his seminal manifesto (Perloff 84), exploded onto the new avant-
garde literary scene. 
Marinetti’s manifesto and Marconi’s Nobel Prize both reflect the industrialized 
world’s positive attitude toward progress.  Just as Marconi and the popular press present 
the wireless as a marker of “good” civilization, Marinetti uses the same tropes of progress 
to praise technologies:  speed, efficiency, evolution, and ahistoricity.  Marinetti’s works 
show technology as a new way to liberation—freeing humans from their servile manual 
labor.  Such a situation distinctly marks human progression away from the past.  
Industrialization will usher in a new Italy, so past attributes or history itself is irrelevant. 
 
Ahistoricity in Marinetti’s Aesthetics 
 Marinetti’s most obvious trope of progress extends from his disdain for the past 
and promotion of ahistoricity.  Futurism is born in an allegorical “escape” from a 
backward, non-industrial countryside:  After an evening contemplating where art should 
go, Marinetti and his friends “trampled our atavistic ennui” and roared away in an 
automobile (FM 39).  Marinetti signals their departure from the past by shouting 
“Mythology and the Mystic Ideal are defeated at last . . . We must shake the gates of life, 
test the bolts and hinges” (FM 40).  After a series of quick twists and turns while roaring 
down the highway, Marinetti crashes into a ditch of “[f]air factory drain” (FM 40).  The 
polluted river appears to revitalize Marinetti:  “And so, faces smeared with good factory 
muck—plastered with metallic waste, with senseless sweat, with celestial soot—we, 
bruised, our arms in slings, but unafraid, declared our high intentions to all the living of 
the earth” (FM 41).  Thus begins the first avant-garde manifesto. 
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 As the name implies, Futurism wishes to look forward, and Marinetti clearly 
shows his loathing for passéisme in his early works.  The eighth point of the first 
manifesto claims “[w]e stand on the last promontory of the centuries! . . . Why should we 
look back, when what we want is to break down the mysterious doors of the Impossible?  
Time and Space died yesterday” (FM 41).  Marinetti also claims to want to “destroy the 
museums, libraries, academies of every kind” and “fight moralism, feminism, every 
opportunistic or utilitarian cowardice” (FM 42).  Only the new is to be admired in both 
art and technology.  Marinetti attacks passéisme by “establish[ing] Futurism, because we 
want to free this land from its smelly gangrene of professors, archaeologists, ciceroni and 
antiquarians.  For too long has Italy been a dealer in second-hand clothes.  We mean to 
free her from the numberless museums that cover her like so many graveyards” (FM 42).  
He rails against museums, claiming they are cemeteries, and “[a]dmiring an old picture is 
the same as pouring our sensibility into a funerary urn instead of hurtling it far off, in 
violent spasms of action and creation” (FM 42).  Being linked to the past stops “action 
and creation,” signifying death or halting progress. 
 Although denying the past and stressing progress(ion) are avant-garde 
characteristics, these are also the tropes of business.  Frederick Taylor asserts that “great 
gain, both to employers and employés,” will come “from the substitution of scientific 
rule-of-thumb methods in even the smallest details of the work of every trade” (24, italics 
mine).  Taylor’s text is also a manifesto of sorts.  He, as does Marinetti, places the onus 
on the individual to eliminate sloth and inefficiency.  Inefficient workers were guilty of 
dereliction of duty.  Taylor argues that “[t]he enormous saving of time and therefore 
increase in output . . . can be fully realized only after one has personally seen the 
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improvement” of Taylor’s scientific application (24).  One major goal of Taylorism was 
efficiency from “[t]he general adoption of scientific management” to achieve “the 
increase, both in the necessities and luxuries of life, which becomes available for the 
whole country” (142).  Also, another goal would be “the elimination of almost all causes 
for dispute and disagreement between [management and workmen]” (142).  According to 
Taylor, applying scientific principles to the factory leads to efficiency and benefits all—
science touches all workers and helps produce goods efficiently.  Likewise, Marinetti 
finds a similar attitudinal change because “Futurism is grounded in the great discoveries 
of science” (DWW 96, italics mine).  For both men, science is a good organizational 
strategy for either factories or art. 
Although Taylor directly addresses managers and workers, the results of his 
system portend benefit to all industrialized nations:  “Is it not the duty of those who are 
acquainted with these facts, to exert themselves to make the whole community realize 
this [study of scientific management’s] importance” (144).  Taylor’s text has a certain 
avant-garde quality inherent in its hyper-industrial fervor, but it is hardly the polemic of 
Marinetti’s art.  In fact, Taylorism (and its famous put-in-practice system, Fordism) 
adheres to early twentieth-century ideology—speed, efficiency, evolution, and 
ahistoricity.  Besides promoting progress, Taylor chastises his inefficient audience as 
morally defunct, thus satisfying Renato Poggioli’s definition of the avant-garde:  
“Ideology, therefore, is always a social phenomenon.  In the case of the avant-garde, it is 
an argument of self-assertion or self-defense used by a society in the strict sense against 
society in the larger sense” (4).  Taylor’s manifesto is a product of the time, and a rubric 
for adhering to the value of efficiency.  Factories need only follow the principles Taylor 
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puts forth, and they will assert their productive dominance in the market.  Taylor 
advocates his “primer’s” value for the larger society would be modernization, the same 
argument Marinetti made when he advocated “killing” any connection to the past would 
help Italian modernization. 
 I am not arguing, however, that Taylor shared Marinetti’s ahistorical stance 
against cultural markers and artifacts.  While Marinetti’s work is prone to violence, 
exaggeration, and performance, Taylor appears more practical, systematic, and 
industrious.  Taylor privileges the worker and management’s role in maintaining a well-
organized firm.  Ultimately, he does not fit Poggioli’s definition of an avant-garde artist 
because his work is not absorbed into “the demagogic moment,” which Poggioli argues 
fuels the “[avant-garde’s] tendency toward self-advertisement, propaganda, and 
proselytizing” (34).  Although Taylor’s lack of gross exaggeration and ferocious 
polemical stances mitigate his avant-garde status, his importance for gauging industrial 
practice is without question:  His text exists as a heuristic for industrial progress.  Simply 
put, progression toward increased production and profits mirrors part of Marconi and the 
popular press’s rhetoric of technology.  The wireless, besides often being “praised” for its 
potential, reflected human advancement and commercial/industrial success.  In this 
historical moment, when, as Taylor claims, “our larger wastes of human effort, which go 
on every day through such of our acts as are blundering, ill-directed, or inefficient, and 
which Mr. [Theodore] Roosevelt refers to as a lack of ‘national efficiency,’ are less 
visible, less tangible, and are vaguely appreciated” (5), Marinetti provides a symbolic 
transition.  Instead of looking to the past’s supposed “summit” or “fullness of time” as a 
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goal for avoiding “a fatal infelicitous fall back to barbarism” (Poggioli 72-3), Futurism 
experiments with the new. 
 These new experiments, although brash and violent, glorify new technologies that 
are unconsciously accepted by industrial cultures.  Although I cannot possibly pinpoint 
the mass culture or even the media’s ideology, technologies exist because a group accepts 
them.  Because we have the benefit (or burden) of historical hindsight, we know that the 
wireless extended the reach of communication—it was heralded as a genius product of 
modernity.  Likewise, automobiles became accepted as beneficial technologies, 
“liberating” individuals in industrialized nations because of their potential for allowing 
greater mobility.  Today, wireless transmissions, automobiles, and other technical objects 
are more than just tools; these technologies are prostheses for human activity in 
industrial, hyper-technological societies. 
 Technologies do not have to be accepted universally in order to become realized.  
We cannot claim every member of a society uses such technologies only that they are 
popularly seen as efficient, necessary products we cannot live without.19  As long as large 
enough groups accept a certain technology, these tools will be seen as useful and, 
therefore, be realized.  In fact, these technologies (and “universal” technologies like 
computers, PDAs, or mobile phones) can really only be said to be prostheses for middle, 
working, and wealthy classes.  Claiming “everyone has a mobile phone” marks the 
chauvinistic impulse in dominant society to ignore the material conditions of poorer 
groups.20  Such chauvinism appears in Futurism specifically and avant-gardism generally, 
which “is by nature solitary and aristocratic” (Bontempelli qtd. in Poggioli 39).  Marinetti 
claims “I do not care for the comprehension of the multitude,” and that poetry, avant-
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garde or “traditional” also “requires a special speaker if it is to be understood” (DWW 
106).  Likewise, because new technologies provide markers for civilization, a citizen 
must acquire the appropriate artifacts to be in accord with the well-to-do members.  
Consumerism allows individuals of any background to “buy into” the aristocratic image.  
An aristocratic technology such as the wireless held a certain regal aura because of how 
favorable relevant social groups rhetorically constructed it.  Marconi and the popular 
press documented when royalty and national leaders used the wireless, constructing it as 
an aristocratic or “elevated” technology.  However, for a small fee, any individual could 
send a wireless telegram (Baker 9), allowing him or her access to an aspect of an 
aristocratic lifestyle. 
 Marinetti addresses these aristocratic desires through tropes of efficiency and the 
new efficient, machine-like aristocrat.  But, because of Marinetti’s disdain for tradition, 
the old aristocrat (the noble or royal) cannot serve as a model.  Although Marinetti came 
from a wealthy family (Bondanella 315) and, as Bontempelli points out, “[the avant-
garde] loves the initiated and the ivory tower” (qtd. in Poggioli 39), the new aristocrat 
must embrace modernization.  Marinetti praises the industrial(ized) aristocracy over the 
royal by promoting aesthetic goals against ornamentation:  “A modern aesthetic most 
responsive to utility has no need of royal palaces with domineering lines and granite 
foundations that loom massively out of the past over the little medieval towns, confused 
welters of wretched dog kennels” (BFA 80-1, italics mine).  Instead, the “definitive 
Futurist aesthetic” included “great locomotives, twisting tunnels, armored cars, torpedo 
boats, monoplanes, and racing cars” (BFA 81).  The new “modern phenomena”—
technologies forged from modern ideals—succeed in “hav[ing] reduced to uselessness the 
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great, decorative, imperishable buildings that once expressed kingly authority, theocracy, 
and mysticism” (BFA 80).  In order to progress and fully enjoy modern life, such as “the 
speed of international communications,” modern comforts from “well-ventilated 
apartment blocks” to “perfect chambers de toilette” are required (BFA 80).  These 
technologies, these phenomena, signal progress to Marinetti. 
 
Progress Tropes in Marinetti’s Art 
 Marinetti does not stop by listing the important new technologies of the time 
period; he also celebrates “progress” as an abstract goal useful for his new aesthetic and 
ideal for life.  Humans should strive for progress and hold dearly to the concept as a 
defining goal.  Marinetti’s rhetoric of technology favoring progress matches Marconi and 
the popular press’s rhetoric because all three discourses advocate technological 
advancement as inherently progressive.  Progress is the code by which society should 
live:  “Put your trust in Progress, which is always right even when it is wrong, because it 
is movement, life, struggle, hope” (BFA 82).  Marinetti’s own capitalization of the word 
“Progress” reinforces the concept’s importance for the new modern world.  Progress and 
constant motion (dynamism) are both elements of Marinetti’s aesthetics reinscribed into 
Futurist art.  Marinetti’s art—pushing dynamism as one goal—privileges the struggle or 
act of creation over a finished product:  “The frame of a house in construction symbolizes 
our burning passion for the coming-into-being of things.  Things already built and 
finished, bivouacs of cowardice and sleep, disgust us!” (BFA 82).  Futurist sculpture, 
painting, and even architecture have widely been analyzed for their adherence to 
dynamism (Butler; Kirby; Perloff; Poggioli; Rainey; Rye).  Only through dynamism in 
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art and life can one find beauty:  “Except in struggle, there is no more beauty.  No work 
without aggressive character can be a masterpiece” (FM 41).  Marinetti sees progress 
reified through construction “according to the ever-changing moods of the winds” (BFA 
82).       
 This change supports Marinetti’s view that “the world’s magnificence has been 
enriched by a new beauty, the beauty of speed” (FM 41).  According to Marinetti, speed 
is limited when humans cling to the past.  Italy’s past is a “heavy burden . . . that weighs 
down our swift and warlike vessel” (BFA 83).  That burden of the past works against 
modernization, and Marinetti’s claim that “we Italian Futurists have no desire to see Italy 
left in an inferior state” (BFA 83) reflects the rhetoric behind promoting technology as a 
way out of “barbarism.”  Although barbarism is an exaggerated term, the concept is what 
the time period read as evolution’s antithesis (c.f. Childs).  Just as today’s educational 
push for more math and science skills is argued as crucial to a country’s economic 
prosperity, lack of industry marked then a nation’s backwardness.  A January 1902 article 
from The North American Review claims that “America’s position in the world of science 
is inferior,” and that Americans—even with “the stimulating examples of Edison, Tesla, 
[and] Elihu Thomson”—have been slow to pursue scientific enterprise (Snyder 59).21  In 
order to remedy this “dire” situation, Snyder claims Americans should create an 
equivalent of England’s Royal Institution; however, for this situation to yield results 
“would require . . . those who are broadly interested in scientific progress, and [those] 
who have a desire to keep abreast of the swiftly advancing knowledge of the day” (59).  
Science and technology advance rapidly, and both Marinetti and Snyder promote a 
rhetoric that identifies speed and advancement as a cultural value. 
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 In Marinetti’s words, Futurism “create[d] the new aesthetic of speed,” which 
“notably diminished the concept of time”; before long “[w]e will arrive at the abolition of 
the year, the day, and the hour” (BFA 81).  All that remains is the quickness of a moment.  
But Marinetti does not argue for “speed” in his art just by presenting images of racing 
cars and fast-moving ocean liners; he links the reader’s imagination to the speed of 
telegraphy by claiming “the analogical foundation of life” requires quick communication 
“with the same economical speed that the telegraph imposes on reporters and war 
correspondents in their swift reportings” (DWW 98).  This new aesthetic reaffirms what 
Marinetti argues is the relationship between poet, audience, and industrialization: “This 
urgent laconism answers not only to the laws of speed that govern us but also to the 
rapport of centuries between poet and audience” (DWW 98).22  Within this new aesthetic, 
Marinetti describes certain tenets or textual properties that favor speed, such as 
Futurism’s “[d]read of slowness, pettiness, analysis, and detailed explanations” (DWW 
97-98). 
 Speed and efficiency are major modernist tropes and topoi for Marconi and the 
popular press, and Marinetti’s reinscription of efficiency into his aesthetic and his 
glorification of it signal another rhetorical reconstruction of industrial values.  For 
Marinetti, technologies did not just mark progress, they helped humans achieve progress.  
New technological discoveries “have a decisive influence on [users’] psyches” (DWW 
96) because a human becomes intertwined with the machine’s efficiency; after all, 
Marinetti feels technologies act as prostheses, creating “[m]an multiplied by the 
machine” (DWW 97).  This “[n]ew mechanical sense” Marinetti attributes to humans 
creates a better worker through “a fusion of instinct with the efficiency of motors and 
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conquered forces” (DWW 97).  The height of efficiency for Marinetti’s new human 
would come from what we today know as cyborgs—cybernetic organisms that are part 
human and part machine.  While “preparing the ubiquity of multiplied man” (BFA 81), 
Marinetti sets forth a concept that violently dehumanizes “regular” humans.  In order to 
be efficient, one must use the new technologies simultaneously; one must multi-task.  
Others have pointed out that Futurism has Nietzschean roots (Bondanella; Childs; 
Perloff; J. White), and Marinetti’s concept of the “multiplied man” is nothing more than 
an übermensch made “super” through technological prostheses.  Workers extend their 
productive capacity by replicating mechanical responses, and these “most gifted people” 
are also “the most elastic [and] quick” (BFA 83).  Such malleability—and speed from 
having a worker mimic a machine—show dehumanization:  An individual has been 
reduced to a machine part.  This individual is multiplied throughout a factory when the 
workers cling to (or are made to embrace) scientific labor. 
 Scientifically or technologically reproduced “humans” appear in popular visions 
of cyborgs today,23 but an unfavorable contemporary portrayal of scientifically managed 
workers appears in D. H. Lawrence’s Women in Love.  The novel mainly follows the 
relationships of two sisters, Gudrun and Ursula, who fall in (and out) of love.  Ursula and 
Rupert are the novel’s eventual happy couple who stand by one another.  In contrast, 
Gerald and Gudrun have difficulties connecting to each other, and their relationship 
disintegrates.  But before the demise, Lawrence describes Gerald’s new management 
techniques for his mines as techniques scientifically “formulated” to produce efficient 
results.  Gerald believes, as the boss “above” the workers, he is “giving them what they 
wanted” because his firm is part of the “great and perfect system that subjected life to 
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pure mathematical principles” (Lawrence, Women in Love 231), which is the Futurist 
credo.  Gerald’s miners did not like his new management practices at first, but they 
eventually “submitted to it all” (Lawrence, Women in Love 230) because this was the 
future—human evolution through mechanized frameworks: 
There was a new world order, a new order, strict, terrible, inhuman, but 
satisfying in its very destructiveness.  The men were satisfied to belong to 
the great and wonderful machine, even whilst it destroyed them.  It was 
what they wanted, it was the highest that man had produced, the most 
wonderful and superhuman. (Lawrence, Women in Love 231, italics mine) 
 
Gerald runs the company “on the most accurate and delicate scientific method”; thus, 
“the miners were reduced to mere mechanical instruments” (Lawrence, Women in Love 
230).  Of course, this Taylorist/Fordist impulse for ultra-efficiency was part of the rise of 
industrial America.  Lawrence appears to be aware of America’s dominance (or coming 
dominance in industrialization) because he says that the “[n]ew machinery was brought 
from America, such as the miners had never seen before, great iron men, as the cutting 
machines were called, and unusual appliances” (Women in Love 230, italics mine).  Even 
the machines had nicknames to reinforce their “human” qualities. 
 Gerald became the workers’ god:  “He was the God of the machine.  [The miners] 
made way for his motor-car automatically, slowly” (Lawrence, Women in Love 223).  
Gerald, literally, kept the gears turning; he would dispose of non-critical, inefficient parts 
(workers) as he needed.  An apotheosis of mechanization is apparent in Gerald’s 
“incarnation of his power, a great and perfect machine, a system, an activity of pure 
order, pure mechanical repetition, repetition ad infinitum, hence eternal and infinite” 
(Lawrence, Women in Love 228).  Besides reinforcing the repetitive nature of the 
industrial gear, Lawrence exposes science or, in this case, mechanization begetting 
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mechanization over and over again.  This circular framework of Gerald’s mind—and 
heart—foreshadows the dead end where he arrives at the novel’s conclusion.  The 
mechanization loop is not a loop an industrialist can escape.  It is a self-contained view of 
production and progress that does not allow for new phenomena to develop.  Humans 
will only “evolve” by going round and round on the merry-go-round of circular 
technological advancement, ad infinitum.  Gerald is the god in his own mind because he 
adheres so vehemently to the cult of efficiency that permeates industrialization.  By 
putting humans into this framework, their value is seen only by their “instrumentality,” as 
Gerald puts it.  The worth they can have directly relates to the work they produce. 
 Unfortunately, this system sets humans up for failure because the loop continually 
pushes them to work faster and faster, which is “terrible and heartbreaking in its 
mechanicalness” (Lawrence 230).  Therefore, Gerald is not inherently corrupt and 
destined to breakdown as a machine would, but he is a victim of his own dogma, an 
ideology the industrialized world embraces along with the cult of efficiency.  Gerald must 
keep moving to be worth anything, and he is overcome with fear when he succeeds at his 
“exalted activity” of running the company down to a science:  “And once or twice lately, 
when he was alone in the evening and had nothing to do, he suddenly stood up in terror” 
and went to the mirror to look at himself and saw “the darkness in [his eyes]” (Lawrence, 
Women in Love 232).  For Gerald was “afraid that one day he would break down and be a 
purely meaningless babble lapping round a darkness” (Lawrence, Women in Love 232).  
That darkness can be seen as the Nietzschean void that one fills to hold onto meaning in a 
meaningless world.  This terror Gerald feels relates to his inability to connect to women 
other than for surface affection, and it foreshadows his breakdown on the mountain after 
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he realizes Gudrun will never be his wife and that he became a monster by almost killing 
her. 
 Such mechanical (in)humanity is ridiculous to Lawrence, who, in a letter to 
Arthur McLeod, claimed that the Futurists were rather sophomoric in their art.  Although 
he is attracted to the Futurists’ attempts “of the purging of the old forms and 
sentimentalities,” which he appreciates “for its saying—enough of this sickly cant, let us 
be honest and stick by what is in us” (“To Arthur McLeod” 180), he rejects them as “very 
young, infantile, college student[s] and medical-student[s] at [their] most blatant” (“To 
Arthur McLeod” 180).    Lawrence views Futurism as a young movement, but he does 
not see it maturing; instead, “[t]hey will progress down the purely male or intellectual or 
scientific line.  They will even use their intuition for intellectual and scientific purpose.  
The one thing about their art is that it isn’t art, but ultra scientific attempts to make 
diagrams of certain physic or mental states” (“To Arthur McLeod” 181).  The Futurists’ 
“revolt against beastly sentiment and slavish adherence to tradition and the dead mind” 
are aspects Lawrence praises in the Futurists, but he “[doesn’t] agree with them as to the 
cure and the escape”—the obvious militaristic, mechanistic nature of the movement (“To 
Arthur McLeod” 181).  From this letter, Lawrence shows he is clearly distrustful of 
scientific laws being applied to human consciousness, for this is the downfall of Gerald in 
Women in Love and a critique of the over-mechanization of thought:  inhuman desire to 
act like a machine. 
Such action leads to Marinetti’s most dehumanizing vision of a worker dying for 
the “noble” cause of construction.  Marinetti values efficient human production to such 
an extent that job sites will hear “from time to time—yes, let it happen—the harrowing 
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cry and heavy thud of a fallen construction worker,” causing Marinetti to exclaim “great 
drop of blood on the pavement!” (BFA 81-2, italics mine).  Workers are valued for 
efficiency:  Their humanity has been reduced to what their labor produces, and they are 
expected to give even the ultimate sacrifice if need be.  This sacrifice contributes to 
Marinetti’s rhetoric of technology because he values struggles to create new machines.  
Of course, his manifestos are exaggerations of hyper-industrialization, but they mirror 
Marconi and the popular press’s topoi of presenting technologies (and modernization in 
general) related to tropes of progress. 
 Progress permeates the technological and scientific literature I have examined 
from the early twentieth century.  Marinetti’s early Futurist texts demonstrate how one 
important historical avant-garde managed to reinscribe dominant tropes of progress into 
the movement’s aesthetics.  Marinetti captures the essence of progress in his texts by 
advocating the same values and practices of the larger culture; specifically, he reflects 
industrial society’s push for modernization by glorifying contemporary technologies and 
arguing for their future potential.  Because technologies marked an advanced civilization, 
the Futurists saw new technologies as a way to bring Italy further progress and become a 
world industrial leader.  Although such advocacy was an exaggeration of societal values 
and goals, Futurism embodies the ideologies favoring science and technology and 
portrays new advancements as expanding human capacity. 
New tools and techniques excited some individuals (i.e., Marinetti, Taylor, and 
the popular press writers I examined) as did the World’s Fairs or other major cultural 
events celebrating technology.  These tools can be thought of as extensions or prostheses 
for human labor and evolution.  Marinetti’s “man multiplied by the machine” (DWW 97) 
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reflects the cultural condition of modernity that views scientific and technological 
progress as human evolution:  Humans evolve by “plugging into” the new electric forces 
technology harnesses.  For example, the wireless advanced human capabilities of speech 
by allowing an individual to communicate with others around the world instantaneously.  
Of course, at the time, communications were sent through Morse code, which constrained 
one’s prose.  Marinetti saw such constraints as liberating words from syntactical “strings” 
by allowing one word to communicate an idea that took several words before.  Such 
telegraphic minimalism was not unique to Marinetti; many artists and artistic movements 
experimented with a style that reflected industrial culture’s drive for greater efficiency. 
And artists were not the only group experimenting with “efficiency.”  Marinetti’s 
texts share Frederick Taylor’s efficiency manifesto’s goal for promoting increased 
production.  Besides increased output, efficient technologies allowed life to speed up.  
Marinetti wanted speech streamlined as much as possible, and he saw the wireless as a 
practical tool for such a goal.  Whereas Marconi and the popular press promote the 
wireless specifically as an important efficient technology, and Taylor promotes scientific 
management more broadly, Marinetti violently advocates efficiency as an artistic and 
even spiritual goal.  The wireless and all technologies were tools for business, and 
industry, but Marinetti also believed they were tools for progressing away from a useless 
past.  His work shows that technologies of the early twentieth century represented 
attitudes and values of a society, an industrial society.  Because Marinetti is a product of 
modernity, as is the wireless, his work resides in the context of industrialization and mass 
culture.  Within such a context, Marinetti’s art conforms to other contemporary pro-
technological discourses with tropes of progress like Marconi and the popular press 
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employed.  In short, his work reflects the culture’s positive (albeit exaggerated) 
fascination that helps technologies become realized.  The rhetoric of technology or, 
specifically, the rhetoric of the wireless presents this new technology as a tool for today 
and tomorrow.  Technology thrusts humans toward the future, and, according to 




1.  Andreas Huyssen notes that “[m]odernists such as T. S. Eliot and Ortega y Gasset 
emphasized time and again that it was their mission to salvage the purity of high art from 
the encroachments of urbanization, massification, technological modernization, in short, 
of modern mass culture”; however, the avant-garde wished to overthrow such high-
minded pretension related to “forms of bourgeois society” (163). 
 
2.  Even D. H. Lawrence was familiar with the Futurists and claimed he had an interest in 
their works:  “I have been interested in the futurists . . . I read Marinetti’s and Paolo 
Buzzi’s manifestations and essays and Soffici’s essays on cubism and futurism.  It 
interests me very much” (“To Arthur McLeod” 180). 
 
3.  I refer to the beginning phase—or “the truly revolutionary phase” as Bondenella calls 
it (229)—as the work done from 1909 to the beginning of WWI.  Marinetti’s later work 
experiments more with performance than manifestos.  Also, the movement was co-opted 
by the fascists following WWI and, therefore, ceased to be “edgy” or avant-garde 
because the movement was now part of the establishment. 
 
4.  The concept parole in libertá is commonly translated as “words in freedom” or 
“words in liberty.”  Either is acceptable, but readers should not confuse parole in libertá 
with “free verse”—a composition Marinetti despised as reminiscent of the past.  
Marinetti’s goal was to free words from their syntactic “oppression” and let them 
communicate their essence.  According to Christopher Butler, “Marinetti’s aim, through 
the disruption of syntax, metre, and punctuation, is to produce a ‘lyrical intoxication’, 
which will abolish the reassuring musical continuities of vers libre, in favour of an 
abrupt, instantaneous, telegraphic form of communication” (173). 
 
5.  Although Marinetti was the first Futurist and Futurism was the first avant-garde 
movement, other futurisms flourished in Europe in the early twentieth century—Russian 
Futurism, Ego-Futurism, and Cubo-Futurism.  Even Vorticism, an English avant-garde 
led by Wyndam Lewis, resembled Italian Futurist aesthetics.  Futurism’s appeal could be 
found in places like Italy, France, Poland, Germany, and Russia (Calinescu; Childs; 
Nicholls; Perloff; J. White).  But, as Perloff argues, the avant-garde’s short-lived 
internationalism ended with the onset of nationalist fervor leading up to WWI (xxxvi). 
 
6.  Marinetti’s incendiary work was a major component of his public performances, such 
as his “attack” on Venice (Perloff 201-2) and the packed theater houses that stunned Ezra 
Pound (Rainey 29).  This violence and discordant noise—as the Futurists often brought 
loud speakers in order to play awful sounds for the audience—continued into the 1920s 
with the Variety Theater. 
 
7.  “Radio-bomb” is a phrase I use to demonstrate Marinetti’s desire to assault audiences 
with his manifestos and his love of destruction.  His texts reveal a strange desire to be 
beamed into the physical minds of audiences.  The ultimate “evolution” for him would be 
to actually become a radio wave to be broadcasted to the world. 
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8.  Technology was not the only movement organized around nationalism.  A political 
rally for Italy’s intervention into WWI actually started the acquaintanceship between 
Marinetti and Benito Mussolini.  Their relationship began around 1915 when the two 
were arrested for an interventionist rally (Bondanella 318).  The two men banded together 
possibly because of Marinetti’s anti-communism and his acceptance of Mussolini’s 
nationalist sentiments for a strong, united Italy.  Today, the fascist party in Italy (led by 
Mussolini’s grand-daughter) still believes in a strong free market expansionism for the 
modern Italian state, but they differ from their close right-wing allies in parliament, La 
Lega Nord, on one very fundamental issue—Italian unification.  The LN wants to divide 
Italy into separate northern and southern nations because the industrialized north feels the 
“backward” south is a blight to economic prosperity.  The fascists, on the other hand, do 
not want a divided Italy. 
 
9.  Sociologist George Ritzer’s book The McDonaldization of America describes how 
these rational ultra-efficient practices have crept into contemporary service-economy 
jobs. 
10.  Translated as POETRY BEING BORN (Marinetti, Zang Tumb 
Tumb 57). 
 
11.  Robert Frost’s 1916 poem “The Line-Gang” responds to the encroachment of 
telephone wires from the city on the New Hampshire countryside (Rhodes 62). 
 
12.  Carlo Carrá left the Futurists in 1916 after WWI (Rye 153).  Although Giovanni 
Papini was a lesser-known Futurist—who joined the movement with Soffici in 1913 (Rye 
13)—the eighth soul could have very well been Benito Mussolini’s because the novel 
was written before Marinetti’s disillusionment with the fascist dictator.  Also, the soul 
could have been Armando Mazza, another lesser known Futurist poet. 
 
13.  I call this work a “poem-manifesto” because it has polemic manifesto qualities much 
like “The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism,” and it also has poetic wireless 
imagery—energy, kilowatts, dials.  However, unlike other manifestos, Marinetti does not 
set down specific goals for his movement, and, unlike his heavily onomatopoeic poems, 
this text describes energy, bombardment, and movement using common descriptive 
adjectives and not made-up words or extravagant typefaces and font sizes. 
 
14.  This quotation encapsulates John White’s argument that the Futurists glorified the 
science fiction of electrical forces of the imagined twenty-first century. 
 
15.  In fifth grade I attempted to stimulate plant growth for a science project by running 
an electrical current through soil.  It did not work.  I do not even remember why I 
assumed electricity could be conducted through soil. 
 





17.  Another science fiction example of “reading” or perceiving electrical forces occurs in 
The Matrix.  To observers outside the Matrix, the binary code flashing on monitors 
represents action inside the Matrix, which is a “fake” world created by machines. 
 
18.  Andrew Hewitt covers Marinetti’s and other modernists’ fascistic ideologies in his 
book Fascist Modernism. 
 
19.  I have often heard my students (and others) claim that they could not live without 
their mobile phones.  I am often asked “how can you live without a cell phone or cable 
TV?”  I just do somehow. 
 
20.  However, many can point to the generic individual in poverty who happens to own a 
cell phone or subscribes to cable/satellite TV. 
 
21.  Interestingly, Snyder’s comment follows a list of prominent Europeans who “made 
wireless telegraphy possible” (59).  Also, Snyder points to “Marconi’s admirable 
triumphs” as an extension of past scientists’ work in electromagnetism (59). 
 
22.  Apparently, “the rapport of centuries between poet and audience” is an element or 
relationship of the past that Marinetti wishes to keep. 
 
23.  Seven of Nine, a popular cyborg from Star Trek Voyager, was rescued from the 
efficient Borg collective.  And John Flynn from Tron is digitized in order to enter the 




STS AND TECHNICAL COMMUNICATION:  EXPANSIVE POSSIBILITIES 
The treatment of scientific knowledge as a social construction implies 
that there is nothing epistemologically special about the nature of 
scientific knowledge:  It is merely one in a whole series of knowledge 
cultures (including, for instance, the knowledge systems pertaining to 
“primitive” tribes).  Of course, the success and failures of certain 
knowledge cultures still need to be explained, but this is to be seen as a 
sociological task, not an epistemological one.  Trevor Pinch and Wiebe 
E. Bijker (qtd. in Pool 13) 
 
 Science, Technology, and Society studies has had a growing impact on 
technical writing scholarship/pedagogy over the last three decades.  I believe my 
analysis of Marconi’s wireless is an example of a project that is essentially about 
scientific and technical communication but influenced heavily by cultural studies 
approaches of STS.  No longer is technical writing simply “nuts and bolts”; instead, 
technical writing pedagogy approaches research from historical, philosophical, and 
social perspectives.  This approach is best shown through William E. Rivers’ call for 
a more robust technical writing discipline:  He believes “[technical writing scholars] 
need a better understanding of the interactions between technical, scientific, and 
business writing done in different languages and cultures” (45).  He also supports 
using approaches to technical writing scholarship that lie outside the field; in fact, he 
specifically mentions the disciplines of literature and literary criticism as two areas to 
“incorporate into our bag of analytical tools” for studying technical writing (45).  My 
impetus for pursuing this dissertation initially came from Rivers’ article.1 
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My dissertation’s case study on Marconi’s wireless addresses Rivers’ call 
because the invention was a product not just of a lab but of a culture.  The wireless 
existed because rhetoric shaped its value and viability in relation to cultural attitudes, 
values, and practices.  The wireless was popular and successful because it was made 
to fit into the time period’s desires.  However, lay audiences, believing in the 
neutrality of language, do not always notice that discourse “constructs” technologies 
and sciences.  One popular notion of technical and scientific communication is that 
those discourses communicate facts with singular interpretations derived effortlessly 
from experiments; unfortunately, such an idea ignores the social and community 
construction of science and technology.  Just as famous scientists such as Einstein, 
Watson, Crick, Curie, and Salk had to communicate their findings to receptive 
audiences through rhetoric, Marconi and pro-Marconi writers had to employ rhetoric 
to construct the wireless as a viable technology that fit within industrial cultures.  
Popular representations aided the rhetorical construction of Marconi’s wireless thus 
creating interest in the invention.  The wireless was progress, evolution, efficiency; it 
had an image of prosperity and viability before it became a black box.  As a cultural 
artifact, the wireless, or rather, the success of the wireless, suggests that the discourse 
surrounding it and the culture’s overall fascination with technology helped audiences 
believe in the wireless and, therefore, realize it.  Furthermore, Marinetti’s 
fetishization of the wireless demonstrates a cultural fascination but through an 
exaggerated medium—avant-garde art.  Without positive discourse, the wireless 
would not have become a realized technology, and, without its reinscription into 
Futurist aesthetics, it would not have been able to represent the early twentieth 
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century’s value for hyper-industrialization.  After all, Marinetti’s love of efficiency 
through art is not very different from Taylor’s blueprint for industrial efficiency. 
 Further analysis of other texts would enrich this study.  Patent documents or 
other technical specifications would offer revelations on technical writing 
conventions.  Business communication such as marketing texts, business proposals, 
and shareholder reports could be examined to analyze the rhetorical strategies 
employed in that particular discourse convention.  However, the wireless was a 
product that was more than a “sound,” profitable technical application; it was an 
invention that held many early twentieth century values.  Therefore, I could expand 
the modernist literature I examine to include more descriptions of the wireless from 
the perspectives of other artists. 
The wireless did permeate Western culture in the early twentieth century, and 
I believe I could locate more tropes of progress associated with wireless descriptions.  
Being labeled as a progressive technology suggests the wireless “spoke” to the 
cultural desire to advance through machines.  The wireless was promoted as an 
evolutionary feat, a marker of industrial progress, just as Edison’s electrical works 
projects were seen in places like San Francisco and Louisville (Bazerman 219).  
Analyzing such cultural values is the STS influence of my dissertation, reflecting a 
growing interest in broader technical writing scholarship.  Therefore, the pedagogical 
base of technical writing scholarship has expanded to incorporate the theories and 
methodologies of STS, especially the case study approach to analyzing the rhetorics 
of technologies and sciences.  Technical writing students can benefit from work 
outside of “nuts and bolts” discussions of layout and design.  If technology is a 
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semiotic system as I suggest in the Introduction, bringing broader cultural concerns 
into the classroom ought to enable discussions and further inquiry into technical 
communication history. 
 I believe this dissertation’s investigative approach to Marconi’s wireless can 
be expanded or redirected in several ways.  First, more emphasis should be placed on 
pedagogical implications of analyzing the discourse of an historical 
phenomenon/apparatus.  Students should learn that science and technology do not 
exist without rhetoric:  Physical inventions and impressive theories are not realizable 
without community acceptance.  Second, tracing the discourse surrounding radio 
innovations after Marconi’s “black box” would allow for an important historical 
analysis of the trends of rhetoric surrounding the radio.  Such a direction would help 
demonstrate the way(s) in which progress continued to be associated with this 
invention or even mass communication in general.  Third, contrasting pro-Marconi 
rhetoric with anti-Marconi rhetoric and the rhetoric surrounding other wireless 
pursuits of the early twentieth century would help identify instances where Marconi’s 
wireless’s rhetoric was similar or dissimilar to that of contemporary inventions.  I 
believe this research would help readers better understand why Marconi is historically 
seen as the inventor of the radio even though he mainly assembled the apparatus.  I 
briefly indicate that a major reason for Marconi’s title of “father of the radio” comes 
from his celebrity status as being the first to excite the world with his invention.  
Finally, each chapter could be expanded to analyze more instances where the 
wireless’s rhetoric and literary value demonstrate why the invention was a 
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monumental early twentieth-century technology that embodied particular tropes of 
progress—speed, efficiency, evolution, ahistoricity, and profitability. 
 We can always “grab more actors” as Bruno Latour says.  These new actors 
will tell us new stories and support former positions.  Technologies become realized 
because potential users perceive or are made to perceive their usefulness.  We accept 
technologies because they become familiar to our values and practices.  Likewise, we 
reject technologies when they disrupt our way of life.  Even though individuals may 
reject certain technologies, society may collectively accept technologies perceived as 





1.  Of course, my initial interest of wanting to examine technical writing in a larger 
social context was too broad and unorganized until the guidance I got in English 620 
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APPENDIX 
List of Abbreviations 
 
BFA “Birth of Futurist Aesthetics” 
 
DWW Destruction of Syntax-[Wireless Imagination]-Words in Freedom 
 
EW “Electrical War (A Futurist Vision-Hypothesis)” 
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